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 The research presented in this dissertation details the development of a new 
probabilistic fracture mechanics model of corrosion fatigue failure of steel CNG bus 
cylinders.  This model was used to estimate the frequency of leakage or catastrophic 
rupture, due to the propagation of a micro-crack on the inside, outside or transition 
surface, of hemispherical and flat-bottom cylinder designs, in assessing the fire and 
explosion fatality risks associated with a typical CNG bus.  Quantitative assessment 
of the fire and explosion fatality risk was completed by analytically modeling the 
postulated fire scenarios from initial release of natural gas from a failed cylinder.  The 
  
frequency of the initiating events, likelihood of subsequent events leading to a fire or 
explosive event was combined with the consequence of each event in a Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) model to estimate the overall risk.  Epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties in the approach was evaluated using a combination of parametric 
modeling, conservative estimation and engineering judgment. 
 
 Direct computation of the fire fatality risk associated with diesel powered 
buses is possible because these are mature technologies for which historical 
performance data are available.  Due to the limited experience, fatal incident data for 
CNG buses fleets are minimal.  This study therefore had to rely on analytical 
modeling of failures, dynamics of fire initiation and propagation along with the 
subsequent events in this PRA approach.  The new methodology provides guidance 
on performing risk assessment of other novel technologies presently being developed 
or for which actuarial performance data is not available.  
 
 This study predicts that the mean fire fatality risk for a typical CNG bus is 
approximately 23 fatalities per 100-million miles for all persons involved, including 
bus passengers.  Estimated CNG bus passengers mean risk is 14.4 fatalities per 100-
million miles or 63% of fire fatalities.  Based on historical data, diesel school bus 
mean fire fatality risk is 0.091 and 0.0007 per 100-million miles for all people and 
bus-passengers respectively.  One can therefore reasonably conclude that CNG school 
buses are expected to be more prone to fire fatality by 250 times that of diesel buses, 
with the bus passengers being more at risk by over four orders of magnitude.  
  
Explosion due to detonation and deflagration of a flammable vapor cloud within a bus 
or building, for which there is some historical events, is a major contributor, to this 
increased risk, a phenomenon not normally associated with diesel fuel. 
 
 The overall mean fire risk frequency has also been estimated at 2.23 × 10-3 
fatalities/bus/year.  The 5% and 95% uncertainty bounds are 1.18 × 10-4 and 8.83 × 
10-3 respectively.  These results provide the foundation for doing comparative 
analysis of CNG with other technologies by combining the estimated mean fire 
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A previous study to assess the fire safety risk associated with Compressed Natural 
Gas (CNG) vehicle system, comprising primarily of a typical school bus and supporting fuel 
infrastructure was conducted by the Center for Technology Risk Studies (CTRS) at the 
University of Maryland, in 2002.  The intention of this study was to assess the fire safety 
risks of CNG buses notwithstanding their significant potential environmental and health 
benefits.  A qualitative evaluation of the hazards associated with the system, using a system 
safety scenario driven technique was conducted as a precursor.  All important fire scenarios 
originate from component failures, excepting fires from electro-static discharge.  This 
informed a subsequent failure mode and effects analysis using the MIL-STD-1629 standard 
which provided the initiating events used in the quantitative risk assessment.  The 
quantitative study utilized probabilistic assessment methods as practiced in nuclear, process 
and aerospace industries.  Computation of the frequency of occurrence of the initiating events 
was done using published generic failure data for similar components.  The likelihood of 
subsequent events to the postulated release of natural gas was estimated using actuarial data, 
generic data and engineering judgment.  Analytical modeling of fuel dispersion and mixing 
was outside the scope of that study.  Consequence of the fire scenarios considered, were 
computed by assuming fatality would occur if an individual was subjected to 25kW/m2 of 
heat flux for 1 minute.  Simplified approaches were used to compute the heat flux produced 
and the likelihood of ignition of a natural gas vapor cloud. 
 
The CTRS study predicted that mean fire fatality risk for a typical CNG bus was 




Mean estimates of 0.16 fatalities per 100-million miles for bus passengers was more than two 
orders of magnitude greater than for a similar diesel bus.  Overall predicted fire fatality risk 
was 2.5 times greater for CNG buses than diesel buses.  The component that contributed 
most to the frequency of gradual and catastrophic release of natural gas was the failure rate of 
the CNG cylinder with the integral pressure relief device.  The cylinder was also the 
component that contributed most to risk reduction based on the Birnbaum reliability 
importance measures. Additionally failure of the cylinder contributed most to the creation of 
a fireball or a large unconfined vapor cloud flash fire, with estimated completely lethal 
effects in the exposure zones. 
 
Intuitively the PRA results agreed with the very small amount of historical data 
available on CNG vehicle fires.  The sensitivity of these results to the generic failure rate 
data, along with the need to develop a robust methodology for computing CNG vehicle risk, 
prompted this research.  A physics of failure approach to estimate mean time to failure of 
cylinders from which a frequency of failure could be derived was considered most 
appropriate.  Analytical methods for estimating consequence of fire scenarios were also 
considered necessary to improve on the simplified approaches used in the previous study.  
Overall this new methodology of computing the risk of CNG buses serves as a template for 
conducting risk assessment for novel technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells, gasoline-
electric hybrids, liquid natural gas, and others that may be contemplated in the future.  The 
results from this risk assessment could be combined with the environmental and health 
benefits to be gained in order to arrive at an assessment of the suitability of each technology 




design standards and maintenance practices in reducing the fire and explosion risks 
associated with existing CNG buses.  
 
Major funding for the initial study, which was published in report CTRS-MC1-02 by 
the Center for Technical Risk Studies, was provide by International Truck and Engine 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objective and Scope of Study 
Analytical modeling of reliability and comprehensive risk analysis of compressed 
natural gas (CNG) fueled vehicles and systems have never been attempted because of the 
sparsity of failure and accidental data.  This is largely due to the small number of such 
vehicles in operation, and the technology being relatively new when compared with 
diesel and gasoline engines.  Where such data exist, estimation of the failure frequencies 
of system components is not possible.  This is due in part to the lack of applicable models 
that can combine actuarial data and operational experience with expert opinions, while 
reducing aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. 
  
The primary objective of this research is to develop an analytical model of the 
predominant failure mechanisms and to estimate the fire safety risks associated with a 
typical CNG bus, with its associated fuel infrastructure.  A secondary objective is to 
provide a methodology for conducting risk analysis of vehicular systems using alternative 
fuels being contemplated for mass transit.  Finally, once absolute risk of CNG buses can 
be established, the societal risk can be compared with other similar technology to help 
guide the development of applicable regulations.  This includes physics based inspection 
intervals, safe operating life and replacement plan. 
  
Compressed natural gas bus fuel system components are subject to degradation 




the storage cylinder to be the component with the highest risk.  This also is the most 
vulnerable component in the system, due to the presence of corrosive constituents in the 
CNG and frequent charging at high pressures in a filling station and discharging the 
cylinders as the fuel is consumed.  Physics of failure modeling is used to estimate the 
frequency of leakage and rupture of the CNG cylinders.  
 
 This analytical model features probabilistic facture mechanics modeling of the 
associated failure mechanisms.  The result of which is the determination of the 
distribution of the frequency of occurrence of cylinder failure leading to a release of 
CNG, while incorporating impact of manufacturing process, material properties and 
inspection methodology in a typical bus.  A risk model is subsequently developed by 
combining the frequency of occurrence of gas release scenarios along with the likelihood 
of subsequence events leading to a fire, and the consequence of the resulting fire.  The 
output from this model is the absolute risk of individual CNG bus fire events. 
 
Consequence of a cylinder failure is modeled analytically by evaluating the 
thermodynamics of the discharge of fuel into the air and the chemical kinetics of each 
scenario leading to a premixed or diffusion fire.   The hazards associated with gaseous 
release of CNG are evaluated using thermo-chemistry of methane which is the 
predominant constituent in CNG.  The ignition, burning rates and plume formation is 
evaluated and the heat flux generated is used to determine the vulnerability of selected 
targets.  Compressibility effects above sonic velocity leading to detonation are considered 




consequence is determined to occur when the heat flux incident on persons exceed that 
required to cause serious injury and death.  Deaths due to explosions are caused by whole 
body translation resulting in injuries as well as overpressure effects on body tissue.  
 
The determination of the total risk will be achieved by combining the frequency 
of occurrence of events leading to the gaseous release, the probabilities associated with 
subsequent scenarios and the consequence of each fire scenario. 
 
1.2 Background 
The growing use of natural gas as a fuel for vehicles is due in part to economic 
and environmental benefits.  Compressed natural gas on an energy-equivalent basis is 
lower in price than the conventional diesel and gasoline fuels.  The emission levels are 
much lower affording cleaner air quality than conventional diesel and gasoline fuels. 
 
Compressed natural gas has to be stored at high pressures in cylinders to increase 
the specific energy of the fuel, for reasonable mileage efficiency between refueling. The 
working pressure of the CNG cylinders has not been defined although the existing 
standard, NGV 2, specifies a service pressure of between 2400 and 4350 psi [2].  The 
storage of gas at this high pressure has implications for fatality risk and presents 
challenges for the safety and reliability of the CNG cylinders throughout their anticipated 
long service life.  
A recent research effort [1] undertaken by the Center for Technology Risk Studies 




powered school buses is between 2-3 times more than diesel buses for all fatalities (those 
inside and outside the bus) and more than two orders of magnitude for bus passengers.     
Ensuring the continued safe and reliable operation of Natural Gas Vehicles (NGV) is 
important to their economic viability and public acceptance. 
 
In the NGV the CNG cylinder is the most critical in addressing fatality risk, since 
it stores gas at high pressures.  The fuel cylinder failure, researched and documented in 
[1] was also found to be one of the major contributors to the absolute risk computed and 
uncertainty in the risk results.  There are many different types of cylinders such as all 
metal, over wrapped, consisting of a metal liner and composite over-wrap, or all 
composite cylinders consisting of a polymer liner and composite over-wrap.  Recent 
studies [3,4] have detected significant degradation defects in cylinders.  Incidents 
involving CNG failures are summarized in [1] which also includes fatalities. 
 
Steel cylinders are currently more widely used (over 90%) and are therefore the 
focus of this study.  These cylinders are the heaviest components of the fuel system and 
are unlikely to be a viable long-term option in the automotive market.  Notwithstanding 
this, steel cylinders have advantages relative to the more advanced designs inasmuch as 
they are a well established technology and have complied with most of the regulations 
relating to CNG cylinders.  These cylinders are covered by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation specification [5].  This specification allows a thinner and more highly 




testing every five (5) years is the only test specified in the governing regulations [2] as 
being mandatory, in order to guarantee reliability and fail safe operations. 
 
Hydrostatic testing is costly since it requires removal of the cylinder from the 
vehicle and shipment to a certified laboratory for testing.  The limitation of hydrostatic 
testing in ensuring the safety of cylinders is highlighted when one considers the expected 
failure mechanisms of the cylinders.  Recent research [3,4], [7] has shown that the 
existing provisions are inadequate to detect the expected forms of damage that could lead 
to failure.  General corrosion which hydrostatic testing is designed to detect is a probable 
degradation mechanism.  However, it does not significantly reduce the wall thickness to 
make it detectable with hydrostatic testing.  Hydrostatic testing will therefore not detect 
failure mechanisms that have significant impact on the life of a typical cylinder, or 
provide adequate indication of the degradation that has occurred. 
    
Catastrophic ruptures will result from localized damage such as that which occurs 
from the growth of cracks, which originate at either corrosion pits or pre-existing 
manufacturing defects.  Leakage will occur when such cracks grow until they penetrate 
the cylinder wall without the crack becoming unstable.  The existence of cracks or the 
growth process cannot be detected using the standard hydrostatic test. 
 
It is therefore imperative that in the absence of adequate testing procedures, 
analytical methods must be developed that are physics based and which can be used to 




significant failure mechanisms is required in order to determine the frequency of 
occurrence of cylinder failure.  Determination of the rate of propagation of defects to 
failure will facilitate the development of appropriate non-destructive examination (NDE) 
inspection methodologies and intervals.  The results of inspections could also be used to 
project remaining life from which cylinder replacement plans can be developed or 
inspection interval revised accordingly. 
  
1.3 Design and Construction of CNG Cylinders 
Compressed natural gas cylinders have been designed to satisfy a variety of 
needs: They must be capable of storing gas at high pressures in order to reach a high 
specific energy content of the fuel; Weight must be kept to a minimum, and 
demonstratively safe over the required life, and cost must not be more than a small 
fraction of the vehicle overall cost. There are four types of cylinders in use for NGV.   
They are designated as follows: 
 Type 1 - All-metal construction 
 Type 2 - Metal liner reinforced with hoop-wrapped filaments in a resin matrix. 
 Type 3 - Metal liner reinforced with full-wrapped filament in a resin matrix. 
 Type 4 - Plastic liner reinforced with full-wrapped filaments in a resin matrix. 
 
 1.3.1 Steel Type 1 Cylinders 
These are the most widely used design (91.7 %) and have been in NGV service, 
since 1974 with an estimated 1.5 million in service.  Steel cylinders are usually 




thinner the wall and the lighter the cylinder.  Susceptibility to sulphide stress corrosion 
cracking due to small amounts of H2S present in the natural gas increases with increasing 
strength.  In the U.S., cylinders having hardness of RC 22 (Rockwell C scale) are used.  In 
other countries, cylinders with hardness numbers as high as RC 33 are permitted.  Typical 
mechanical properties associated with these hardness numbers are shown in Table 1. 
 






MPa ( ksi) 
% 
Elongation 
22 654 (95) 759 (110) - 
33 862 (125) 952 (138) 20 
 
 
Six types of steels are permitted for use as material in the manufacturing of NGV fuel 
cylinders under the Department of Transportation’s governing standard, DOT-3AA.  
Most cylinders are however made from the highly alloyed AISI 4130X steel, containing 
Chromium and Molybdenum.  Fined grained steel such as 15B30 containing higher 
manganese content micro-alloyed with Boron as well as marageing steels have been 
experimented with in the past, but without widespread success.  Research has focused on 
two micro structural variations of the 4130X alloyed steel.  These are: 
• 4130-M, Martensitic micro-structure achieved in the rapidly quenched regions 
of the cylinder such as the sidewalls. 
• 4130-B, Bainitic micro-structure typical of regions of the cylinder where 





The chemical composition of steels used to manufacture cylinders is shown in Table1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 Chemical Composition Limits for DOT-3AA Alloyed Steels 
 
Steel 
Designation Chemical Composition in Weight (%) 


























Because of the prevalence of the AISI 4130X steel in service and the extensive fracture 
analysis research done on the two-micro structure variations (4130-M and 4130-B), only 
the failure mechanisms of this type  is considered in this research. 
 
1.3.2 Aluminum Type 1 Cylinders   
All-aluminum cylinders have historically been made from AA 6061-T6 and AA 
7032.  Only a fraction of these, when compared with steel cylinders, are in service so 
they will not be considered further in this analysis or model development. 
1.3.3 Type 2 Hoop-Wrapped Cylinders   
Hoop wrapped cylinders are the second most widely used design and were 
introduced in 1983.  There are estimated an 80,000 units in service or approximately 4.9 
% of NGV cylinders.  This design is based on the ability of the liner (without the hoop-
wrapping) to contain the maximum fill pressure, allowing for the use of higher fiber 
stress levels than is employed in fully wrapped designs.  The design philosophy of hoop 




as a long cylinder of the same diameter and wall thickness.  The weaker cylindrical 
portion of a thinner-walled cylinder is wrapped to achieve a comparable pressure 
retaining capability as in the nearly hemispherical ends.  Further consideration will not be 
given to this design in the ensuing analysis and modeling. 
1.3.4 Type 3 Full-Wrapped Cylinders   
 This design was introduced in 1992 and there are about 40,000 units in service or 
approximately 2.4 % of CNG cylinders.  It consists of a metal liner wrapped with 
continuous filaments in a resin matrix.  In this design, partial load sharing takes place 
between the metal liner and the composite wrap.  Due to this load sharing, the long-term 
integrity of the composite is more critical to the cylinder durability and safety.  No further 
consideration will be given in the modeling and analysis. 
1.3.5 Type 4 Full-Wrapped Cylinders  
Composite cylinders were introduced into the NGV market in 1993 with about  
15,000 units in service, representing approximately 0.9 % of usage.  The liner is non-
load-bearing plastic, making them very lightweight.  The composite bears the entire load 
and therefore the cylinder’s safety relies on the durability of the composite.  Composite 
cylinders while, offering substantially improved performance on a pressure per weight 
basis, can fail in a multiplicity of modes that are accounted for through accelerated life 
testing and conservatism in design.  These modes will not be evaluated in this research. 
In a report on compressed natural gas safety [8] evaluations of CNG cylinders were made 
on the basis of cylinder designs, material of construction and inspection measures utilized 




the observed degradation of certain materials while in service and the likelihood that such 
degradation could occur.  The results of the risk assessments show that: 
• Steel is generally safer than aluminum due to the superior impact, fire and 
corrosion performance. 
• Type 1 cylinders are generally safer than composite-designs as Type 1 designs are 
highly resistant to external damage. 
• Hoop-wrapped designs are generally safer than full-wrapped designs due to the 
redundancy of the liner design. 
• Carbon fiber is generally safer than other fiber types due to the superior resistance 
to stress rupture, fatigue, environment attack and thermal stresses. 
• Type 3 designs offer advantage over Type 4 designs because the metal liner offers 
more resistance to leak and liner-boss interface concerns. 
 
From this analysis it was assumed that the physical modeling of the failure mechanisms 
of Type 1 steel cylinders would give the lower bound representation of the risk of the 
entire CNG cylinder population due to its superior performance.  The risk determined 
from this modeling approach would be the lower limit of the expected absolute risk of 
using CNG cylinders. 
 
1.4 Manufacture of Steel CNG Cylinders from Stock Material 
The three main fabrication technologies [8] for all steel cylinders is well 
established.  The processes involve forming the stock metal, spinning to form the neck, 




a heat treatment processing.  This section describes the manufacturing processes used in 
the fabrication of CNG steel cylinders.  The three different methods are a result of the 
differences in the form of the raw material employed. 
1.4.1 Billet Stock Process 
The billet pierce method which is shown schematically in Figure 1.1 is capable of 
producing high pressure gas storage cylinders with diameters of up to 20 inches.  The raw 
material is a solid steel billet ranging in size from 14 to 20 inches square and from 40 to 
60 inches long.  After heating to a temperature of about 2,300 F, the billet is formed into 
a solid cylindrical shape by forging in a closed die forging press.  A hole is subsequently 
pierced in the center of the billet.  Currently, this technology is used to produce cylinders 
in the 8 to 11 inches diameter range. 
 
The drawing process involves the re-heating of the pierced billet to 2,300 F which 
is subsequently placed on a mandrel in a horizontal draw bench.  The mandrel moves the 
piece through a series of ring dies which progressively reduce the outside diameter and 
elongate it on the mandrel.  Further reduction and elongation are possible using the same 



















Figure 1.1   Schematic Diagram of Billet Stock Process 
 
As the drawing operations induced high stresses in the work piece, intermediate heat 
treating or annealing is required.  The annealing process involves heating the steel to 
1,800 °F and cooling it in air.  Annealing not only removes stresses, but also softens the 
work piece by altering the mechanical properties and refining the grain structure of the 
steel through re-crystallization.  Shot Blasting is sometimes used to relieve stress in the 
newly formed cylinder.  At the completion of the drawing operations, the cylinder is 
inspected using ultra-sonic and other NDE techniques to determine the wall thickness and 
surface quality. 
 
The Spinning operation involves square cutting the open end of the newly formed 
cylinder and heating it to a dull red color.  It is then inserted in the hollow spindle of a 
lathe-type machine and rotated at speeds of 600 to 1,200 rpm.  A spinning tool is fed 
against the cylinder and moved in a sweeping motion from the outside diameter to form 




work piece is sufficient to form a weld and completely close the open end.  The process 




Figure 1.2   Schematic of Steel Cylinder Neck Formation and End Closing 
 
The fabricated cylinder is quenched and tempered to achieve the desired strength, 
hardness and toughness.  The steel is first heated to above the critical reform temperature, 
approximately 1,500 to 1,600°F and then cooled rapidly by immersion in an oil or water 
bath.  The resulting Martensitic micro-structure is extremely hard and brittle.  The 
cylinder is then tempered to reduce the hardness and increase the toughness or fracture 
resistance of the steel.  The tempering process is accomplished by heating the cylinder to 
an intermediate temperature of about 1,000°F, holding it at this temperature for an 
appropriate length of time, allowing the transformation of the grain structure, and then 





The neck region of the cylinder is ported and threaded to accommodate the valve, after 
the heat treatment.  This valve has a pressure relief valve integrated into it.  The interior 
surface is first shot blasted to remove all scale from the heat treatment and then 
chemically washed.  The cylinder is then tested for hardness and ultrasonic inspection 
done to check for cracks and other defects.  Hydrostatic testing is also done following 
which an external coating is applied. 
 
1.4.2 Plate Stock Process 
The manufacture of steel cylinders using the plate stock process starts with steel 
plates as stock material.  The steel coils are prepared by first drawing in stages in a 
vertical press followed by deep drawing as shown in Figure 1.3, and ironing in a 
horizontal press to flatten.  The steel coils are cut into blanks from which the cylinders 
are formed.  Intermediate annealing between the drawing operations is critical to ensure a 
relatively stress-free and malleable work-piece.  Chemical treatment and lubrication is 




















Following the formation of the cylindrical shape, the spinning operation is then 
undertaken to form the neck and close the cylindrical end.  It is similar to the one 
employed for the neck fabrication of cylinders from billet stock.  The ends are ported and 
threaded and the cylinders are subsequently quenched and tempered in a similar process 
to the one detailed in the Billet Stock process and shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
The cylinder walls are inspected visually and with ultrasonic methods at the end 
of the deep drawing process.  After heat treatment the material is checked for tensile and 
hardness properties.  Hydrostatic testing is the final procedure following which an 
external coating is applied to the cylinders as was the case for the Billet Stock process. 
 
1.4.3 Tube Stock Process 
The process of manufacturing cylinders from tube stock is less costly than the two 
processes detailed above.  The starting stock is seamless tubes of about 15 inches 




spinning one end of the cut tube until it is closed.  The tube is then subject to a series of 
deep drawing and intermediate annealing cycles to thin the wall and elongate the 
cylinder.  
 
Base shaping operations is used to form the flat bottom and hemi-spherical end of 
the cylinders.  This operation is conducted with precision, ensuring that there is 
uniformity throughout the thickness.  Final spinning, porting, threading, heat treatment, 
inspection, testing and painting are performed in a manner similar to the process 
previously described for the other two manufacturing methods mentioned previously. 
 
1.5 Cylinder Inspection and Testing Procedures 
There are three routine inspection or testing procedures that are done on NGV 
cylinders.  Visual inspection is mandatory under the ANSI/NGV2 standard [2], every 
three years, following manufacturing and deployment of the cylinder.  Non-Destructive 
Examination is recommended by the same standard for all cylinders manufactured and 
hydrostatic testing every five years.  Both tests are intended to ensure the structural 
integrity of each cylinder.  Other tests have been developed and used to examine 
cylinders especially during routine inspection but none of these tests have been found to 
be a sufficiently reliable in detecting and characterizing flaws.  The testing methods are 
now reviewed for their effectiveness, in detecting crack-like flaws that originate during 
the manufacturing process, or cause by general degradation of the cylinder material while 





1.5.1 Hydrostatic Testing  
Hydrostatic testing is required for re-certification of compressed gas (e.g., air and 
nitrogen) cylinders.  The effectiveness and appropriateness of this practice for CNG 
cylinders are open to some questions.  As a result this testing procedure has been 
withdrawn as a required test since it was determined to be inadequate for detecting cracks 
and crack growth in the cylinder wall [2].  This is the most likely degradation process 
leading to the observed failure modes of CNG cylinders [7].  Hydrostatic testing is more 
suitable to detect section thinning due to localized corrosion which is not one of the 
failure mechanisms being considered for CNG cylinders. 
1.5.2 Non-Destructive/Acoustic Emissions Testing 
Acoustic Emissions (AE) testing is a non-destructive testing (NDT) technique 
used in various industries for evaluating the fitness of structures including tubes and 
cylinders.  Neither existing DOT-3AA [9] specified cylinders, nor existing NGV2-2000 
[2] cylinders have regulations that identify AE or other NDT methods as an approved in-
service inspection techniques.  Therefore, the use of AE in place of detailed visual 
inspection is only done with approval of the cylinder manufacturer. 
 
AE and other NDT techniques were approved by the revised NGV2-2000 
standard in production tests.  This is to qualify a cylinder as being free from defects that 
exceed a specific fracture significant size.  The application of these techniques is in 
accordance with ASTM E647 [10] and other applicable standards.  Research currently 
being undertaken and pending revisions to the ANSI/NGV2 standard opens the potential 




NDT inspection techniques in place of detailed visual inspection requires the approval of 
the cylinder manufacturer.  The Gas Research Institute (GRI) recommends that users 
consult the cylinder manufacturer for guidance on the use of AE or other NDT 
techniques. 
1.5.3 Visual Inspection 
Research indicates that periodic general and detailed visual inspections of CNG 
cylinders are a prudent and cost-effective means of addressing cylinder safety.  General 
visual inspection, recommended by GRI, describes how to evaluate the visible areas of 
the cylinder for signs of external damage or abuse.  Owner and operators are encouraged 
to develop awareness among vehicle drivers and mechanics on warning signs to look for 
when undertaking general visual inspection of NGV cylinders.  The NGV2-2000 standard 
has some guideline for performing such inspections and the qualification of inspectors.  
Warning signs of damage or abuse that may compromise cylinder integrity includes: cuts, 
gouges, abrasions, discoloration, broken fibers, loose brackets, damaged gaskets, and heat 
damage.  The general inspections are part of a normal preventive maintenance protocol. 
 
Presently, NGV2 states that a detailed visual inspection should be conducted 
every three years.  FMVSS 304-designed cylinders [11] require this examination every 
three years or 36,000 miles.  This procedure involves a trained and experienced third-
party or in-house individual who possesses a thorough understanding of CNG cylinders 






General visual inspection on a periodic basis by fleet vehicle operators and / or 
mechanics who have some general training, coupled with detailed visual inspection on a 
three-year basis, as referred to in the ANSI/NGV2 standard could constitute a suitable 
program for inspection of compressed gas cylinders for NGVs, providing that all defects 
were visible to the naked eye.  This however is the not the case and continued 
degradation of cylinders between inspections will lead to failures in service which has 
been the experience. 
 
1.6 Motivation for This Research 
The description of the manufacturing process highlights its potential to introduce defects.  
These defects, if they continue to grow after leaving the inspection process when the 
cylinder is manufactured, will very likely go undetected by the existing testing procedure 
mandated by the NGV-2 standard.  This is unless they are on the outside of a cylinder and 
easily detectible with visual inspection.  Even if a crack or crack like defect is detected 
there is no basis for determining its effect on the remaining life of a cylinder. 
 
The existing state of affairs as it relates to CNG cylinders is that there is a high 
probability that defects can grow undetected from a sub-critical crack size through the 
sidewall of a cylinder causing leakage.  Unstable crack growth can also occur leading to 
catastrophic failure of a defective cylinder.  Even if a defect is found on the surface of a 
cylinder using present inspection methods, there are no analytical methods developed and 





In the foregoing it has been demonstrated that a physics based model that can analytically 
model the predominant failure mechanisms of a typical CNG cylinder is necessary.  This 
is the motivation for conducting this research.  The rationale is that once such a model is 
developed the frequency of occurrence of failures due to the un-detected degradation of 
cylinder and the attendant consequences, including fire fatality, can be determined.   
 
Additionally the analytical model will provide a method to fleet owners and 
operators for estimating the remaining life of a cylinder when defects have been found 
during the inspection process.  The method of developing this physics of failure model 




CHAPTER 2: PHYSICS OF CYLINDER FAILURE 
2.1 Factor Contributing to Cylinder Failure 
The primary factors that contribute most in determining CNG cylinder life is 
diagrammatically represented in the conceptual model shown in Figure 2.1.   The factors 
including material property, operating profile, environmental conditions, cylinder 
geometry and manufacturing process significantly impact the degradation process and 
ultimately the time or the number of cycles to failure.  Their influence is incorporated in 
the physics of failure model either in development of the mathematical model that best 
describes the failure mechanisms, or the rate at which the degradation process occurs 
leading to cylinder failure. 
 
Some factors such as cylinder geometry and operating profile have been analyzed 
in the past within the context of fracture mechanics in order to develop deterministic 
models of the growth of preexisting cracks in the material [3 – 4].  Other research efforts 
have assessed the effects of environmental conditions in determining the degradation 
process and its effect on the material properties in defining an appropriate criterion for 


























Figure 2.1   Conceptual Cylinder Life Modeling 
 
A combination of approaches will be used to incorporate the effects of these 
factors in analyzing the physics of cylinder failure, and developing a completely new 
model of CNG cylinder life.  Some of these factors will contribute to or determine the 
basic input parameters to this model.   Other factors such as operating profile and 
material properties combined to define the cylinder failure criterion.   
 
In developing the physical model, it is assumed that the predominant degradation 
mechanism could be reduced to a single model with uncertain parameters.  The physical 




influence of the input parameters shown in Figure 2.1.  It has a foundation based on 
deterministic fracture mechanics.  The life of the cylinder is determined by the rate of 
degradation and the material fracture behavior.  The parameters of the deterministic 
model and the material properties that are used to assess when failure is likely to occur 
are considered to be random variables, which could be fitted to a parametric distribution.  
Once the deterministic fracture mechanics model is available and the distribution of the 
random variables defined, then the failure probability as a function of time, cycles or load 
can be evaluated.   
 
Determination of the failure frequency is subjected to two well established types of 
uncertainty: epistemic and aleatory.   
 
Aleatory uncertainty arises as a result of: 
1. Inherent randomness in the physical processes that result in cylinder failure such 
as existence of flaws and fracture toughness of the material. 
2. Variability due to incomplete life distribution models selected to represent the 
crack growth phenomenon. 
3. Incompleteness in the parameter selection to define corrosion fatigue 
phenomenon. 
4. Inadequate definition of the inter-relation between the parameters in the complex 
process of crack propagation to instability. 





Epistemic uncertainties exist because of: 
1. Statistical uncertainties due to the use of limited information to estimate the 
parameters of the fracture mechanics model.  
2. Simplifying assumptions made in preparation of the mathematical model. 
 
By quantifying the uncertainties, for a given operating profile imposed on the physical 
model, we are able to determine the expected life of each cylinder in a robust procedure 
with some measure of confidence.  The influence of the input factors in defining the 
failure mechanism of a CNG cylinder is now detailed below. 
 
2.1.1 Manufacturing Process 
Folds, cracks and other defects may be introduced during the manufacturing 
process.  Nucleation and growth of these defects under the influence of cyclic stresses 
and contaminants in the CNG are the life limiting processes that produce the failure 
mechanisms in all steel cylinders [12]. 
  
Additionally the spinning operations shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, creates a 
large bending moment in the sidewall-bottom transition region as well as the sidewall-
neck region.  This can promote growth of circumferential crack, initiating on either the 




bending stresses and these stresses are higher at the surface of the metal than at the root 
of the crack, the crack can grow very long and uniform in depth.   
 
2.1.2 Environmental Condition 
The principal corrosion contaminant in U.S. natural gas supplied to gas 
compression stations are carbon dioxide (CO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S), other sulphur 
species, oxygen and water [12 - 13].  Natural gas suppliers in the U.S do not routinely 
analyze their product for H2S, other sulphur species and water.  It has been demonstrated 
that water is the key constituent since none of the other contaminants produced 
significant corrosion of cylinder materials in the absence of liquid water or vapor.   
 
Available analyses of the U.S. natural gases from transmission pipelines and 
distribution systems indicate that corrosive contaminants in natural gas generally are well 
within limits set by transmission companies and by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation.  These limits apply to natural gas entering transmission pipelines and 
natural gas used in CNG services, respectively.  The only exception is water vapor which 
is very high in some distribution lines [12].  The maximum water vapor limit allowed by 
the NFPA standard (7 lbs/mmcf) enables liquid water to form in compressed gas 
cylinders under certain condition of temperature and pressure.  Furthermore, it must also 
be pointed out that the formation of liquid water within the cylinder is facilitated by the 





2.1.3 Operating Profile 
Natural gas vehicle cylinders typically experiences a large number of pressure 
cycles (from filling at a CNG station to emptying during gas use), than cylinders used in 
industrial compressed gas service.  For example, a 3000 psig service pressure cylinder 
design is required to provide 15,000 pressure cycles from 300 psig to 3,750 psig for a 15 
to 20 years life in NGV service [15 – 17].  This amounts to approximately a refueling 
history of 2 cycles/day for 365 days/year. 
 
Pressure cycling exceeding the service life will eventually cause cracks in the 
cylinder walls to grow due to fatigue that may extend through the thickness.  When the 
cracks grow through the cylinder wall they will either result in leak or rupture, the failure 
mode is usually dependent on the length of the fatigue crack, fracture toughness of the 
material, internal pressure at the time of failure and the cylinder wall thickness.   
 
The upper pressure limit to which CNG cylinders are filled can exceed the 3750 
psig stated above depending on the filling temperature of the gas.  Since a fixed volume 
of gas is usually supplied through the dispensing system, in hot climates the final 
pressure in the CNG cylinder could be significantly higher assuming ideal gas behavior.   
 
Ambient temperature plays a major role due to the possibility of ductile to brittle 
transition of the cylinder material. Changes in fracture toughness in very cold climates 




2.1.4 Material Properties 
The National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) has determined that 
corrosion of steels will occur irrespective of the threshold limit of hydrogen sulphide, one 
of the impurities in CNG.  The material specified by NACE standard MR-01-75, [18] as 
being acceptable for service in a gaseous environment where the partial pressure of 
hydrogen sulphide exceeds 0.05 psia, which is typical for CNG, include carbon and low 
alloy steels with a minimum hardness of 22 on the Rockwell "C" scale.  Quenched and 
tempered AISI 4130X steels up to a maximum hardness of 26 is also allowed. 
 
The higher the strength of this steel the thinner the wall and the lighter the 
cylinder.  This is a desirable property as not only does it allow the design of lighter 
cylinders but the higher the strength of the cylinder the more resistant it would be to 
crack growth and fracture.  The corrosive environment limits the use of steels with 
hardness exceeding 26 HRC, which limits the fracture toughness of the steel used to 
make CNG cylinders. 
 
2.1.5 Cylinder Geometry 
Mode I fatigue cracking occurs more rapidly on the inside walls of a cylinder due 
to the cylinder geometry, which facilitates higher crack driving force on the inside 
surface of the cylinder.  Cracks tend to grow outwards in a semi-elliptical shape.  For 




becomes unstable and causes the vessel to fail.  This critical crack size is a function of the 
geometry of the cylinder, geometry of the crack and the material properties [7].  
 
For the plane strain fracture toughness KIC to be a valid failure prediction criterion 
for any CNG cylinder, plane strain conditions must exist at the crack tip.  That is, the 
material must be thick enough to ensure plane strain conditions [19].  It has been 
estimated empirically that for plane strain conditions the minimum material thickness 
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                                                           (2.1) 
 
 
Where material thickness is t, which is typically from 0.25 - 0.35 inches for CNG 
cylinders. 
 
A typical CNG cylinder has the following physical parameters: 
 
KIC = 93 ksi 
 Fyp = 125 ksi 
 
 
The condition of plane strain is not achieved and plane stress condition exists (right hand 
side of inequality in Equation 2.1 is 1.38).  Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) 
criterion using KIC fracture toughness is not valid if the plastic zone around the crack tip 




small scale yielding conditions are no longer valid then this approach is not valid.  If this 
is so then Elastic Plastic Fracture Mechanics (EPFM) procedures should be employed.  
This may also affect using available LEFM crack growth models, which have been 











Figure 2.2 Definition of Formal Plastic Zone at Crack Tip 
 
 
Cylinders that are manufactured with hemi-spherical heads and flat-bottoms, are designed 
for catastrophic failure to occur in the middle cylindrical portions.  This is the area with 
the highest operating stress.  The transition regions are subject to bending moment in the 
sidewall-bottom and neck transition region.  This sets up areas for high stress 
concentrations if any folds, cracks or other defects are found in this region and would 




2.2 Steel Cylinders Failure Mechanisms 
Material properties, cylinder geometry, operating profile, environmental 
conditions and manufacturing process all contribute to determine the failure mechanisms 
that are responsible for the degradation process and subsequent failure of a typical CNG 
cylinder.  The combined effect of these factors is more important than any one of them.  
The manufacturing of thin walled cylinders is a mature technology with the defect 
limiting procedures well documented.  Materials and cylinder profile are selected 
according to existing good engineering standards to limit the possibility of premature 
failures.  Unlike the other factors less control exist over the operating profile and the 
environment to which the cylinder is exposed.  Undoubtedly therefore, the dominant two 
factors that determine the mechanism of cylinder degradation leading to failure, are 
pressure cycling at low frequency in the presence of a corrosive products contained in 
CNG.  The rate of progression of the mechanisms to failure is influenced most by the 
material properties of the steels and the cylinder geometry.  The significant mechanism 
that results in the degradation of a typical CNG cylinder is now examined.  
 
2.2.1 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 
There is no threshold limit for hydrogen sulphide below which corrosion of steel 
does not occur [20].  The partial pressure of hydrogen sulphide that could cause sulphide 
induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in CNG cylinders depends primarily on the 
following factors: 




• Applied stress on the cylinder wall 
• Time of exposure to the SCC environment 
 
Hydrogen sulphide induced stress corrosion cracking of steels is essentially a 
hydrogen embrittlement phenomenon [21], [13].  Dissolution of H2S in water produces an 
acidic solution according to the reaction in Equation 2.2. 
  H2S ⇔ H+ + HS-        (2.2) 
 
Steel in contact with such a solution corrodes to form atomic hydrogen and iron sulphide 
according to Equation 2.3. 
  Fe + H+ + HS-  ⇔ FeS + 2H°      (2.3)  
 
If the iron sulphide formed is adherent, it acts as a barrier and reduces the 
corrosion rate to a low level, which is further reduced with additional build up of 
corrosion products.  If the sulphide corrosion products do not adhere to the surface, 
corrosion continues at a rate determined by the concentration of H2S, the solution pH, and 
other factors such as temperature.  If iron sulphide covers only part of the metal surface, 
the corrosion rate of the uncovered part may be accelerated and pitting may occur. 
 
Most of the hydrogen generated in the corrosion reaction shown in Equation 2.3 
combines to form molecular hydrogen, H2, which is evolved from the surface as a gas.  




form molecular hydrogen within the metal which reduces the ductility and fracture 
toughness of the steel.  Under conditions of high stress localized sulfide-induced stress 
corrosion cracking may occur. 
 
When a cylinder is filled, the material is in tension.  The equilibrium 
concentration of hydrogen at microscopic crack tips is greatly increased by the 
hydrostatic tension.  During the slow filling operations the hydrogen has time to diffuse 
to any existing crack tips while filling is still in progress; thus, embrittlement results and 
additional crack propagation occurs during the filling process which is  representative of 
a loading cycle.  When the cylinder is fully pressurized, the diffusion of hydrogen to the 
crack tip still occurs, however the hydrogen cannot cause cracking during the utilization 
of CNG or the unloading cycle.  This is because of the reduction of the partial pressure of 
hydrogen sulphide in the remaining CNG due to corrosion reactions and the utilization of 
the fuel.  When the pressure in the cylinder is reduced and held at low pressures SCC 
does not occur as the hydrogen diffuses away from the crack tip because of the reduction 
of hydrostatic tension.  
 
The propensity is for SCC to increase with increasing material hardness (or 
strength) and hydrogen sulphide content [21].  Typically, as the strength of the steel 
increases, less hydrogen is required to promote cracking [20].  Both AISI 4130X and 




H2S.  However, it was found that 15B30 steel, which is harder was more susceptible to 
general corrosion than was 4130X and the corrosion rate was higher [13]. 
 
 Other sulfur-containing species such as mercaptans contributes to stress corrosion 
cracking.  Mercaptans are common contaminants containing sulfur which may occur 
naturally in natural gas or which may be added as an odorant.  Mercaptans are chemically 
similar to H2S and attack steels similarly, forming hydrogen and iron sulfides.  Other 
water soluble sulfur species may be expected to behave similarly to H2S and mercaptans. 
 
Evaluation of various cylinders, with up to 5 years in service [13], [20] through 
burst testing, pressure cycling to failure, inspection by acoustic emission, ultrasonic and 
visual examination has not shown any significant loss of integrity or surface corrosion.  
No noticeable crack growth from large fabrication flaws found in several of the cylinders 
was detected during this detailed inspection.   These results are not consistent with the 
previously described failure mechanism of stress corrosion cracking.  A possible 
explanation for this is that a thin film of oil typically found coating the internal surfaces 
of cylinders, coming from the compressor, acts as an inhibitor contributing to the absence 
of corrosion.  Additionally most of the water in the gas supplied to the compression 
station is removed by the transmission gas drying system.  The distribution and 





Because of this finding from extensive research stress corrosion cracking due to hydrogen 
embrittlement irrespective of the partial pressure of H2S and CO2 in the CNG fuel will 
not be considered by itself to degrade CNG cylinders to be a life limiting  failure 
mechanism.  Its contribution to modeling cylinder life is however significant.  The 
elimination of stress corrosion cracking could lead to errors in the results especially for 
catastrophic failures or rupture of CNG cylinders.  This becomes more apparent when 
one considers the fact that higher strength steels are more susceptible to SCC.  It could 
become an important failure mechanism in the future, with the current research 
suggesting that significant weight reductions can be achieved without any increased risk 
of cylinder failure, by switching to higher strength steels.  
 
2.2.2 Corrosion - Fatigue   
The most damaging form of cylinder degradation is corrosion fatigue.  Corrosion-
fatigue occurs as a result of the combined action of cyclic re-pressurization and corrosion 
of the cylinders due to the presence of impurities in the CNG.  The corrosion process is 
exactly as has been described for hydrogen sulfide induced stress corrosion cracking 
detailed in the previous section.  This failure mechanism is expected to originate at 
corrosion pits formed on the inside surface of the cylinder or pre-existing manufacturing 
defects.  The corrosion process accelerates fatigue failure by producing pits and surface 
discontinuities which acts as stress raisers and therefore sites for further crack growth.  
Additionally cracks in the areas affected by corrosion which are usually brittle acts as 




result of cyclic fluctuation of the internal pressure of the CNG during normal bus 
operations in the presence of a corrosive environment.  The cyclic loads or strain causes 
cracking and flaking of the corrosion layer, which exposes parent metal to the corrosive 
medium.  Each process will compliment the other thereby accelerating the crack growth 
phenomenon and making the result disproportionately more significant than would 
normally be obtained if either mechanism acted independently.  Unlike SCC, corrosion 
fatigue crack growth is expected to occur, the rate of which will be determined by the 
initial crack size, the cyclic frequency of the loading and the environment.   
 
These cracks will propagate from sub-critical dimensions to a critical size, 
following which rapid tearing of the cylinder material will occur resulting in a 
catastrophic burst fracture.  Alternatively, the crack could propagate through the sidewall 
of the cylinder without plastic tearing occurring.  The occurrence of one failure mode or 
another is dependent on the fracture toughness of the material, temperature and the 
maximum stress intensity factor as the crack penetrates the wall of the cylinder. 
 
Information on the interaction between the environment and the metal surface at 
the crack tip is necessary in order to model corrosion fatigue and to predict service life of 
cylinders subject to this failure mechanism.  The corrosion process was detailed in the 
previous section and shows how localized pitting or cracking can occur due to hydrogen 
embrittlement.  The results of the first investigation into the effect of the frequency of 




in [22 – 24].  From the data it was concluded that acceleration of fatigue crack growth in 
a corrosive environment does occur, below the stress intensity factor for unstable crack 
growth due to stress corrosion cracking, KISCC.  It also showed that for the high strength 
steel used in the experimentation (12Ni-5Cr-3Mo maraging steel) at ambient temperature 
in air and 3% sodium chloride solution, the fatigue crack growth rate can be represented 
by Equation 2.4 [21]. 
 
( ) m(N)da D N K
dN
= ∆                                                       (2.4) 
 
 
Where D(N) is the constant of proportionality between the rate of crack growth and K∆ ,  
the stress intensity factor.  D(N) is dependent on the steel and the composition of the 
corrosive environment and the sinusoidal cyclic stress frequency.  The stress intensity 
factor exponent, m(N), on the other hand is dependent on the rate of increase of the stress 
level and on the maximum and minimum stress levels.  It remains constant with different 
materials and environment, between stress intensity factor levels where stable or Stage II 
crack growth is occurring.  
 
Barson found [22 -23] that in air and in sodium chloride solutions at high 
frequencies (greater than 600 cpm), D(N) was a constant.  This suggested that the 
corrosive environment at stress cycling above this frequency had negligible effect on 
fatigue crack growth rate.  In sodium chloride solution at 6 cpm, D(N) was found to be 




accelerated the fatigue crack growth rate.  It is further inferred [21] that the corrosion 
fatigue crack growth rate of this high strength steel in a corrosive environment increases 
to a maximum value then decrease as the sinusoidal cyclic stress frequency decrease from 
600 cpm to frequencies below 6 cpm. 
 
It has been shown in reference [21] that in addition to frequency of load cycling, 
D(N) is dependent on the form of the cyclic loading and the corrosion resistance of the 
material.  Since high strength steel is not strain rate sensitive, then D(N) at high 
frequency loading approaches a constant value characteristic of fatigue crack growth rate 
in a benign environment.  In a corrosive environment at low frequency the shape of the 
fatigue crack growth curve remains the same and can be represented by Equation 2.4.  
The shift in the curve from a purely fatigue stable crack growth process, is represented by 
a multiplicative constant.  The same applies to other steels.  
 
Fractographic analysis of the fracture surface [24] of specimens that have failed 
due to corrosion-fatigue crack growth, indicated that the primary mechanism responsible 
for accelerating the fatigue crack growth in high strength steel in a corrosive environment 
(3% sodium chloride) was hydrogen embrittlement [24].  A phenomenological analysis of  
corrosion-assisted fatigue below KISCC, shows that crack growth occur primarily while 
the material at the crack tip is being plastically deformed during the loading cycle and 
that the environment has little effect during the constant load portion of the cyclic wave.  




triangular).  The load profile of a typical CNG cylinder is somewhere between a square 
and sinusoidal loading and therefore this crack growth phenomenon would apply.  In [24] 
it has also been shows that the magnitude of environmental is effects dependent on the 
time within each cycle during which the metal is being plastically strained. 
 
Hydrogen is generated in the crack tip neighborhood by the interaction between 
the corrosive environment and the fresh metal surface exposed in each cycle as occurs in 
the SCC process.  The hydrogen then diffuses into the plastic zone region where the 
material has undergone relatively few cycles of plastic strain.  Acceleration in the rate of 
fatigue crack growth in the corrosive environment then occurs by hydrogen 
embrittlement of the cyclically strained material.  No indication of corroding away of 
ligament left behind the crack tip by the corrosion products have been reported [24].   
 
2.2.3 Generalized Corrosion - Fatigue Crack Growth 
The generalized fatigue behavior of various metals can be obtained from 
experimental research conducted on fatigue crack growth.  Fatigue crack growth behavior 
of steel can be divided into three regions as shown in Figure 2.3.  The behavior in Region 
I exhibit a threshold for cyclic stress intensity factor fluctuation, )Kth, below which 
cracks do not propagate under cyclic stress fluctuations [25] or the crack growth rate is 
immeasurably slow.  ASTM [26] has defined the threshold )Kth to correspond to a 
fatigue crack growth rate of 10-10 m/cycle.   The value of )Kth for CNG cylinder steels 




where microscopic defects in the metal nucleate resulting in significantly increased crack 
growth rate with small changes in the applied stress intensity factor.    
Region II is characterized by steady growth of the fatigue crack under the influence of 
increased stress intensity factor cycling.  This represents the most significant part of the 
corrosion fatigue life of a CNG cylinder.  Modeling the growth of a crack through 
Regions I and II will give adequate representation for the fatigue life of a typical CNG 
cylinder. 
 
The corrosion-fatigue crack growth rates above )Kth, in Region II, can in general 




∆=                                                            (2.5) 
where: 
 a = crack length (inches), 
 N = number of cycles, 
 )K = stress intensity factor fluctuation (ksi /inch), and 
f ()K) = functional relationship between the stress intensity factor fluctuations 
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Figure 2.3   Schematic Representation of Fatigue Crack Growth In Steel. 
 
Crack growth behavior is generally modeled using Linear Elastic Fracture 
Mechanics (LEFM) concepts.  LEFM is used because of the availability of stress 
intensity factor solutions which relate rate of crack growth to loading on the crack 
surface.  Most of these solutions were developed using numerical methods.  LEFM 




Region II. In this region the slope of the log da/dN versus log )K curve is approximately 
linear and lies roughly between 10-6 and 10-3 in/cycle. Many curve fits to this region have 
been suggested. The Paris equation [29], shown in Equation 2.6, which was proposed in 





∆=                                                         (2.6) 
where 
  a = crack length (inches) 
 N = number of cycles 
 )K = stress intensity factor range (Kmax - Kmin) (ksi /inch) 
 C, m = material constants 
 
ASTM E647 sets guidelines for performing tests in order to determine values of the 
exponent, m and constant C.  
 
Region III corresponds to the transition into instability and rapid crack extension 
leading to cleavage fracture typically along a particular crystallographic plane.  In this 
region the fatigue crack growth per cycle is higher than predicted by Equation 2.6.  
Research has shown [28], [30] that the rate of fatigue crack growth increases and that 
under zero to tension loading, ()K = Kmax), this increase occurs at a stress intensity factor 











                                           (2.7) 
where 
 E = Young's modulus and  
Fy = yield strength (0.2% offset) 
Equation 2.7 is used to calculate the stress intensity factor corresponding to the onset of 
fatigue transition, KC, for materials where the fracture toughness, KIC is higher than the 
transition stress intensity factor [21].  This applies to all high strength cylinder steel 
materials.   
 
Acceleration in the rate of fatigue crack growth occurs at a value slightly below 
the critical stress intensity factor when the fracture toughness, KIC, of the material is less 
than the Region III transition stress intensity factor KT.  Most important is the 
acceleration in the rate of fatigue crack growth, below KT when the KISCC for the cylinder 
exposed to a corrosive environment is less than the stress intensity factor at the onset of 
fatigue rate transition, KT.  This applies to all DOT 3AA cylinder materials.   
  
The fatigue life in Region III is insignificant compared to the overall life, as the 
fatigue life is measured by the steady growth of a crack from a small to a critical crack 
size.  Crack growth in this region occurs at high stress intensity factor cycling, )K's and 
therefore more indicative of imminent failure.  The criterion for such failure is when the 





CHAPTER 3: PHYSICS OF FAILURE MODELING OF                      
SUB-CRITICAL CRACK GROWTH 
 
3.1 Approaches to Cylinder Physical Life Modeling  
The major components of the physical life model incorporating deterministic and 
probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis of corrosion fatigue crack growth is summarized 
in Figure 3.1 This schematic representation of the model shows the fundamental 
considerations in modeling and prediction of crack growth to instability in a CNG 
cylinder.   
 
Overall the failure characteristics are determined by the following from the model: 
• Fatigue important cracks and other flaws that originate in the cylinder at the time 
of manufacture and their location in the cylinder walls. 
• Inspection methods used and the probability of detection of fatigue flaws. 
• Physical properties of the AISI 4130X material used to construct the cylinders. 
• Sub-critical and fast corrosion fatigue crack growth characteristics of the alloy. 
• Applicability of the crack driving force solution adopted based on the influence of 
plasticity at the crack tip. 
• Operating profile and stress history of the cylinder while in service. 
• The failure criterion used whether elasticity is assumed to dominate the fracture 
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The elements of the model and their effects are derived from the factors that have been 
determined to impact significantly on the degradation and failure of a typical CNG 
cylinder.  The distribution of the parameters representing each element is required in 
order to analytically model the degradation and the point at which failure is deemed to 
occur.  Calculation of the probabilistic fracture mechanics sub-critical crack growth and 
the fast crack growth at the onset of fracture can be undertaken by inputting the 
distributions in the appropriate crack growth model.   
 
The sub-critical crack growth will be assumed to occur as a result of fatigue crack 
growth which will be accelerated by environmental influences such as the presence of 
water vapor and corrosive compounds in the CNG.  The factors or their influence on the 
failure characteristics of a cylinder is distributed in nature and as such the cycles to 
failure and time to failure will be distributed quantities.  The model to be developed and 
the method to evaluate them will be consistent with accepted probabilistic fracture 
mechanics methods.  
 
A probabilistic model of crack growth will now be developed and its propagation 
to failure as a result of the characteristics discussed above will be evaluated.  The type of 
crack to be analyzed and necessary assumptions adopted, allow for tractable fracture 
mechanics analysis of the DOT 3AA materials under consideration, without loss of 
accuracy in the results.  This is consistent with similar analysis done for pressure vessels 




growth in CNG cylinders.  Comparisons will be made to this model and a deterministic 
model developed at South West Research Institute (SWRI), to show the superiority of 
this probabilistic fracture mechanics method of modeling corrosion fatigue crack growth 
to previous research done. 
 
3.2 Discussion of Fundamental Assumptions 
The major assumptions employed in the physical modeling of cylinder life are 
discussed in this section.  Some of the assumptions are inherent in probabilistic fracture 
mechanics analysis of the CNG cylinders while others are more germane to the specific 
type of analysis.  Throughout the analysis other assumptions more specific to the 
different sections will be presented.  Uncertainties due to these assumptions are not 
quantified and should be analyzed in future research.  The assumptions made are not 
expected to significantly alter the results of the probabilistic modeling of the corrosion-
fatigue crack growth phenomenon. 
 
The following are the major assumptions: 
• Cylinder failure due to corrosion fatigue occurs due to the growth of cracks 
introduced during manufacturing or through normal use.  Other failures due to 
design, manufacturing, assembly or errors in use are omitted.  All other failures 
which are stochastic in nature such as accidental impact are also omitted.  These 





• All cracks are assumed to be located on the inside or the outside surface of the 
cylinder wall for both the cylindrical portion and the transition regions which 
include the ends.  Embedded cracks were not considered because it was felt that 
for a given crack size and stress level, a surface crack will be more severe, 
because it will have a larger stress intensity factor.  The crack driving force will 
be much greater making the inside and outside the most likely failure sites.  
Furthermore it has been documented that only surface cracks grow in fatigue. 
 
• In the transitional regions of the cylinder principal stresses are determined and 
used in finite element solutions of a flat plate subject to bending and tension.  This 
is a simplified approach but the best within the framework of current fracture 
mechanics techniques and available stress intensity factor solutions. 
 
• Manufacturing flaws in the cylinders are independently and identically distributed 
in size.  In other words the initial crack size distribution is taken to be the same in 
each section of the cylinder.  The density of cracks (number per unit area) will 
vary for each section consistent with the manufacturing process and the stress 
distribution in the cylinder.  A homogenous Poisson process can therefore be used 







• Only cracks which are fracture important are considered.  Three aspect ratios are 
considered, 0.2, 0.4 and 1.0 representing a diverse crack shapes that are expected 
to grow in fatigue. 
 
• The sub-critical growth of cracks due to corrosion fatigue are similar to fatigue 
crack growth and can be predicted from linear elastic fracture mechanics or elastic 
plastic fracture mechanics analysis. 
 
• The stress history defined by cycling from filling the cylinder and emptying 
during the use of CNG, controls corrosion fatigue crack growth.  Filling raises the 
internal pressure to 3000 psig and emptying reduces the pressure to 300 psig. 
 
• If more than one crack exists in each section of the cylinder then the cracks will 
not interact with each other or nucleate to form larger cracks.  The critical 
condition for unstable crack propagation is dependent only on the size of the 
largest crack present on the surface of the cylinder. 
 
• Catastrophic cylinder failure from unstable corrosion-fatigue crack growth is 
determined either by Kapplied > K1C (cleavage fracture), net section instability 
(excedence of a critical net section stress) or tearing instability, Tapplied > Tmat  
(ductile rupture) whichever results in the smallest critical crack size at a given 




• The applied stress used in the failure criterion will not be significantly relaxed by 
crack extension, instead remains constant even during incremental crack growth.  
Initial pressure is only relaxed when crack breaches through wall. 
 
• Cracks are elliptical or semi-elliptical in shape and retain that profile during crack 
growth until they grow through the walls of the cylinder.  Once a crack grows 
through the cylinder wall, the outside and inside surface lengths are equal. 
 
• The crack growth is controlled by the stress intensity factor arising from the stress 
intensity created by the pressure in the cylinder and the stress distribution at the 
crack tip. 
 
• Cracks are found during the testing phase after manufacturing or periodic testing 
using NDE techniques.  The probability that a crack will be detected depends only 
on the size and not on the skill of the equipment operator. 
 
• Cracks detected, if their sizes are fracture significant, are weld-repaired or the 
cylinder is removed from service.  The crack population is not affected by any 
other maintenance procedure.  Cracks can be introduced during the weld repair 






3.3 Characterizing Corrosion - Fatigue Crack Growth  
Crack growth and fracture behavior of CNG cylinders can be evaluated by the 
two well established fracture mechanics modeling techniques, namely Linear Elastic 
Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) and Elastic Plastic Fracture Mechanics (EPFM).  The 
growth of cracks due to corrosion-fatigue has to be modeled from the initial crack size 
until the crack grows through the wall of a typical CNG cylinder, or for rupture of the 
cylinder material to occur.  Both failure modes are considered and constitute the fatigue 
life of the cylinder.   
 
The rate of crack growth is dependent on the initial crack size, stress distribution 
at the crack tip and the material resistance to crack growth.  Fracture on the other hand is 
dependent on the resistance of the material to plastic tearing in the vicinity of the crack 
and fracture toughness.  It is therefore evident that the failure modes under consideration 
are dependent on the number and size of fracture significant flaws generated during 
manufacturing, operating profile as well as the material properties.  Cracks generated 
during the weld-repair during inspection or after manufacturing are considered separately 





 Research work conducted on behalf of the Gas Research Institute at South West 
Research Institute (SWRI ),  have characterized corrosion-fatigue crack growth and 
fracture behavior of cylinder steels, within the framework of linear elastic fracture 
mechanics [4].  This was done by studying the crack growth phenomenon in Region II 
until transition into Region III where accelerated crack growth will occur.  This has been 
used to define the useful life of the cylinder.   
 
The research results highlighted in Figure 3.2 show that the crack growth rate 
increased with decreasing frequency of cycling and showed a saturation point of about 
0.05 Hz.  Below this cyclic loading there was no enhancement in crack growth rate.  The 
significance of this is that the deterministic models developed for corrosion-fatigue 
testing of CNG cylinders at frequencies below this saturation point, are applicable to 
much lower cyclic frequencies.  The results are therefore valid for the cyclic frequencies 
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Figure 3.2   Corrosion-Fatigue Crack Growth Dependence on Cyclic Frequency [3]   
 
 
The stress-strain field near a crack tip in a linear elastic body is controlled by the 
stress intensity factor, K.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the rate of growth of a 
crack under cyclic loading conditions is controlled by the cyclic value of the stress 















This relationship between the cyclic stress intensity factor and the rate of growth of a 
crack in a material undergoing fatigue cracking, has been experimentally demonstrated 
since it was first suggested by Paris, Gomez and Anderson [32] and standard exist for 
such measurements.  Many functional relationships have been suggested and correlated 
with experimental data for fatigue crack growth.  Under similar environmental 
conditions, the growth relationships have been shown [33] to be remarkably insensitive to 
micro structural variables, with generic values of material constants being applicable to a 
wide class of materials, such as ferritic steels, martensitic steels, etc., [34].  This is 
because the growth relationship is most impacted by the lattice structure of the material.  
At extremes of crack growth rates more material dependencies are seen and more 
sophisticated models have been developed to account for this.  These models have all 





∆=                                                      (3.3) 
 
 
There are no crack growth models that explicitly accounts for the non-linearity 
inside the plastic zone which surrounds the crack tip.  Unlike stress intensity factor 
solutions, the number of fully plastic crack driving force solutions available are very 
limited and are generally confined to simple specimen geometries and a few planar and 
axisymmetric bodies [35].  A conservative approach will be adopted where all corrosion 
fatigue crack growth modeling will be limited to consideration of the stress strain field 




For Type I cylinders, the critical crack length is the crack length at which point the crack 
becomes unstable and cause the vessel to fail.  This critical crack size is a function of the 
geometry of the cylinder, geometry of the crack and the material properties.  LEFM and 
EPFM methods will be used to analyze final fracture behavior of CNG cylinders.  
Research at Powertech Laboratories [7], has found that EPFM methods are more 
appropriate for characterizing final fracture.  This is consistent with what has been 
determined in Section 2.1.5.  Since plain strain conditions do not exist, the uncertainties 
as a result of the effect of the plastic zone cannot be accounted for in existing LEFM 
models.  
 
3.4 Corrosion-Fatigue Crack Growth Modeling 
Corrosion fatigue crack growth in the CNG cylinder will occur under the 
influence of the stress intensity factor as the crack driving force.  The stress intensity 
factor represents the combination of far field or bulk stresses and crack length.  An 
increase in either of these will result in an increase in the stress intensity factor.  The 
growths of these cracks are also influenced by the amount of moisture present in the 
CNG as shown in Figure 3.3.  Crack growth in the sidewall region is different from crack 
growth in the transition region because of the different crack driving force.  As will be 
shown later in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, the stress intensity factor for the transition 






3.4.1 Deterministic Crack Growth Modeling 
Research on crack growth modeling in pressurized CNG cylinders is sparse, with 
the most notable conducted at SWRI [3 - 4].  The corrosion-fatigue crack growth model 
developed from this research is a deterministic model developed empirically from data.  
This work was conducted on AISI 4130X steels in aqueous, wet and dry gas 
environments at cyclic frequencies of 0.05, 0.1 and 1.0 Hz.  The crack growth behavior at 
0.05 Hz is applicable to corrosion fatigue crack growth at the expected much lower 
frequencies of cyclic filling and emptying of CNG cylinders at use level.  
Experimentation has shown that the rate of crack growth is greater at the lower cyclic 
frequency and remains a source of uncertainty when performance is extrapolated to the 
use level.  
 
The mathematical representation of the phenomenon covers the three crack 
growth regimes and describes the experimental data over a range of stress intensity 
factors from the very low near-threshold behavior to the crack growth rates at high ∆K=s 
when failure is eminent.  This expression describes the results well for the three 
environmental effects that were investigated.  The mathematical expression is a modified 
form of the Foreman relation [36] and includes threshold effects and the influence of load 
ratio, R.  It is written in a form to represent the materials resistance to crack growth 
instead of the rate of crack growth and is given as: 
 



































KR =                                                                (3.6) 
 
 
A1,n1,A2,n2, and Kc are empirical constants obtained from the experimental data and R is 
the ratio of the minimum to maximum loads in each fatigue cycle.  R also characterizes 
the mean stress level.  The variability of the constant terms in the expression was not 
accounted for in the crack growth modeling as the data was not available to develop 
distributions for these terms.  This is a source of uncertainty in the frequency of cylinder 
failure which should be evaluated. 
 
The first two terms in the equation describe the crack behavior in the first two 
stages of crack growth before the onset of unstable crack growth.  The third term which 
describes unstable crack growth just prior to ductile tearing and fracture is not needed to 
describe the cylinder life as this region only contributes to crack growth rate (da/dN) at 
very high ∆K=s, when most of the life has already been expended.  The first two terms of 
the expression describe the fatigue crack growth during what can be called the fatigue life 




the third expression is important to define the fracture point.  This was not included in the 
calculations for the number of cycles to failure that was done. 
 
The values of the parameters shown in Table 3.1 were evaluated by fitting 
Equation 3.4 to the experimental data obtained by fatigue testing in three gas 
environments [4].  The parameters represent two different portions of the curve as shown 
in Figure 3.3.  One portion of the curve represents the behavior of the lower ∆K=s in the 
near threshold region, and the other at the higher ∆K=s above the threshold.  Crack growth 
tests were conducted on cracked ISI 4130X steel specimens in corrosive environments 
described as aqueous and wet gas as follows: 
 
1. Aqueous environment consists of H2S and CO2 in water with the specimen fully 
immersed.  The partial pressures of H2S and CO2 levels were designed to be 
greater than NFPA 52 Regulation in order to simulate worst case situation. 
 
2. The gaseous environment consists of H2S and CO2 gas and water vapor.  The 
partial pressure of water vapor was limited to ensure than condensation did not 
occur even though capillary condensation of water vapor was observed to occur 
during the test. 
 
































































































































































A1 n1 A2 n2 
Aqueous 8.3 x 1060 48 2.0 x 107 2.3 
Wet Gas 8.3 x 1060 48 7.7 x 107 2.3 
Dry Gas   1.0 x 1010 3.30 
 
 
The corrosion fatigue crack growth rates in the aqueous and wet gas environment falls off 




precipitous drop in the crack growth rates at the lower frequency is a result of the crack 
flanks being wedged open due to the build up of corrosion products within the crack as 
well as increasing contact of crack face asperities due to the rough surfaces produced by 
crack growth in the aggressive environment.  This wedging action effectively relieves the 
high stresses at the crack tip and produces an increase in crack closure with concomitant 
drop in crack growth rates.  This drop in the crack growth rates effectively defines a 
threshold below which cracks will not grow in an aqueous environment. 
 
3.4.2 Probabilistic Crack Growth Modeling 
A probabilistic model was developed for corrosion fatigue crack growth based on 
the data generated in the experimentation that was used to develop the deterministic 
model.  The uncertainties highlighted in Section 3.3.1 as well as the inability of the model 
to account for the stress intensity factor threshold below which crack growth will not 
occur is the primary reason for developing this probabilistic model.  The deterministic 
model did not adequately represent the different mechanism of crack progression from 
crack blunting to unstable growth and was one of the rationales for the development of 
this model.  The evaluation of the sensitivity of the crack growth relation to the empirical 





3.4.2.1 Crack Growth Relationship 
Fatigue crack growth rate as shown in Equations 3.1 and 3.3 is a strong function 
of cyclic stress intensity factor.  The crack growth rate can be adequately characterized 









=                                                       (3.7) 
 
 
Expressing in a simplified format 
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dN
da









=                                                       (3.8b) 
 
where 
da/dN is the fatigue crack growth rate in inches/cycle 
∆K is the cyclic stress intensity factor (Kmax -Kmin) in ksi-in1/2  
R is the load ratio, Kmin/Kmax 
C and m are empirical material constants   
 
K' is the effective stress intensity factor that accounts for the effect of cyclic stress 




Bamford, Hale and James [37 – 39] that using an exponent of 2 as shown in Equation 
3.7 is a good value to use for the steels and environment under consideration.  Once we 
have obtained the distributions of the material constants C and m, we can assume the 
form and compute the parameters of the distribution of fatigue crack growth as a function 
of stress intensity.  The effect of load ratio for the AISI 4130X material and corrosive 
environment created by the CNG contaminants would also be included in the distribution.  
The material constants will now be determined from the data used to generate the 
deterministic model discussed in Section 3.3.1 and the method of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE). 
 
From Equations 3.3 and 3.8 and considering the resistance of the CNG cylinder 
material to crack growth, we can write this resistance to cracking as the inverse of the 






=                                                    (3.9) 
 
 
If we let the effective stress intensity factor be represented by V and the crack resistance 
by L, then the crack resistance as a function of the stress intensity factor is given by: 
 
( ) mVC






From equation 3.10 we see that an inverse power model relationship exists between the 
resistance to crack growth and with the effective stress intensity factor.  If we take the 
natural log of the crack resistance relationship we get, 
 




We could plot the data of crack resistance with effective stress intensity factor to 
estimate the parameters.  One parameter would be evaluated from the slope of the line 
and the other from the intercept.  This is not the approach that will be used however as 
there are obvious scatter in the effective stress intensity factor as shown by the results in 
the graph in Figure 3.3.  Instead the parameters will be assumed to be randomly 
distributed and the uncertainty associated with each evaluated from the available data on 
Figure 3.3.    
 
Two types of uncertainties arise.  Firstly, aleatory or Class A uncertainties arising 
from the inherent variability of the stress intensity factor due to the interaction of the 
stress distribution at the crack tip, material response and the plasticity effects.  Epistemic 
or reducible uncertainties are represented by the measured variation in crack resistance 
for the same effective stress intensity factor.  Both types of uncertainties are reflected in 
the randomness of the data in Figure 3.3.  Only epistemic uncertainties will be considered 





We will use a lognormal model to represent the epistemic or reducible uncertainties in the 
rate of crack growth.  Lognormal distribution is a good model for fatigue crack growth 
since the random variable cannot take negative values and the realizations can be orders 
of magnitude different [40].   The choice of lognormal distribution is itself an epistemic 
uncertainty.  Weibull distribution is also a good model for characterizing the uncertainty 
in crack growth.  Preliminary analysis using the data showed that the lognormal 
distribution was a better fit than the Weibull distribution. 
 
The choice of lognormal distribution to model the uncertainties of parameter C 
has intuitive appeal.  The reason is that such a distribution results in symmetric 
distribution of the crack growth rate, da/dN for a given K' when plotted with log scales.  
Such an assumption appears justified for the stable crack growth region of the fatigue 
phenomenon, denoted as Region II in Chapter 2, Figure 2.3  
 
Recall Equations 3.3, 3.8 and 3.9.  Let random variable representing crack 




























1Tf                                        (3.12)   
   
where    




'T = the mean of the natural logarithms of the crack resistance 




The median of crack resistance based on the lognormal distribution of the crack 
resistance can be set to be equal to the effective stress intensity factor function.  From 
Equation 3.11 we get: 
VlnmCln'T −−=                                                (3.13) 
 
 
The function for crack resistance, taking into account the dependence on the 




























1V ,Tf                         (3.14) 
 
The parameters of the inverse power model can be evaluated using the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation.  The likelihood of each data point on the graph in Figure 
3.3 can be determined by inputting the values of the crack resistance and the effective 
stress intensity factor.  From the individual likelihood functions the total log likelihood 































φ(x) = Standard normal distribution function,  
 









=φ                                       (3.16) 
 
 
 F is the number of data points on the effective stress intensity factor vs. crack 
resistance curve, 
σT' is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the crack resistance and 
one of the three parameters that have to be estimated, 
 C is the material constant and is the second parameter to be estimated, 
 m is the exponent in the inverse power model.  This is the third parameter to be  
 estimated, 
 Vi is the effective stress intensity factor at the ith data point, and 
 Ti is the exact crack resistance value at the ith data point. 
 
The parameters can be estimated by solving for the maximum likelihood estimators 
(MLE).  The MLE’s, m̂ ,Ĉ ,ˆ 'Tσ  are the values of the parameters such that the partial 
differential of the log-likelihood function with respect to each parameter would be equal 
to zero.  That is  
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Λ∂                                       (3.17) 
 
































































The standard deviation estimator, ,ˆ 'Tσ and the material constant estimator, Ĉ are 
positive parameters.  We will assume that the natural logs of these estimators are 
normally distributed in order to estimate the bounds.  This assumption fits with the 
inverse power law model and that the resistance to crack growth being lognormally 
distributed.  Let the number of standard deviations from the mean corresponding to 1-α 
confidence level be equal to Zα.  The respective upper and lower bounds of the 

















































































                                              (3.24) 
 
By similar reasoning and assuming a normal distribution for the exponent of the inverse 
power law model, the respective upper and lower bound can be shown to be equal to 
 
( )m̂VarZm̂mU α+=                                               (3.25) 
 
 
 ( )m̂VarZm̂mL α−=                                               (3.26) 
 
 
The variance and co-variance of the parameters are estimated from the local 
Fisher Matrix, F, evaluated at the MLE estimators as shown in Equation 3.27.  The local 
Fisher Matrix is evaluated from the partial differential of the total log likelihood function 
as shown in Equation 3.28. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
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The data used in the development of the deterministic model for wet gas, dry gas 
and aqueous conditions was extracted from Figure 3.3 and used to calculate the MLE 
estimators of the parameters as well as the confidence bounds.  Plot of the inverse power 
model of the data as well as the lognormal distribution of the crack resistance is shown in 















Aqueous Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth vs. Effective Stress Intensity Factor
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The MLE estimators of the parameters C and m are summarized below in Table 3.2 and 
Table 3.3.   Table 3.4 summarizes the results for the standard deviation, for dry gas, wet 
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Table 3.2   Results of Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth Material Parameter 
 
Model Parameters 
Low Stress Intensity Factor High Stress Intensity Factor Environment 
 
Upper1Ĉ  1Ĉ  Low1Ĉ  Upper2Ĉ  2Ĉ  Low2Ĉ  
Aqueous 3.4721x1038 4.5211x1032 5.8870x1038 7.2675x107 5.5240x107 4.1988x107 
Wet Gas 3.9203x1016 3.8123x1015 3.7072x1014 9.3175x107 6.5470x107 4.6003x107 




Table 3.3   Results of Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth Exponent 
 
Model Parameters 
Low Stress Intensity Factor High Stress Intensity Factor Environment 
Upper1m̂  1m̂  Low1m̂  Upper2m̂  2m̂  Low2m̂  
Aqueous -18.6238 -23.6454 -28.6671 -2.3421 -2.4218 -2.2501 
Wet Gas -8.2434 -9.1364 -10.0294 -2.1477 -2.2456 -2.3435 




Table 3.4   Results of Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth Standard Deviation 
 
Model Parameters 
Low Stress Intensity Factor High Stress Intensity Factor Environment 
Upper1σ̂  1σ̂  Low1σ̂  Upper2σ̂  2σ̂  Low2σ̂  
Aqueous 0.3893 0.2742 0.1930 0.1945 0.1763 0.1598 
Wet Gas 0.0110 0.0216 0.0422 0.1327 0.1636 0.2016 




The local Fisher Matrix evaluated at the MLE estimators of the parameters was used to 
calculate the variances and co-variances of the distributions.  The variances along with 
the estimators in Table 3.2 to Table 3.4 define the distribution of the material parameter 
and the crack growth exponent.  The co-variances are used in the data analysis section of 
Chapter 7, where the quality of the data is assessed.  The local Fisher Matrices are 
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                   (3.33) 
 
From Figure 3.4 and 3.9 the rate of crack growth for aqueous and wet gas increases 
rapidly from a minimum value and then reduces after a fairly well defined stress intensity 
factor is reached.  This precipitous drop in the crack growth rates at the higher effective 
stress intensity factor can be explained by crack tip blunting and interaction with the 
asperities formed on the crack surface.  The crack growth phenomenon is different at low 
and at high effective stress intensity factors and therefore will be modeled separately for 
each region.  The parameter for crack growth in each region is denoted with a 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
    
In addition to the transition stress intensity factor at which the growth 
phenomenon changes its mode of propagation, the presence of a minimum value for 
crack growth rate suggests that there is a threshold below which crack growth will not 
occur.  This phenomenon is investigated in Section 3.4.2.3. 
 
From the results in Tables 3.2 to 3.4 we can see that the AISI 4130X material is 
more susceptible to corrosion fatigue in an aqueous environment.  This is with the same 
rise time for the loading and effective stress intensity factor.  This is not totally 
unexpected because corrosion fatigue proceeds as shown in Chapter 2 by hydrogen 
embrittlement.  The presence of oxygen in water causes oxidation of the recently cracked 
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surfaces.  This process increases the partial pressure of hydrogen which acts as a catalyst 
for further hydrogen embrittlement and crack growth. 
 
Even when the partial pressure of water vapor was controlled in the fatigue 
experiments conducted on the AISI 4130X material, condensed vapor was found on 
cracked surfaces.  The presence of condensed vapor is sufficient to cause aqueous 
conditions to exist.  Since it represents the worst case scenario, this is the condition that 
will be used for modeling the fatigue crack growth in the representative CNG cylinder. 
 
3.4.2.2  Distribution of Parameters  
The development of the distribution of C and m has been discussed in the 
previous section.  As was stated earlier it will be assumed that C is lognormally 
distributed with upper and lower values as shown in Table 3.2.    Since C is lognormally 
distributed it will have the following probability density function and complimentary 
cumulative distributions, [40] shown in Equations 3.34 and Equation 3.35.  The median 
of this distribution is C50 and the standard deviation of the natural log of C isη . 
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Table 3.5   Results of Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth Material Parameter Distribution 
 
Model Parameters 
Low Stress Intensity Factor High Stress Intensity Factor Environment 
1Ĉ  
2
1η  2Ĉ  
2
2η  
Aqueous 4.5211x1032 1.3868x1067 5.5240x107 8.4823x1013 
Wet Gas 3.8123x1015 2.9163x1031 6.5470x107 1.9720x1014 




The crack growth exponent, m, was noted previously to be normally distributed.  
The corresponding normal density function and complimentary distribution functions are 
given by Equation 3.37, with σ  being the standard deviation of m. 
 
Table 3.6   Results of Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth Exponent 
 
Model Parameters 
Low Stress Intensity Factor High Stress Intensity Factor Environment 
 
1m̂  2m1σ  2m̂  2m2σ  
Aqueous -23.6454 9.3164 -2.4218 2.3464 
Wet Gas -9.1364 0.2946 -2.2456 3.5404 





































































The distribution of the crack resistance property of the material is reflected in the 
scatter of the data shown in Figures 3.4 to 3.9.  This is typical for fatigue crack resistance 
data.  The scatter in the data will be assumed to be because aleatory or epistemic 
uncertainty in the resistance to crack growth and not the variability in how the 
experiments were carried out. 
 
The standard deviation of the material resistance and therefore the crack growth 
rate averaged over all the different effective stress intensity factors is also shown in Table 
3.4.  This is an important parameter which is useful in fully characterizing the random 
nature of the crack growth rate.  The level of complexity that this presents is unnecessary 
as the distribution of the material constant C and the exponent m is sufficient to describe 
the randomness in the crack growth rate.  The standard deviation will therefore not be 
used in the ensuing analysis. 
3.4.2.3 Crack Growth Transition and Threshold 
The transition stress intensity factor under aqueous conditions, K'T , was defined 
previously as the point when the crack growth rate is impacted significantly by corrosion 
products on the crack surface and the interaction of crack asperities.  From Figure 3.8, 
this transition point is conservatively estimated to be approximately 15 ksi-in1/2.  This 
transition point is a source of uncertainty.  
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Another important aspect of the corrosion fatigue crack growth modeling is the threshold 
conditions below which crack growth will not occur.  This threshold has been found to be 
independent of the environment but dependent on the R, the ratio of the minimum to the 
maximum loading.  It has been shown to be also dependent on the tensile properties and 
microstructure of the material [41]. 
 
The effective stress intensity factor, defined in Equation 3.8b, is a reasonable 
parameter to account for the influence of R as environmental conditions do not seem to 
have much effect on the threshold conditions for crack growth.  The work of Paris [42] 
and Ritchie [43] show that a threshold effective stress intensity factor for a given 
material, heat treatment and temperature is not as dependent on R, as the threshold cyclic 
stress intensity factor.  This makes it a better measure of the threshold crack growth 
condition. 
 
Research by Coke [44] found that a parameter resembling the effective stress 
intensity factor was independent of R.  This suggests that this modified stress intensity 
factor could be used to characterize the threshold conditions, is applicable over all stress 
ratios and would be more representative of a true material constant.    The expression of 











The threshold value of the effective stress intensity factor, in equation 3.39, is estimated 
from the data taken from Figure 3.3.  A conservative value from the results in Figure 3.4 
is 12 ksi-in1/2 . 
 
Both the transition and threshold stress intensity factors are treated as constants in 
this analysis.  More data would be required to fully evaluate the uncertainties and the 
sensitivity of the results.   No consideration is taken of any underlying distribution that 
would be a better model of these quantities for the remainder of this analysis.  
  
A model to adequately estimate corrosion fatigue crack growth has been 
developed.  This model is superior to the deterministic model developed by SWRI and 
detailed before, since it characterizes the major epistemic uncertainties associated with 
corrosion fatigue crack growth.  These uncertainties arise because of unknowns in the 
material response to stress field in the plastic zone surrounding the crack tip as well as the 
material properties itself.  The model also takes into account transition and threshold 
stress intensity factors.  These points on the crack growth curve identify the change in 
crack propagation phenomenon and the initiation of fatigue crack growth respectively. 
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The parameters of the crack growth equation are distributed quantities.  Parameter   
C is lognormally distributed with parameters given in Table 3.5.  Parameter m is normally 
distributed with parameters given in Table 3.6.  This result is assumed to be applicable to 
parent material, weld material and heat affected zone material for DOT 3AA specified 
material used to manufacture CNG cylinders.  This relation will be used to model crack 
growth leading to failure whether by leakage or fracture.  All that is required now to 






CHAPTER 4: STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR 
DETERMINATION 
 
Stress intensity factors are determined within the framework of LEFM crack 
driving force solutions to finite element analysis of cracked surfaces.  Two somewhat 
different approaches are required for cracks in the sidewalls of the cylinder and cracks in 
the transition regions and ends.  Stress intensity factor solutions are obtained by relating 
the internal pressure, stresses, geometry, crack shape and geometry to crack driving force 
solutions obtained from finite element analysis.  The stress intensity factor solutions are 
























Figure 4.2   Cross-Section Typical Flat-bottom CNG Cylinder Design 
 
 
Two configurations of cylinders are considered for this analysis.  The first design 
in Figure 4.1 has a hemispherical dome at the bottom and is termed hemispherical 
cylinders.  The second design shown in Figure 4.2 has an inverted hemi-spherical end 
which gives it a flat surface and is typically called   a flat-bottom design.  Laboratory and 
analytical research sponsored by Gas Research Institute (GRI) [4] has shown that both 
designs have different operating lives.  Flat-bottom designs have been found to fail more 
by catastrophic rupture, by a crack growing until it becomes unstable rather than a crack 
growing through the sidewall causing leakage, as is typically found for the hemi-
spherical design. 
 
Stress analysis conducted on the two designs showed that the stress distribution 




the sidewalls.  A crack is therefore most likely to originate in this area and under the 
influence of the crack driving force grow to failure.  The nature of the failure, whether 
rupture or leaking is to be determined by the material properties, the initial crack size and 
the crack growth rate.  Experiments have been done which shows resistance of CNG 
cylinder materials to rapid corrosion fatigue crack growth.  Leakage is expected to 
occurring before rupture, for the hemispherical end design [3]. 
 
Flat-bottom cylinders have developed circumferential cracks in the transition 
region under fatigue testing.  Small initial defect in the transition region tend to grow 
rapidly and usually results in rupture of the cylinders [4].  The sidewall region of the flat-
bottom design showed similar fatigue performance as the hemi-spherical bottom design. 
 
Determination of the stress intensity factor, in the transition region, and in the 
sidewalls of both designs is necessary in order to complete the probabilistic physical 
model of corrosion fatigue crack.  The stress intensity factor will also help us determine 
whether the cylinder will fail by leakage as a crack grows through the sidewall and 
remains stable throughout the life of a cylinder or for unstable crack growth to occur 
resulting in rupture. 
 
The stress intensity factor for the sidewall is the same for both configuration 
shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.  The stress profile in the transition region of the 




modeling is also quite different.  In the case of cylinders with hemispherical ends it can 
be seen that hoop stress is the predominant in the transition region as is the case with the 
sidewall.  The high residual bending stress arising from the spinning operation during 
manufacturing when combined with the hoop stress creates a complex stress distribution.  
The resultant stress is greater than the hoop stress and will cause a small initial defect to 
grow more rapidly resulting in a shorter fatigue life.  The approach to determining the 
stress intensity factors is now detailed. 
 
4.1 Sidewalls of Cylinder 
For the cylindrical portion or sidewalls of the cylinder the stress intensity solution 
equations are based on fits to extensive three-dimensional finite element stress analyses 
of pressurized cylinders containing internal semi-elliptical surface cracks having a wide 
range of crack sizes and shapes by Newman and Raju [45].  Stress intensity factor 
solutions were obtained by solving the complimentary problem of applied stresses on the 
crack surface. 
 
CNG cylinders are considered to be thin-walled pressure vessels.  It is therefore 
assumed that the wall is thin enough such that the radial stress component in the wall is 
negligibly small compared to the tangential or hoop stress which is uniform across the 
thickness.  Cracks in the sidewall of the cylindrical portion as shown in Figure 4.3, are 
therefore driven by stresses which are uniform through the thickness except at the crack 




simplification as the longitudinal and the hoop stresses can be easily determined from 
closed form solutions.  The tangential and longitudinal stresses are given by Equations 




























Comparing the two equations it may be noted that the tangential or hoop stress, σt 
is twice the longitudinal stress σl.  Because a biaxial state of stress exists we should 




at a sufficient distance away from the transition region or the dome heads.  For simplicity 
we will consider only the effect of the hoop stress on the crack surface and the crack 
driving force is assumed to apply to all of the sidewall.  
 
The cylinder length, 2b, has negligible effect on the stress intensity for the typical 





≥                                                            (4.3) 
 
 
The results for a typical cylinder are assumed to be applicable to all DOT-3AA cylinder 
sizes.  The remainder of this analysis will be conducted with the dimensions for a typical 
cylinder used to represent performance of all cylinder sizes.  
Stress intensity factor solution for a pressurized cylinder was obtained by Newman and 
Raju [45] by superposition of four stress distributions on a three dimensional finite 
element model of a cracked surface.  The stress distributions applied to the cracked 
surface were constant, linear, quadratic and cubic.  The in-plane symmetric stresses in the 
three dimensional finite element model in Figure 4.4, as a result of the four applied stress 

















for j from 0 to 3 identifying each stress distribution separately.  z is measured from the 
crack mouth towards the crack front as shown in Figure 4.5 and a is the crack depth 




































Figure 4.5   Distribution of Loading on Crack Surface [45] 
 
Mode 1 stress-intensity factor, KI, at any point along the crack surface can be written with 





















jG boundary correction factor corresponding to the jth stress distribution
Q shape factor for an elliptical crack
a crack depth
c crack half angle
t thickness of cylinder material














For the four stress distributions j = 0 to 3.  The shape factor for an elliptical crack, Q, is 
given by the square of the complete elliptical integral of the second kind and is 













Superposition of the results for the different stress distributions and the general 
expression given in Equation 4.5 gives the stress-intensity factors solutions for two 
symmetrical surface cracks in an internally pressurized CNG cylinder.  Incorporating the 
dimensions of the cylinder and the internal pressure for convenience the stress-intensity 



















RKI                                              (4.7) 
 
 
where, ρR/t is the hoop stress and is equivalent to the average stress for the four loading 
conditions assumed in the finite element model.  F is a function that accounts for 
boundary correction for a surface crack on the inside and outside of the cylindrical 
sidewall for an internally pressurized cylinder.  F depends on the geometric parameters: 





The function F was determined from the first four terms of the power series expansion of 
Lame=s stress intensity factor solutions [47] for the hoop stress in an internally 
pressurized cylinder, plus the internal pressure applied to the crack surface.  An 
expression for F, obtained in terms of the boundary correction factor Gj, for the jth stress 



















































tF                       (4.8) 
 
 
where, Gj is obtained from the finite element solution for the stress distribution in each of 
the planes under consideration.  The correction factor F, includes the influence of the 
internal pressure, ρ, acting on the crack surfaces.  The finite element solutions for Gj 
under each loading conditions is shown in Table 4.1 to 4.4 for the particular values of a/c, 
a/t, R/t andφ.  These boundary correction factors will be used with the pressure 
fluctuation in the cylinder and the crack size distribution to determine the stress intensity 
factor distribution for the sidewalls of the cylinder.  The stress intensity factor 







Table 4.1   Influence Coefficients, Gj , Semi-Elliptical Crack on Inside of a Cylinder ( t / R = 0.1) [45] 
 
a/c 0.2 0.4 1.0 TYPE OF 
LOADING 2φ/π a/t 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0  0.607 0.791 1.179 0.777 0.936 1.219 1.140 1.219 1.348 
0.25  0.740 0.932 1.284 0.810 0.948 1.164 1.068 1.126 1.200 
0.5  0.945 1.188 1.568 0.940 1.076 1.243 1.033 1.074 1.091 
0.75  1.073 1.366 1.798 1.038 1.180 1.357 1.019 1.055 1.090 
UNIFORM 
(G0) 
1.0  1.115 1.427 1.872 1.072 1.217 1.393 1.015 1.050 1.090 
0  0.079 0.138 0.253 0.125 0.176 0.259 0.197 0.221 0.255 
0.25  0.206 0.268 0.374 0.246 0.291 0.356 0.359 0.377 0.397 
0.5  0.422 0.503 0.619 0.422 0.487 0.538 0.541 0.554 0.555 
0.75  0.603 0.705 0.859 0.608 0.657 0.727 0.669 0.683 0.703 
LINEAR 
(G1) 
1.0  0.673 0.783 0.960 0.672 0.723 0.806 0.715 0.729 0.760 
0  0.023 0.052 0.104 0.043 0.069 0.106 0.074 0.085 0.099 
0.25  0.075 0.105 0.154 0.097 0.119 0.149 0.153 0.162 0.170 
0.5  0.237 0.277 0.331 0.256 0.279 0.302 0.333 0.339 0.337 
0.75  0.429 0.480 0.560 0.441 0.466 0.505 0.514 0.520 0.533 
QUADRATIC 
(G2) 
1.0  0.514 0.571 0.671 0.523 0.549 0.601 0.588 0.596 0.618 
0  0.010 0.027 0.056 0.021 0.036 0.056 0.038 0.044 0.051 
0.25  0.032 0.049 0.077 0.044 0.058 0.074 0.075 0.080 0.085 
0.5  0.146 0.169 0.199 0.161 0.174 0.187 0.218 0.222 0.219 








Table 4.2   Influence Coefficients, Gj , Semi-Elliptical Crack on Inside of a Cylinder ( t / R = 0.25) [45] 
 
a/c 0.2 0.4 1.0 TYPE OF 
LOADING 2φ/π a/t 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0  0.606 0.797 1.201 0.770 0.924 1.219 1.128 1.191 1.316 
0.25  0.736 0.925 1.270 0.801 0.932 1.154 1.058 1.105 1.180 
0.5  0.935 1.170 1.549 0.928 1.056 1.241 1.025 1.060 1.088 
0.75  1.057 1.343 1.838 1.024 1.157 1.385 1.013 1.045 1.099 
UNIFORM 
(G0) 
1.0  1.097 1.405 1.959 1.057 1.193 1.443 1.009 1.041 1.105 
0  0.079 0.141 0.262 0.123 0.174 0.263 0.194 0.214 0.248 
0.25  0.205 0.268 0.372 0.243 0.287 0.356 0.356 0.371 0.393 
0.5  0.419 0.498 0.615 0.438 0.481 0.540 0.538 0.550 0.556 
0.75  0.598 0.698 0.876 0.603 0.650 0.740 0.667 0.680 0.708 
LINEAR 
(G1) 
1.0  0.666 0.776 0.996 0.666 0.715 0.828 0.713 0.726 0.768 
0  0.023 0.054 0.108 0.042 0.068 0.109 0.072 0.082 0.097 
0.25  0.075 0.106 0.154 0.096 0.118 0.150 0.152 0.159 0.169 
0.5  0.236 0.275 0.330 0.254 0.276 0.304 0.332 0.338 0.339 
0.75  0.426 0.477 0.571 0.439 0.462 0.513 0.512 0.519 0.537 
QUADRATIC 
(G2) 
1.0  0.511 0.567 0.692 0.520 0.545 0.614 0.588 0.594 0.623 
0  0.010 0.028 0.059 0.021 0.036 0.059 0.037 0.043 0.050 
0.25  0.032 0.050 0.077 0.044 0.057 0.075 0.075 0.079 0.085 
0.5  0.145 0.168 0.199 0.160 0.173 0.188 0.217 0.221 0.220 
0.75  0.330 0.361 0.419 0.345 0.358 0.391 0.416 0.419 0.431 
CUBIC 
(G3) 




Table 4.3   Influence Coefficients, Gj , Semi-Elliptical Crack on Outside of a Cylinder ( t / R = 0.1) [Newman Raju] 
 
a/c 0.2 0.4 1.0 TYPE OF 
LOADING 2φ/π a/t 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0  0.612 0.806 1.262 0.788 0.984 1.378 1.156 1.266 1.453 
0.25  0.750 0.968 1.432 0.823 1.002 1.325 1.082 1.165 1.278 
0.5  0.965 1.272 1.867 0.958 1.147 1.425 1.044 1.106 1.144 
0.75  1.102 1.502 2.208 1.061 1.267 1.541 1.029 1.083 1.125 
UNIFORM 
(G0) 
1.0  1.147 1.584 2.298 1.096 1.310 1.565 1.025 1.078 1.118 
0  0.080 0.142 0.277 0.128 0.192 0.309 0.202 0.236 0.286 
0.25  0.208 0.279 0.419 0.250 0.309 0.406 0.363 0.390 0.421 
0.5  0.428 0.530 0.715 0.448 0.511 0.595 0.544 0.565 0.570 
0.75  0.614 0.752 0.993 0.616 0.687 0.784 0.673 0.692 0.712 
LINEAR 
(G1) 
1.0  0.685 0.839 1.099 0.680 0.755 0.858 0.718 0.738 0.765 
0  0.023 0.053 0.114 0.045 0.076 0.129 0.076 0.092 0.113 
0.25  0.076 0.110 0.175 0.099 0.128 0.173 0.155 0.168 0.181 
0.5  0.240 0.290 0.377 0.259 0.290 0.329 0.335 0.344 0.344 
0.75  0.434 0.504 0.626 0.445 0.481 0.531 0.515 0.524 0.536 
QUADRATIC 
(G2) 
1.0  0.521 0.600 0.739 0.528 0.565 0.625 0.590 0.600 0.619 
0  0.010 0.028 0.062 0.022 0.040 0.070 0.039 0.048 0.059 
0.25  0.032 0.052 0.088 0.046 0.063 0.088 0.077 0.084 0.091 
0.5  0.147 0.177 0.226 0.163 0.181 0.202 0.219 0.224 0.222 
0.75  0.335 0.378 0.450 0.349 0.370 0.400 0.418 0.422 0.430 
CUBIC 
(G3) 




Table 4.4   Influence Coefficients, Gj , Semi-Elliptical Crack on Outside of a Cylinder ( t / R = 0.25) [45] 
 
a/c 0.2 0.4 1.0 TYPE OF 
LOADING 2φ/π a/t 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 
0  0.612 0.786 1.160 0.793 0.994 1.400 1.163 1.286 1.498 
0.25  0.752 0.952 1.346 0.828 1.016 1.365 1.088 1.184 1.320 
0.5  0.972 1.278 1.860 0.967 1.175 1.513 1.049 1.123 1.183 
0.75  1.114 1.541 2.344 1.072 1.311 1.682 1.034 1.100 1.163 
UNIFORM 
(G0) 
1.0  1.162 1.640 2.510 1.109 1.360 1.727 1.030 1.094 1.156 
0  0.080 0.134 0.242 0.130 0.195 0.318 0.204 0.243 0.302 
0.25  0.209 0.272 0.372 0.252 0.315 0.421 0.365 0.396 0.435 
0.5  0.430 0.532 0.713 0.451 0.521 0.626 0.546 0.570 0.583 
0.75  0.618 0.767 1.044 0.620 0.702 0.833 0.674 0.698 0.724 
LINEAR 
(G1) 
1.0  0.691 0.861 1.178 0.685 0.773 0.914 0.720 0.743 0.777 
0  0.023 0.049 0.097 0.045 0.078 0.134 0.077 0.096 0.122 
0.25  0.076 0.106 0.159 0.100 0.130 0.180 0.156 0.171 0.188 
0.5  0.241 0.291 0.376 0.261 0.295 0.345 0.336 0.347 0.350 
0.75  0.437 0.513 0.654 0.447 0.489 0.556 0.516 0.527 0.542 
QUADRATIC 
(G2) 
1.0  0.524 0.613 0.782 0.530 0.575 0.653 0.591 0.603 0.625 
0  0.010 0.025 0.051 0.022 0.041 0.073 0.040 0.051 0.064 
0.25  0.032 0.050 0.079 0.046 0.064 0.093 0.077 0.086 0.095 
0.5  0.148 0.177 0.255 0.164 0.184 0.212 0.220 0.226 0.226 
0.75  0.337 0.383 0.468 0.350 0.375 0.416 0.418 0.424 0.433 
CUBIC 
(G3) 




4.2 Transition Region and Ends of Cylinder 
Cracks in the transition region and ends of the cylinder complicate the analysis of 
the CNG cylinder.  At the transition region the stress distribution is much more complex 
because of the changing geometry and numerical analysis is required to obtain the stress 
distribution and the stress intensity factors for circumferential cracks in this section of the 
cylinder.  Numerical analysis is required because unlike the case of the sidewalls the 
stress distribution in not uniform.  The changing geometry of the cylinder causes the 
stress distribution on the crack surface to change with the cylinder profile.  As a result the 
boundary correction factors and influence coefficients at any crack site cannot be 
determined by application of arbitrary stress fields and modeling the crack response.  
This complexity makes it difficult to determine both the crack driving force and the stress 
intensity factors in the vicinity of the crack tip.   
 
Contrasting this with the case of the sidewalls where the stresses are uniform 
through the thickness of the cylinder so the stresses can be included into the stress 
intensity factor relationship without regards to variation across the cross section.  These 
stresses are therefore directly calculable from closed form relationships and applicable to 
the stress intensity factor relationship.  
 
The two geometries of the cylinder bottom and transition regions shown in Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2 are considered separately.  The end for fitting a threaded connection is 
the same in both cases.  In order to simplify the analysis the highest stresses determined 




transition regions and the ends where changing geometries are encountered.  It should be 
noted that this assumption will not affect the accuracy of the results as the crack with the 
highest driving force will propagate to failure and we had assumed before that cracks are 
independently distributed and do not interact with each other as they grow to failure.  
 
To obtain stress intensity factor solutions a detailed three-dimensional finite 
element analysis approach with representative cracks was attempted in a previous 
research project [4].  A finite element model of the transition region of the flat- bottom 

















Figure 4.6b   Finite Element Model of Flat Bottomed CNG Cylinder [4] 
 
 
The three-dimensional analysis is complex and the results unable to be directly 
incorporated into probabilistic corrosion fatigue model that was developed in Chapter 3.  
It would not be possible to model the corrosion fatigue crack growth with the existing 
relationship developed.  A simpler approximate approach was proposed to get the stress 
intensity factors [45] and will be used to determine the stress intensity factor solutions for 
cracks in the transition region and ends.   
 
The essence of this approximate approach is to use existing stress intensity factor 
solutions developed for components with similar stress distributions and to calibrate the 
solutions based on results derived from three dimensional finite element analysis of 
actual CNG cylinder profile.  In the case of CNG cylinders stress intensity factor 




bending and tension seems the most suitable.  This is quite appropriate for CNG cylinders 
as we will recall from the manufacturing process of cylinders highlighted in Chapter 1, 
the residual stresses would be bending and tension, if the cylinder was manufactured 
from flat plate or billets.  The spinning operations shown in Figure 1.7, used to form the 
bottom and neck of cylinder involving heating and bending the material in all three 
manufacturing processes.  For these reasons it is assumed that the finite element solution 
for a flat plate under bending and tension is applicable to the transition regions of CNG 
cylinders.   
 
The radius of curvature of a cylinder and the non-uniform profile in the transition 
region significantly affects the stress distribution and therefore the accuracy of the 
simplified approach being used.  The three dimensional crack profile is a source of 
uncertainty in mapping the results of a flat plate under biaxial stress with a surface crack 
in a cylinder.  A calibration factor is used to map the two results for a few crack sizes in 
the three dimensional model shown in Figure 4.6 to the predicted result using the 
simplified model.   
 
To calibrate the results for a flat plate this approach involves multiplying the 
stress intensity factor solutions for a flat plate under bending and tension by a factor.  
This factor was determined from detailed three dimensional finite element analysis, done 
for a limited number of crack geometries in which the exact stress intensity factor at 
various angles around the crack front was calculated.  A finite element model with the 




stresses were predicted from two dimensional analysis to be highest and where cracks 
were encountered in fatigue testing done in the laboratory.  As was expected the highest 
stress intensity factors for the geometries was found along the deepest point at the front.   
 
The results of the detailed three dimensional analysis were then compared with 
the stress intensity factors that are predicted by the Raju and Newman empirical stress 
intensity factor equations for a surface crack on a flat plate in bending and tension [46].  
The exact crack geometries were used and the deepest point at the crack front was used to 
estimate the empirical result from the stress intensity factor solutions.  Comparing the 
results shown in Table 4.5 we see that the highest ratio of under reporting of the stress 
intensity factor, for three different crack sizes and aspect ratio was 21 % [4]. 
 
Table 4.5   Comparison between Newman-Raju Empirical and Finite Element Stress 
          Intensity Factor Solutions at the Deepest Point along Crack Front 
 
Crack Geometry Stress Intensity Factor (ksi-in1/2) Factors 
a/t a/c Empirical Results Finite Element Results % Difference 
0.15 0.50 17.9 22.7 21 
0.30 0.50 21.8 25.7 16 
0.50 0.50 22.2 26.3 16 
 
 
Under prediction of the stress intensity factor by the empirical results is probably 
due to the use of a flat plate analysis to represent the cylinder which ignores the influence 
of the curvature. The stress intensity factor from this geometry is expected to be 
somewhat different for a radial crack in a cylinder.    Additionally the use of the stresses 
determined by a two dimensional finite element analysis to represent the remote stresses 
at the crack surface is subject to errors in mapping the exact three dimensional 




stress distribution and geometric profile making the results from the stress intensity factor 
solutions for a flat plate with a crack representative of a crack in the curvature of the 
transition region of a cylinder.  This calibration factor was used for all crack sizes and 
will lead to conservative results for the stress intensity factors for other crack sizes.  
  
Three dimensional finite element stress intensity factor solutions by Raju and 
Newman for flat plates under bending and tension [46], calibrated for the cylinder 
geometry can be used to approximate the stress intensity factors due to the complex stress 
distribution at the crack tips in the ends and transition regions of the CNG cylinder.   The 
method of forming the head and the ends by the spinning process makes this a credible 
approximation for the complex stresses in the transition region. 
   
The empirical stress intensity factor equation for a surface crack in a finite plate 
subjected to combined loading of tension and bending loads as a function of the crack 















aHSSK btI                          (4.9) 
 
 
for 0 < a/c < 1.0,  0 < a/t < 1.0,  c/b < 0.5 , and 0 < φ < π.  The crack parameters are 
defined in Figure 4.3. 
 
St, is the remote uniform tensile stress and Sb, is the remote bending stress. The 
remote bending and tensile stresses in the transition region and ends can only be 




the stress intensity factor relationship to account for the difference in the stress 
distribution.  Since the cylinder is thin enough for plain stress conditions to exist, two 
dimensional finite element analysis of the un-cracked cylinder will be used to determine 
the stresses.  The nodal solution stresses of the inner surface will be used in Equation 4.9.   
 
4.2.1 Finite Element Analysis 
The finite element analysis was performed on the un-cracked cylinder to determine 
the bending and tension stresses which are then inputted into the stress intensity factor 
solution.  This two dimensional analysis was carried out using ANSYS Mechanical and 
Structural Analysis finite element code.  Eight-noded two dimensional elements were 
chosen, with two degrees of freedom at each node for translations in the x and y 
directions.  This element was chosen as it has compatible displacement shapes and is well 
suited to model curved boundaries.  Due to the symmetric nature of the cylinder 
geometry only one- quarter of the cylinder was modeled and automatic meshes used.  The 
internal of the cylinder was subjected to a pressure loading of 2700 psi.  The following 
material properties were used in the finite element analysis: 
 
Young’s Modulus 29 x106 psi 
Poisson ratio of 0.3 
Internal Radius 5.0 inches 
Sidewall thickness 0.35 
 
Analysis was performed for the hemi-spherical bottom as well as the flat bottom 




shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. Most notable result from this analysis is the presence 
of a region of high stress on the inner surface of the transition regions.  This is the 
location where the crack driving force is expected to be the highest and accelerated crack 
growth is expected to occur.  Further more, the stresses are much higher than the stresses 
in the cylindrical portion and therefore the areas where leakage is most likely to be 
expected.  Notable from the analysis as well is the presence of a large bending moment 
where the stress go from tensile on the inner surface of the cylinder to compressive on the 
outside surface.  The stresses in the flat-bottom design cylinder design are higher than the 
hemi-spherical bottom design as was expected.  The results of the flat-bottom design will 
be used as input to the stress intensity factor solution.  This will result in unnecessarily 
conservative result for cylinder fatigue life as this would be the lower bound expected for 











Figure 4.8   Elemental Stresses for Hemi-Spherical Bottom Cylinder Design 
 
The linearized nodal stresses for a path defined across the transitional region for 
the flat bottom design is plotted in Figure 4.8.  It can be seen that the linearized stresses 
are a straight line and would suggest that it is a combination of pure bending stress on 
which is superimposed a proportionately very small tension stress.  The use of only 
bending stresses at nodal points along a path across the cross section of the transitional 
region in the stress intensity factor solution of Equation 4.9 is justified.  This is how we 






Figure 4.9 Linearized Stresses across Cross Section of Transition Region 
 
Equation 4.10 was derived from the results for the linearized stresses across the 
thickness from the inside to the outside of the cylinder for a typical cylinder, similar to 
the one used in the previous finite element analysis.  The results were obtained by 
meshing the digitized cross section of an actual CNG cylinder using ABACUS finite 
element code at SWRI.  Since these results will more accurately represent the stress 
distribution in an actual cylinder they will be used instead of the generic shape that was 
used in this finite element analysis [4].  
 
S = 66.139 – 219.19d                        (4.10) 




The linear relationship between the stress and the distance across the cross section shows 
that the stress is approximately pure bending with an insignificant tension stress 
superimposed on it.  The tension stress will therefore be ignored in Equation 4.9 and the 
linearized result from Equation 4.10 will be used to calculate the stress intensity factor 
for the transition region in a CNG cylinder.   
 
4.2.2 Transition Region Stress Intensity Factor  
The stress intensity factor for the transition region is given by Equation 4.9.  The 
stress component was determined by linearlizing the results of finite element analysis 

















The function, F, was obtained by Newman and Raju from a systematic curve-fitting 
procedure by using double-series polynomials in terms of parameters a/c, a/t, and angular 
functions of φ.  The stress intensity factor boundary correction factor relationship 































































































++=                                      (4.15) 
 
 











+φ=φ                                             (4.16) 
 
 













csecfw                                                 (4.17) 
 
 
The function fc is the ratio of boundary correction factor for cylinder to flat plate and 


























The curvature correction factor fc determined from boundary correction for a flat plate 
compared with a surface  with a curvature [45] was determine to be true for t/R ≤ 0.25 
t/R, which applies to the typical CNG cylinders under consideration. 
 
The function H, was also developed by curve fitting and engineering judgments and has 
the form [46]. 
 














































+=                                           (4.23) 
 
































The approximate expression for the stress intensity factor KI for a wide range of 
configuration parameters was found to be within ± 5% of the results obtained by 
boundary layer integral method [49] and from finite-element methods [46].  
 
The finite element solution results obtained for a single crack was found to be less 
than 4% [45 – 46], [50] of that obtained from the approximate equation for two 
symmetrically surface cracks given above.  Thus the stress-intensity factor relationship 
can be used for a single surface crack without significant error.   
 
Calibrating the stress intensity factor derived from this empirical relationship with 
the factor of 1.21 will effectively map the result for flat plate to a typical CNG cylinder.  
The resulting empirical stress intensity factor relationship, representing crack driving 
force at the crack front is given by 
   ( )a a a cI b Q t c bK 1.21(HS ) F , , ,= π φ      (4.26) 
 
where the bending stress, Sb,  is given by Equation 4.10, shape factor for elliptical crack, 
Q, is given by Equation 4.6.  F and H after simplification are given by Equations 4.27 
and 4.28. [50]. 
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The stress intensity factor relationship for cracks in the transition region and sidewalls of 
the cylinder has now been developed.  Only semi-elliptical crack shapes were considered 
and the crack is assumed to retain the shape as it grows through the sidewall.  While 
undoubtedly cracks can change shape as they grow and may not have a semi-elliptical 
profile, such simplification should not affect the accuracy of the results [51 – 53].  What 
is left now is to categorize the cylinder fracture performance completing the development 
of the physics of failure model.  Categorizing fracture involve modeling the behavior of 
the cylinder beyond sub-critical crack growth to when unstable final fracture or Stage III 




CHAPTER 5: FRACTURE PERFORMANCE OF 
CYLINDER 
 
5.1 EPFM Cylinder Fracture Performance 
Unstable crack growth leading to final fracture for CNG cylinders is best 
characterized by EPFM.  This is so because the typical thickness of a CNG cylinder is not 
enough for plain strain conditions determined by Equation 2.1, to exist.  What this means 
is that the plastic region surrounding the crack tip will have an impact on the fracture 
performance.  If this impact is such that nonlinear elastic conditions predominate then 
invoking LEFM criteria could lead to significant error in predicting the onset of failure.  
The results would be conservative as strain relaxation at the crack tip would reduce the 
effect of the crack driving force in propagating the crack with increased stress.  
 
There are four EPFM criteria used to identify the onset of unstable crack growth 
which are applicable to CNG cylinder fracture analysis.  The governing criterion to be 
used in this analysis is the one that predicts the smallest unstable crack size. 
 
5.1.1 J-Integral Failure Criterion 
This failure criterion is the exceeding of the critical J-integral value, JIC.  The 
parameter, J, is Rice's J-integral and is a measure of the crack driving force.  J is the 













∫ −=                                                (5.1) 
 
The integral is performed around the arbitrarily chosen closed contour around the crack 
tip, Γ, shown in Figure 5.1, w is the strain energy density, Ti, is the outward traction 
vector on an increment of path, Γ, ds.  The displacement of increment is ds along outward 
traction vector is ui.  Since J is an independent path, it will have the same values for all 
choices of Γ. 
 
J-Integral fracture criterion has been extensively used to evaluate non-elastic 
crack growth and fracture [54 – 56].  Numerous experimental verification of its adequacy 
as a EPFM criterion has been completed [57 - 59] as long as applied loads increase 












The elastic-plastic zone around the crack tip for which this model is valid is called the J-
dominant region.   The intensity of the crack-tip stress-strain fields in the J-dominant 
region are completely characterized by the single J parameter.  Failure of the material by 
unstable crack growth will be associated with a critical value of J, namely, JIC [60].  That 
is instability will exist and can propagate to failure when 
 
J ≥ JIC                                                          (5.2a) 
or 
         J(Driving Force) ≥ J(Material Resistance)                             (5.2b) 
 
If crack tip plasticity is negligible then J integral analysis will produce the same results as 
LEFM. 
 
Use of JIC as a sufficient criterion for unstable crack growth to occur leading to 
rupture is conservative.  This is because it does not take into account the increased crack 
driving force required to grow a crack once JIC is exceeded.  In order to include the 
increased driving force required to grow a crack beyond JIC, the tearing instability 
criterion by Paris [61] should be used.  
 
5.1.2 Tearing Instability Criterion 
The tearing instability criterion is derived from the J-resistance curve.  From the 
schematic curve shown in Figure 5.2, it is obvious that if the crack driving force J, 
exceeds the critical value, JIC, extending the crack further can cause the material 




follows significant growth in crack extension with applied J level which is explained by 
coalescing of micro voids in the material.  Material resistance will subsequently increase 
as further crack extension can only occur with ductile tearing of the material at the crack 









Figure 5.2   Schematic Representation of Material J-Integral Resistance Curve 
 
From Figure 5.2 we can see that the applied crack driving force also increases 
with increasing crack extension.  Unstable crack will occur when the rate of change of the 
material resistance to crack growth as the crack length increases is less than the rate of 
increase in crack driving force.  This is the essence of the tearing instability criterion and 
















                                   (5.3) 
 
A dimensionless tearing modulus for the material is sometimes used.  This is denoted by 















=                                              (5.4) 
 
where σ0 is the flow stress of the material and is commonly defined as  [62]. 

















Using the tearing modulus criteria, unstable crack growth leading to cylinder 
rupture will occur when the applied tearing modulus exceeds the material tearing 
modulus.  Intuitively it can be seen that the applied tearing modulus is computed from 
Equation 5.4 by replacing the rate of increase in the crack resistance with crack growth 
with rate of increase of crack driving force with crack extension.  
 
Values for JIC and TMAT have to be determined from data on AISI 4130X materials 
used to manufacture CNG cylinders.  Such data sources could not be identified for this 
research so they will be derived from experimentation done to analyze the EPFM 
properties of CNG cylinder materials.  In actuality JIC and TMAT are distributed quantities 
and should be treated as such.  The data available for evaluating these quantities cannot 




fit and gives no insight into the uncertainty associated with the crack size at which 
instability and cylinder rupture is expected to occur. 
 
From research conducted at SWRI [3] and at Powertech Laboratories [7] the 
graphs shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 were produced.  In Figure 5.3, line a represents an 
estimate of the apparent crack extension associated with crack tip blunting, as the 
specimen is loaded.  JIC is defined as the J-value at which stable crack extension starts.  It 
is represented by intersection of the crack blunting line (line a) and the stable crack 
growth line.  This stable crack growth line is a linear regression fit of the data between 
two lines drawn, that are parallel to line a, and between which the data appears to satisfy 
a linear fit.  The JIC values are subsequently converted to KIC using  






 =  − υ 
   (5.6)  
JIC = 205 in-lb/in2
KIC = 82.2 ks/in
JIC = 199 in-lb/in2
KIC = 81.0 ks/in
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Figure 5.4 Fracture Resistances of the Steels of Type 1 Cylinders and Type 2 Liners [7]  
 
Tensile and fracture properties of steel cylinders manufactured by different companies 
were measured using small scale test specimens at room temperature by Powertech 
Laboratories Inc [7].  Fracture properties of the materials were established using the 
ASTM E813-89 [63] fracture toughness test.  This test method determines a critical value 
of J-integral which characterizes the toughness of a material near the onset of unstable 
crack extension from a pre-existing fatigue crack.  The J-integral values are determined 
from the areas under the load vs. load-line displacement curve, obtained from tests.  The 
tests also produce J-R curves which are plots of J-integral versus ductile crack extension, 
∆ a.  Plots for a range of CNG cylinder materials are shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. 
 
A critical value of J-integral for the onset of unstable crack growth, JIC, is defined 
as the J-integral value corresponding to the intersection of the J-R of the material and an 




obtained from each of the materials.  Table 5.1 summarizes the measured material 
properties. 
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The materials fracture resistance (J-R curves) for the all steel cylinders and steel liners 
are shown in Figure 5.4.  The curve for the Faber all steel cylinder material is steeper 
than that of the Taylor Wharton cylinder material, reflecting a higher fracture toughness 
steel.  The values for JIC , TMAT as well as (dJ/da)MAT and (dJ/da)APPLIED can be estimated 
from Figures 5.3 - 5.4 and Table 5.1 for determining whether tearing instability of the 
material will occur.  The values for the Presses Steel Tank manufactured cylinders will be 
used for the remainder of this analysis even though these results will be conservative in 
the case of cylinders manufactured by Taylor-Wharton but underestimated for cylinders 
manufactured by Faber. 
 
5.1.3 Critical Crack Length Excedence Criterion 
An empirical relationship was developed by Cyltek, Inc [7] that could be used to 
predict the critical crack size for cylinder leaks without performing detailed EPFM 




method [64 - 65], of identifying initiation of unstable crack growth due to plastic collapse 
at the crack front.  The equation that was developed cannot be used for the transition 
regions or the domed ends.  
 
Development of the equation was achieved by performing regression analysis on 
cylinder data generated in EPFM experimental analysis to obtain the functional 
relationship between the critical crack length and the cylinder properties.  The basic 
functional relationship established was that: 
 
LD = f(Cylinder dimensions, Material Properties, Operating Conditions)             
 
More specific to the cylinder and material properties, the critical crack size could be 
represented as follows: 
 
    LD = f(r, t, σH, σy, J0, Jl)                             (5.7) 
 
where LD is the calculated crack length for cylinder to leak instead of fracture.  Cracks 
with lengths less than LD will leak when they penetrate the sidewall.  Conversely, cracks 
greater than LD are expected to cause cylinder to rupture.  This equation covers all 
cylinders, so the critical crack dimensions could be easily determined by inputting the 
cylinder properties into the equation.  The other parameters in the equation are: 
   
  r is the cylinder outer radius, 




  σH is the hoop stress, 
  σy is the yield stress, 
  J0 is the critical J-integral parameter, and 
  Jl  is the slope of the crack growth resistance curve.  
 
The values of the coefficients that define the regression equation were determined by 
statistical analysis and goodness of fit testing.  The final form is shown in Equation 5.8. 
 
( )l0yHJ0313.0H446.0I087.2y1E73.4D J064.0J1.0008.0024.0expJtr4E8.3L 1 −+σ−σ−σσ−= −    (5.8) 
 
The above equation provides a very accurate fit to the critical crack length and could 
therefore be determined without performing detailed fracture analysis.  The variables in 
the parametric equation vary between ranges as shown in Table 5.2 [7]. 
 
Table 5.2   Typical Values for Variables in Parametric Equation 
Variable Description Range Typical Cylinder 
rt Product of Cylinder radius and thickness 0.5 < rt > 5 1.67 
σy Yield Strength 90 < σy >200 125 
σH Hoop Stress 50 < σH > 100 94 
J0 Resistance Curve Intercept 0.2 < J0 > 1.0 0.8 
J1 Resistance Curve Slope 0 < J1 > 60 38 
 
The critical crack length calculated from Equation 5.8 for the typical CNG cylinder being 




LD = 2.89 inches                                                       (5.9) 
 
This compares well with the results of testing done on all steel cylinders where a flaw 
was machined into the wall of the cylinder and pressurized to failure [66].   
 
5.1.4 Net Section Applied Stress Excedence Criterion  
This criterion mostly applies to circumferential cracks in a cylinder, which have 
been determined from experimentation [4] to occur mostly in the transition region.  It is 
also applicable to cracks in the sidewalls except in this case the stress acting on the crack 
surface is hoop stress versus longitudinal stress which occurs with circumferential cracks.   
 
It is possible that the fracture criteria established in the previous three sections can 
predict that crack growth can never go unstable.  In fact such a conclusion has been 
drawn from studies done by [3], [67].  Complete and sudden failures could still occur if 
the remaining cylinder ligament cross-section was not sufficient to support the applied 
loads.  This forms the basis of the net section criterion first suggested by Kanninen [68], 
[57].   
 
Longitudinal applied stress, σL, in the cylinder has to be supported by the 
remaining ligament of the cylinder if there is a circumferential crack in the transition 
region and the hoop stress, σH, in the case of longitudinal cracks in the sidewall.  The 
critical value of the net section stress has been observed to be equal to the flow stress 









=σ     (5.10) 
 
Failure is determined to occur if the condition expressed in Equation 5.11 exists. 
 
F LIG 0 LIG CRACKA (A  - A )σ = σ     (5.11) 
 
where σF is the stress acting on the remaining un-cracked ligament of the cylinder, ALIG 
the cross sectional area of the untracked ligament and ACRACK is the cross sectional area of 
the cracked section. 
 
The flow stress σo has to be determined from the yield and tensile strength of the 
AISI 4130X material.  These tensile properties are not constants, and in fact are variables 
with an under-laying distribution.  Test data on the tensile properties of CNG cylinder 
materials were not available for this research, so deterministic values will be assigned 
based on what is published in the literature.  The flow stress based on the available data is 
calculated to be:  
σ0 = 117 ksi                                                         (5.12) 
 
based on the following published data: 
σYS = 111 ksi                                                       (5.13) 
 




The use of the hoop and longitudinal stresses as the load stress acting on the remaining 
ligament can be questioned.  It should be noted however that these stresses are not 
affected by relaxation in the plastic region of the crack front or deformation of the 
cylinder.  The stresses have to be supported by the uncracked cross section of the 
cylinder.  The maximum cylinder pressure is used when calculating the load stress which 
gives us conservative results as the contents of the cylinder will be leaking thereby 
reducing the pressure.  Ideally, the pressure in the cylinder should be estimated by 
calculating by crack mouth opening displacement and accounting for the pressure drop 
over time with gas flow through the crack mouth opening.  Such complexity is not 
necessary for this analysis as the conservative results provides an adequate criterion.   
 
5.2 LEFM Cylinder Fracture Performance 
LEFM can been used to estimate when unstable crack growth and catastrophic 
rupture is likely to occur.  This approach as has been discussed before is subject to errors 
[7] due to uncertainties arising from the influence of crack tip plasticity.  Crack tip 
plasticity is the condition where a large plastic zone exists ahead of the crack tip (see 
Figure 2.2).  Crack progression occurs because of small scale yielding in the small plastic 
zone surrounding the crack tip and the stress distribution is influenced primarily by the 
free crack surfaces.  At lower frequencies, a precipitous drop in the crack growth rates 
has been noted in [4] as a result of crack flanks being wedged open.  This wedging action 
occurs due to the build up of corrosion products within the crack and the increasing crack 
face asperities as a result of the rough surfaces produced by crack growth in the corrosive 




and produces an increase in crack closure with a concomitant drop in crack growth rates.  
This drop in crack growth rates effectively defines a threshold below which cracks will 
not grow in this environment. 
  
The plastic zone is confined within an elastic field which determines the fracture 
behavior.  The intensity of the local stress field in the region around the plastic zone is 
affected only by the remote boundaries and applied force.  LEFM assumes that the stress-
strain field near a crack tip in a linearly elastic solid is controlled by the stress intensity 
factor, K, and failure will occur when this exceeds a critical value, KIC. 
 
LEFM is a suitable criterion for mechanically thick sections of steel or where 
plasticity is contained in a small region near the crack tip.  Plain strain conditions 
dominate in this situation.  Test conditions with extensive plasticity shows an increasing 
resistance to crack growth as the crack extends upon loading, before it goes unstable, 
with the resultant uncertainty in crack growth behavior if LEFM techniques are applied. 
 
Cracks in the cylinders can be either sub-surface or surface.  For a given crack 
and stress level, surface cracks will be more severe because it will have a larger stress 
intensity factor.  Interior and exterior surface cracks will have different stress distribution 
at the crack tips so the crack driving force solutions will be different.  The same applies 
to cracks in the transition regions and ends of the cylinders.  Cracks located totally within 
the cylinder wall are omitted from consideration in this analysis as only surface cracks 




which should be included in future studies on CNG cylinder risk analysis, its omission 
will not significant alter the calculated failure probabilities, especially if cracks in the 
three distinct regions of the cylinder are considered separately and their effect combined 
to get an overall distribution of failure frequency.  
 
Using LEFM as a failure criterion states that a cylinder will fail catastrophically 
or rupture if the maximum stress intensity factor exceeds the fracture toughness of the 
material.  More specifically if the stress strain field near a crack tip in a linear elastic 
solid is controlled by a single parameter, K, the stress intensity factor then the crack will 
go unstable when the applied value of K exceeds a critical value, KC, the fracture 
toughness.  Under plain strain a condition which applies to CNG cylinders, this property 
is called KIC.  The failure criterion can therefore be written as: 
 
Kapplied > KIC                                                        (5.15) 
 
The fracture toughness can be considered a material property much like ultimate tensile 
stress which depends on temperature, alloying materials, loading rate and strength.  
 
Fracture toughness is a distributed quantity dependent on the carbides present, 
temperature and other factor which results in uncertainties which are aleatory in nature 
[71].  Fracture toughness data typically exhibit noticeable scatter even when testing is 
performed according to the specifications in ASTM Standard E399-90 [72].  Low alloy 




to brittle transition region at low temperatures.  This behavior is under current research 
and continues to be a phenomenon that can impact fatigue life of steel components 
especially at low temperatures [73]. 
 
Compressed natural gas buses are required to be used in various climactic 
conditions.  The NGV-2 standard does not specify a minimum operating temperature for 
such vehicles.  The cylinders can therefore be exposed to temperatures below the ductile 
transition temperatures.  However the fatigue life at low temperatures have not been 
documented and consistent with the ductile to brittle transition expected at certain 
temperatures, the fatigue life is expected to be less.  No data was available to compute the 
effect of temperature on the fracture toughness.  This remains an area of considerable 
uncertainty based on the use profile of a typical bus.  In the absence of relevant data to 
analyze this important effect, no attempt will be made to model the effect of temperature 
and carbide distribution on fracture toughness.   
 
The distribution of KIC will be estimated from Charpy-V-Notch data generated in 
the ISO WG-14 cylinder fracture performance testing [74].  KIC was derived from the 
Charpy Impact data by the common elastic fracture toughness correlation relationship 
shown in Equation 5.16 [75 - 76].  The data used was for fracture test results for cylinder 
steels matching the typical cylinder in the transverse orientation at 20°C degrees C, and 
was fitted to a Weibull distribution.  The results are shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.  
The parameters of this distribution are also shown.  JIC values can be derived from the 
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Figure 5.6   Least Square Fitting of Elastic Fracture Toughness Data 
         
5.2 Fracture Criteria for CNG Cylinders 
The fracture criterions that will most likely result in CNG cylinder failure due to 
corrosion fatigue crack growth will now be determined.  The selection of the criterion 
will be based on which criterion results in the smallest critical crack size for a given crack 
driving force or applied stress. 
 
Figure 5.4 and 5.5 can be used to estimate the crack size that would result in 
unstable crack growth due to tearing instability.  This data is not considered to be 
sufficiently accurate to predict the crack extension that could result in instability so this 





Cracks in the circumferential direction are more likely to become unstable due to the 
remaining ligament criterion.  From equation 5.10 we could estimate the crack length that 
would become unstable.  The cross-sectional area of the crack after the geometry 
refinement of through wall cracks is given by [77]. 
 
( )acrack RA ac 2= +                                                     (5.18) 
where, 
   
a crack depth
c crack half length






Using the longitudinal stress in the cylinder and the flow stress from Equation 5.11, the 
crack depth at which instability would occur can be calculated based on the crack aspect 
ratio of the crack being considered.  This is how the criteria will be applied. 
 
The LEFM (KIC) and EPFM (JIC) fracture toughness is derived from the critical J-
integral value in Table 5.1 and not determined independently.  As such only one will be 
used as a failure criterion.  For this analysis the KIC will be used as the failure criterion in 
the crack growth relationship to determine the critical crack depth.  KIC can be calculated 
from Equation 5.16.  This relationship applies when LEFM conditions are valid.  Never 
the less, this criterion has been used successfully to characterize crack-tip fracture 




relatively large.  The mean value of the distribution of fracture toughness from Table 5.1 
and Equation 5.17 is 
 
KIC = 81 ksi                                                         (5.19) 
 
    Any crack not deep or long enough to cause unstable crack growth and rupture of 
a typical CNG cylinder will be considered to grow only as a fatigue crack until it grows 
through the sidewall.  No further crack growth will be modeled once the crack grows 
through the sidewall, however the crack aspect ratio may change and the crack length at 
all possible aspect ratios will be checked to determine if the length will be such that 
unstable crack growth will occur.  If none of these conditions are met then the cylinder 
will be deemed to have failed by leakage only.  The application of the failure criterion is 
detailed in the numerical computations and shown in a flow diagram in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6:  INITIAL SIZE CRACK DISTRIBUTION 
 
The initial crack size is an important consideration in fracture mechanics 
modeling of cylinder reliability.  In deterministic fatigue crack growth and fracture 
mechanics analysis the crack size is considered to be a specific quantity.  In the analysis 
adopted for this physics of failure modeling, the crack size and the number of cracks are 
considered to be probabilistic in nature, requiring distributions to completely describe the 
crack geometry, and to account for the uncertainties in the available crack size data.   
 
Initial crack size is the input to the physics of failure model that the least 
information is available in order to calculate the frequency of cylinder failure.  Numerous 
attempts were made to ascertain the initial crack size distribution from the known 
manufacturers of cylinders for natural gas vehicles in service in the United States.  This 
effort did not produce results, and as such a generic distribution was adopted based on the 
existing practice of rejecting pressurized industrial cylinders with defect depth greater 
than 5 % of the wall thickness [78].  Elsewhere, it has been reported that initial defect 
size of 0.02 inches can be expected in CNG cylinders [3].  The exact distribution of crack 
sizes would have been ideal for this analysis.  However in most realistic situations, the 
crack depth, length and location through the thickness of the cylinder are important 
considerations, but are subject to such considerable variation that instead what has been 
developed is a methodology to update the generic distribution used for the typical 
cylinder used in this analysis with in service inspection and other data using Bayesian 
 
 134
methods.  This way the distribution used in fatigue life model can be revised to make it 
more applicable to any cylinder being analyzed, whether from initial deployment, after 
inspection when data become available or after repairs.  It should be noted that while the 
discussion so far has only mentioned crack size distribution, that the crack existence 
frequency which is a random variable is equally important and will be considered as part 
of the initial crack distribution.  The initial crack distribution will therefore consist of two 
components: 
 
1) The conditional crack size distribution which is the size distribution given that a 
crack is present. 
  
2) The likelihood function of crack existence which is the underlying distribution 
accounting for the frequency of occurrence of cracks.  This likelihood of 
existence is dependent on the region of the cylinder, whether inside or outside, 
sidewalls or transition region and also on the cylinder design being considered. 
 
When cylinders are manufactured, cracks or other flaws that could contribute to 
corrosion crack growth can either be on the surface or at the sub-surface.  For the purpose 
of this analysis, folds and other such defects which can contribute to crack growth will be 
included as cracks in the initial crack distribution.  In the stress intensity factor 
discussions in Chapter 4, we have established that for a given crack size and stress level, 
the crack driving force on an interior surface crack will be more severe since it has a 
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larger stress intensity factor.  For this analysis, we will concentrate on interior surface 
cracks.  Cracks originating on the outside as well as cracks embedded in the walls will be 
omitted from consideration in the present analysis.  The consideration of only interior 
surface cracks will not significantly affect the accuracy of the results because, based on 
the manufacturing processes, when cracks are expected to be introduced, they are more 
than likely to occur on the inside surface and these are the cracks that will propagate to 
failure [3 – 4], [7]. 
 
We note from the finite element analysis in Chapter 4, and from experimental 
work done on CNG cylinders [4], that circumferential cracks in the transition region 
occur more frequently and have a more damaging effect on cylinder life based on the 
crack driving force in this region.  Consequently, as a further refinement, attention will be 
focused on circumferential cracks in the transition region.  Some analysis will be done for 
cracks in the sidewall to demonstrate the accuracy of this approach.  The typical crack 
geometry considered in this analysis is therefore a circumferential interior surface crack 





Figure 6.1   Initial Crack Geometry Considered In CNG Cylinder  
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Cracks introduced in the cylinder are assumed to have a fixed shape.  The use of semi-
elliptical cracks with random length to depth ratio would be more general in the treatment 
of initial crack size and shapes.  However, the use of a more general crack geometry 
complicates the crack growth calculations and defining the distribution of the initial crack 
size.  To make both the crack depth and length random variables we would need a bi-
variate crack size distribution to fully describe the initial crack size.  The absence of data 
to estimate the parameters of this distribution makes it necessary to consider only the 
crack depth to be randomly distributed.  This will be further discussed in the Sensitivity 
Analysis section of Chapter 9. 
 
The uni-variate distribution where a density function will only be developed for 
the crack depth is marginal distribution.  The density function for this marginal 
distribution can be written as a function of the bi-variate distribution as shown in 
Equation 6.1.  Equation 6.2 describes the bi-variate distribution. 
 




=                                                     (6.1) 
 









This assumption greatly simplifies the initial crack size distribution.  The effort is 
therefore reduced to determining the marginal distribution of the initial crack size based 
on the crack depth.  The crack parameters are as follows: 
   
a is the average of the distribution of crack depth across the material wall thickness  
t is the material wall thickness 
c is the crack half length 
R is the cylinder inside diameter 
R0 is the cylinder outside diameter  
      
Initial crack size, a, is considered to be a random variable that can be fitted to a 
parametric probability distribution density function which adequately accounts for the 
uncertainties in the observed crack size data.  This distribution then describes the 
probability density on crack depth.  The crack frequency of occurrence or density is 
subsequently determined from the observed number of cracks and the fraction of total 
cracks as predicted from the crack depth distribution in the expected depth range. 
   
To account for a crack occurring in the CNG cylinder and propagating to failure, two 
important characteristics are therefore established.  These are the crack depth distribution 
and the rate of occurrence of cracks in a typical cylinder (crack existence frequency).  
The former is the probability distribution of crack size, given that a crack exists and the 
latter is the crack frequency of occurrence.  The two combined give the total cylinder 
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initial crack distribution, fo(a), used in the crack growth model.   This is summarized in 
Figure 6.2. 
 
f(x) dx = fraction of cracks




(Probability Density on Crack Size)
D = Crack density
   = Number of cracks/unit area, or
   = Number of cracks/cylinder volume
Crack Density
(Crack Rate of Occurrence)
N(x) dx = number of cracks in
x to x + dx per selected





Figure 6.2   Components of the Crack Depth Distribution  
 
The procedures that follow derive the initial crack distribution parameter in terms 
of its separate components.  A methodology to update this distribution is also now 
developed. 
 
6.1 Development of a Generic Crack Depth Distribution 
The crack depth is the most important parameter when considering the corrosion-
fatigue life of any component when only elastic strain loading conditions exist.  Surface 
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length is not as significant.  The initial crack depth distribution is generally estimated 
from non-destructive examination of cylinders coming off the production line as detailed 
in Chapter 1.  This data is therefore subjected to a depth characteristic and a detection 
probability. 
 
Information was requested from all the major manufacturers in order to determine 
the type of distribution that would be applicable to cracks in CNG cylinders as well as the 
parameters of this distribution of best fit.  The information was not forth coming for this 
analysis from Faber or Pressed Steel Tank the major manufacturers of steel CNG 
cylinders.  This was due to legal and propriety constraints being cited for divulging such 
information for this academic research.  In fact, a meeting of the CSA/ANSI Technical 
Working Group on NGV was attended [79] with the objective of soliciting the opinion of 
the main participants in cylinder technology as part of an expert opinion solicitation 
process.  This is an acceptable procedure in the absence of data in model and parameter 
uncertainty analysis.  Invitations for such a process were declined by the experts in NGV 
cylinder technology.  Other methods therefore, had to be resorted to in order to determine 
the particular distribution that best models the uncertainties associated with the existence 
of cracks in CNG cylinders and to estimate the  parameters of this distribution. 
 
The only published data on crack depth in manufactured components is provided 
in the work by Hudak of SWRI [80].  This data gives the results of observations on initial 
crack sizes in Inconel weldment.  A lognormal distribution was found to be the best fit as 
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shown in Equation 6.3, with median crack depth , a50 , being 0.0150 inches and the shape 



























1ap                           (6.3) 
 
Since the method of manufacturing compressed natural gas cylinders, detailed in Chapter 
1, is a very different process from that which this model was derived it was not 
considered to be relevant.  It is more relevant in repairing defective cylinders either after 
manufacturing or during in-service inspection.  This model is used for the likelihood 
function in the subsequent Bayesian updating procedure for in-service inspection and 
repairs of existing cylinders.  The application of data on crack depth distribution from 
one type of welding, material properties and thickness of weld-section is questionable.  
Some attempts will be made using the work of Chapman [81] to map the repair procedure 
of CNG cylinders with that of Inconel weldment. 
 
A large number of models have been proposed in the literature to analyze 
pressurized vessels found in the nuclear industry.  Some of them will now be reviewed 
for their relevance in analyzing compressed natural gas cylinders.  The first such 
statistical model by Marshall [82] employs the exponential distribution for the marginal 
distribution of initial crack sizes.  A model proposed by Wilson [83] based on expert 
judgment, also used the exponential distribution for crack depth and surface length.  
 
 141
Becher and Hansen [84] concluded based on inspection of weldments of reactor pressure 
vessels that the depth distribution was lognormal.  Neilssen [85] showed that a gamma 
distribution fitted this same data very well.  The exponential distribution which is derived 
from the Neilssen analysis also fits the data very well. 
 
An analysis of various distributions used to analyze reactor data is shown in 
Figure 6.2 [57].  It clearly shows that the Marshall exponential distribution provides the 
most realistic estimate of the crack depth.  It is also less conservative for small sized 
cracks (below 1 inch) and will be used in the succeeding analysis to represent the initial 
crack depth distribution.    
 
Figure 6.4 Various Complimentary Cumulative Marginal Crack Depth Distributions [57] 
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The exponential distribution representing the marginal distribution of the initial crack 
depth, has the density and cumulative distribution functions shown in Equations 6.4 and 
6.5.  This type of distribution has only one parameter, 8.  The average crack depth µ, is 
given by Equation 6.6. 
 
( )0
1 ap a  exp = − µ µ 
                                               (6.4) 
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1                                                          (6.6) 
 
Equation 6.5 implies that cracks can be of any size from a minimum value.  This 
technically is not possible as cracks cannot have a depth exceeding the cylinder wall 
thickness.  To rectify this, the density function is normalized such that the probability of a 
crack exceeding the pipe thickness is equal to zero.  That is:  
 




For this to happen, the probability of all cracks being equal to or less than t, P0(a ≤ t) 
must be equal to 1.  This is achieved by the normalization of the density function shown 
in Equation 6.8. 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] t a  0for       ,texp1
aexpap0 ≤≤µ−−µ
µ−
=                          (6.8) 
 
It has been discussed earlier in Chapter 6 that average crack depth in CNG 
cylinders resulting from the manufacturing process is not expected to exceed 5% of wall 
thickness.  A value of 0.02 was suggested to be a realistic crack size [4].  This is what 
will be assigned to the expected crack depth in the typical cylinder being considered for 
this analysis.  The distribution of initial crack depth for a typical cylinder is therefore now 
defined.  What is left now to completely define the crack size distribution originating 
from the processes used to manufacture CNG cylinders is the frequency of occurrence of 
cracks or the crack existence frequency. 
 
The uncertainty in the model as well as actual data to derive the parameter of the 
crack size distribution is a major source of uncertainty in the results of this analysis.  
These results have to be updated using the Bayesian methods described in Section 6.3 as 
soon as data becomes available. 
 




6.2 Crack Existence Frequency 
The distribution of crack depth discussed in the previous section integrates to 
unity.  This distribution however is a conditional distribution on a crack being present.  
Just to reiterate, the definition of a crack here includes all defects such as voids, folds and 
other defects which could cause a crack to propagate under the influence of stress 
intensity factor as a crack driving force.  Also, some defects below a certain size are not 
of concern because corrosion-fatigue will proceed at an infinitely slow pace.  Otherwise, 
they are not treatable by the corrosion-fatigue crack growth model because the cyclic 
stress intensity factor falls below the threshold limit discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The crack existence frequency as shown in Figure 6.2 has two components.  
Firstly there is the probability of existence of cracks of a certain depth in the material 
coming out of the manufacturing process, and then there is the probability of detecting 
these cracks and characterizing their dimensions.  Both are distributed quantities which 
will be combined in a Bayesian framework to develop the crack existence frequency. 
 
6.2.1 Probability of Crack Existing 
This section will investigate the probability associated with a crack initially 
existing in a cylinder coming out of the manufacturing process.  Typically, the number of 
cracks in a component is assumed to be Poisson distributed with a mean existence of 
cracks specified per unit volume, area or length.  Which of these are used as the reference 
unit is not important because large variations in the thickness of the cylinder are not 
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expected.  Since only surface cracks are being considered, we will use unit of measure of 
crack existence to be per unit area of cylinder.  We will also treat cracks in the sidewall 
and the ends including the transition region separately. 
 
The surface area of the inside of the cylindrical portion or sidewall is given by: 
 
CA 2 Rh= π                                                    (6.9) 
 
where h is the length of the cylindrical sidewall portion of the cylinder.  Similarly for the 
ends and transition region the surface area is given by: 
 
2
T R4A π=                                                   (6.10) 
 
Since both ends of the cylinder are included the surface area of a sphere is used here and 
the surface areas of the hemi-spherical and flat-bottom designs are assumed to have the 
same surface area. 
 
The probability of having N cracks assuming that the crack existence is a Poisson 
distribution is given by: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
!N




where the intensity function of the Poisson distribution, rate of occurrence of cracks per 
unit area is given by < ,and the area under consideration denoted by, A.  The use of the 
Poisson distribution is justified based on the fact that if the inter-arrival crack sizes are 
exponentially distributed,  as has been deduced to be the case for compressed natural gas 
cylinders, then the number of arrivals in a unit space interval are Poisson distributed [40], 
[71], [87].  The Poisson distribution has been recommended to model the number of 
defects in a batch of material or similar process [88 - 89].  This again is a source of 
uncertainty which has to be reduced when data becomes available. 
 
The probability of having a crack is the compliment of not having a crack.  This 
probability is given by Equation 6.12. 
 
( )ν−−= Aexp1Pa                                           (6.12) 
 
By substituting into Equation 5.11 we can write the probability of having exactly one 
crack to be  
( ) ( )ν−ν= AexpA1P                                         (6.13) 
 
Both expressions can be shown to be equal for very small value of the product of the area 
and the rate of crack occurrence, which is the expected number of cracks in A.   




This shows that the probability of having a crack is approximately equal to the 
probability of having exactly 1 crack.  Also the expected number of cracks varies linearly 
with the crack existence rate per unit area.  We therefore need to estimate < only, in 
order to describe the crack existence frequency. 
 
As is the case with other data pertaining to cracks in compressed natural gas 
cylinders, no data was available in order to estimate this parameter.  Other methods were 
therefore resorted to in order to estimate the crack existence frequency for a typical 
cylinder.  Cracks in the base metal of steel sections used to make thin walled pressure 
vessels was available [90].  The bounds for high strength steel were found to be between 
4x10-5 in-2 and 7.1x10-5 in-2.  It has been shown in Chapter 1 that the process used to 
manufacture CNG cylinders introduces defects and as such the use of results for base 
material not involved in any forging or other forming operations is very conservative.  
The upper bound value of 7.1x10-5 in-2 will be used for the crack density, in this analysis.  
This value of crack density is expected to be very conservative and will be treated as a 
deterministic value representing both the sidewalls and transition regions.  The 
probability of a crack being present will be combined with the frequency of cylinder 
failure assuming a crack is present to get the unconditional frequency of cylinder failure, 
in Chapter 9 of Part III. 
 
The probability distribution of a crack being initially present in the cylinder after 
manufacturing is now fully developed.  The distribution of the crack as originating from 
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the manufacturing process will now have to be combined with the probability of 
detection of such a crack using the available ultrasonic inspection technology in order to 
completely define the existence frequency of cracks in a typical cylinder.  This will be 
further combined with the crack distribution to develop the initial crack distribution.  This 
is what will be fed into the crack growth model previously developed. 
 
6.2.2 Probability of Crack Detection 
Extensive research by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) [91], under 
funding from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established the 
distribution and parameters for crack detection in base metal of austenitic piping used in 
nuclear power plants.  Data on the probability of detection of crack like flaws using 
ultrasonic inspection has also been reviewed by Harris [92 - 94] on ferritic piping.  
Research work by the Plate Inspection Steering Committee [95] has also provided data on 
the probability of non-detection of a crack like defect as a function of the defect depth.   
 
The material of construction of CNG cylinders is banitic or martensitic, these 
results will still be helpful in estimating the probability of detection of representative 
crack sizes in CNG cylinders.  The micro-structure of the steel should have no effect on 




Figure 6.5   Probability of Crack Detection Using Ultrasonic Inspection Technique [96] 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the probability of detection of cracks using ultrasonic inspection under 
controlled testing conducted by Rummell et al. [96].  From this and other data referenced 
above a lognormal distribution was found to be the best fit for the probability of non-
detection of a crack of a given size, PND.  Based on these data, a lognormal relation as 
shown in Equation 6.15 was found to be adequate to mathematically model PND. 
 







































where aND  is the crack depth that has a 50 % chance of being detected and s is the shape 
parameter of the lognormal density function.  The most reasonable values of the 
parameters based on best fit of all the available data [57] was:  
 
                 aND = 0.35                                                    (6.16) 
 
s = 1.46                                                     (6.17) 
 
6.3 Generic Initial Crack Distribution 
The “as-fabricated” crack depth distribution will now be combined with the 
probability of detection to determine the post-inspection crack distribution.  Bayesian 
procedures will be used to update the “as-fabricated” crack distribution.  By using Bayes 
theorem the posterior distribution or the detected crack size distribution is:  
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p (a /  ) the distribution of detected crack depth after ultrasonic inspection.
p (a / )  the prior or the as fabricated crack depth distribution.
P (a) the probability of detecting a crack as a function 
λ =
λ =









da/apaP  is a normalizing constant such that the posterior distribution remains 
a density function.  That is so that 
 




                                              (6.19) 
 
The crack depth distribution parameterλ , is itself considered to be a random variable that 
has a gamma distribution.  The probability density function would then be:  
 








                                       (6.20) 
 
The parameters of the gamma distribution can be evaluated using methods of moments 
by equating the postulated mean and variance with the mean and the variance of the 
gamma distribution.  The mean crack depth was previously determined to be 0.02 inches.  
The variance of λ  is assumed on the basis of the degree of certainty on the value of λ .  
Using engineering judgment of the variation expected in a typical CNG cylinder crack, a 
standard deviation of 20 % of the mean was felt to be a good description of the degree of 
uncertainty on the crack depth.  This is an acceptable degree of uncertainty based on the 
variation in the average crack depth that is possible [33].  The parameters can be 




















=                                                   (6.22) 
 
Solving the simultaneous equations we get  
 
k = 25                                                         (6.23) 
 
b = 0.5                                                        (6.24) 
 
This defines the prior distribution of the parameter of the crack depth distribution, p'(λ). 
 
Testing done on used CNG cylinders have suggested that crack sizes of 5% [4], 
7% [7] of thickness are acceptable for service.  It has also been recommended that crack 
depth of 15% is acceptable if Acoustic Emission (AE) testing is done every five years 
[97].  Crack of these sizes have been found in cylinders tested [97].  The likelihood of 
detecting three cracks with the depths shown above is: 
 









The posterior distribution of the crack depth distribution parameter, p"(λ), using the 
Bayes updating procedure again is: 
( ) ( ) ( )









'paL  p                                      (6.25) 
 
The updated mean value of the crack depth distribution function parameter is given by: 




0                                       (6.26) 
 
Similarly the non-conditional posterior crack distribution can be computed from: 




00                                    (6.27) 
   
The non-conditional crack depth distribution can be used as the initial crack depth 
distribution.  We could also use the updated mean value of the crack depth distribution 
parameter and assume that the exponential distribution still applies.  This would then be 
the used as the initial crack size distribution. 
 
The posterior distribution of detected crack depth and detected crack depth 
parameter distribution can only be determined by numerical integration as the lognormal 
distribution for the likelihood of detecting a crack, as a function of its size is not 
conjugate with the exponential prior distribution.  This is the procedure that will be used.  
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This updated average crack size will be used in the statistical distribution of initial crack 
sizes as detected from inspection. 
6.4 Development of Crack Distribution from Inspection and Repairs 
6.4.1 Crack Depth Distribution Function 
The initial crack distribution can be developed from in-service inspection and 
repair data.  This is in contrast to using a postulated prior distribution when inspection 
data was not available as was described in sections 6.1 to 6.3.  The procedure developed 
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Figure 6.6  Procedure for Initial Crack Size Determination From Inspection  
 
The crack depth, x, is considered to be a random variable that can be fitted to a 
parametric probability distribution density function which adequately accounts for the 
uncertainties in the observed crack size data.  This distribution then describes the 
probability density on crack sizes.  The crack density is subsequently determined from 
the observed number of cracks and the fraction of total cracks as predicted from the crack 




The following are the important items that will be determined from the inspection data: 
1. The probability density function of crack size in terms of depths measured, 
f(x).  
2. The crack density, D, which essentially determines the expected number of 
cracks found in the two separate sections of the cylinder being considered, namely 
the transition region and the sidewall, per unit area.  This can be considered to be 
deterministic in nature if the manufacturing process is well established and not too 
much variation exists from one batch to another. 
 
Weibull distribution is chosen to describe the initial crack sizes found from ultrasonic 
inspection of CNG cylinders.  The parameters of this distribution are " and $, usually 
called the scale and shape factors respectively.   
 
A number of assumptions are made about the true population of cracks in evaluating the 
parameters of the distribution.  These assumptions should not have significant effect on 
the accuracy of the results because of the physics of the crack initiation, propagation and 
growth.  The main assumptions are: 
 
• The cracks in each section of the cylinder are from a homogenous population with 
a single true crack distribution.  This approach recognizes the non-homogenous 





• The crack size, X, in each section is follow a Weibull distribution, the parameters 
of which can be derived from the individual crack data available for each section. 
 
• Ultrasonic inspection used to detect the cracks has a low limit crack size that 
cannot be detected with the available technology.  Above this crack size all other 
cracks has a constant probability of detection (POD) which is independent of the 
crack size. 
 
• Observed crack sizes from ultrasonic inspection includes an additive error, E, due 
to the instrument calibration.  This error is uniformly distributed between the 
calibration ranges, el and eu, which represents the lower and upper limits of the 
calibration for each crack dimension.  This calibration is constant for each crack 
size with no bias towards under-sizing or over-sizing.  
 
 
The Weibull distribution of the crack size, X, is given by the probability density function, 














β                                  (6.28) 
The corresponding cumulative distribution function is given by: 














This distribution is for the true crack size that exists in the cylinder either after 
manufacturing or during the course of its usage on the NGV.  This has to be modified to 
account for the observation of the cracks by ultrasonic detection during routine NDE 
inspection. 
 
 The minimum flaw size assumed to be detectable for this to be a true density 
function is 0.  There is a limit to the capability of the UT equipment in detecting cracks.  
This minimum detectable size is called xth.  The density function above is therefore 
normalized with respect to the actual cumulative probability distribution function.  This 
















eK                                                     (6.31) 
          
The function for the detectable crack size truncated at the lower limit and normalized to 





















elsewhere                 ,0            








The density function, f(x), represents the detectable crack size distribution.  
 
All that is left now is to account for the probability of detecting a crack using the 
available technology.  This is the reliability of the crack detection process referred to as 
the probability of detection, POD with its complimentary function, PND and PND.  The 
PND is affected by the sensitivity of the inspection instrumentation, the inspection process 
and the skill of the operator.  The PND consideration has two components.   
  
Firstly, the crack size distribution is the actual size of the crack observed, given 
the inherent instrument measurement error, called the calibration error.  The bias for UT 
instruments is additive in nature and the true reading is uniformly distributed between 
some lower value, el and the upper value, eu,  in the vicinity of the true readings 
respectively.  This range is dependent on the instrument calibration error.  This uniform 
distribution can be represented as fE(e).  Two important considerations about the 
calibration error are as follows: 
• This uniform distribution,  fE(e) is not a function of the crack size and each crack 
size is assumed to be equally affected by the calibration error.   
• The shape and form of the actual crack size distribution itself is not affected by 
the calibration error 
The second component is the probability of detecting a crack in the range that the 
instrument is capable and calibrated to detect cracks, PD.  It is dependent on the 
sensitivity of the instrument setup to detect crack sizes that are considered fracture 
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mechanics important and the skill of the operator.  This probability is assumed constant 
for each crack size but is a function of the cracks sizes.  The total crack count and the 
density or rate of occurrence per unit area is proportionately affected by PD.   
 
Both cases are now discussed in the following section. 
 
6.4.2 Crack Size Error Correction 
The crack size that is observed consists of the actual crack size and an additive 
error, E.  This additive error will result in an observed crack size that is uniformly 
distributed between the actual size and an upper and lower value.  The joint probability 
density function of observed crack size, X, given the instrument error, E, is shown in 
Equation 6.33. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]efxfgExg Ex=                                           (6.33) 
where 
 fE ( e ) is the error distribution of the instrument 
 fX ( x ) is the distribution of actual crack sizes 
The likelihood of observing a randomly distributed crack of size, x, is known to be 
approximately uniformly distributed [98] in the calibration range given by, el and eu, 
representing the lower and upper calibration limits respectively.  The probability density 
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l                        (6.34) 
 
We have determined before that the crack size distribution is the truncated Weibull 
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0X                           (6.35) 
 
For an observed crack Xo, to make the transform to the actual crack size we 
introduce a random variable, W, then 
    
X0 = W + E                                                  (6.36) 
where     
 E    =    calibration error 
 W   =    X, the actual crack size 
 
Assuming that the error distribution function and the crack size function are independent, 
then the joint probability density function of observed crack size given the actual crack 
size, 
( ) ( ) ( )wfefwxg Eo =                                         (6.37)  
 
 162
Substituting for fE(e) and f(w) into Equation 6.37,  the joint probability density function is 
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The marginal distribution in Xo  alone is obtained by integrating the joint distribution with 
respect the other variable, W, for all possible values.  The marginal density function is 
given by 
 
( ) ( )∫=
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Remembering that, w, is the actual crack size and that detectable crack size using 
ultrasonic inspection is, xth, in evaluating the interval we would therefore have to take 
that into account.  The actual crack size distribution has been truncated at xth, as shown 
previously in Equation 6.35.  To account for the calibration error, readings observed at 
the threshold  can be anywhere in the interval: 
     
uth0th ex      x  ex +≥≤− l                                         (6.44) 
 






































































      (6.46) 
 
A review of UT inspection data derived in controlled tests have shown that crack size 
error (eu-el) and error distribution fE (e) is largely invariant with crack size for the same 
UT system [98 - 99].  Once we have accounted for the probability of detecting a crack, in 
the observed crack size function, h(xo / w), then the problem then reduces to determining 
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the values of the parameters " and $ that will maximizes this function.  Evaluating the 
intervals and substituting for the actual crack sizes limits and K we get: 
 
































  (6.47) 
 
and 






























         (6.48) 
 
Equations 6.47 and 6.48 define the depth distribution of cracks given that a crack is 
present in the cylinder.  The conditional distribution of crack size is therefore now 
defined.  What remains in completely defining the initial crack size distribution is the 
probability that a crack is initially present and detected.  Combining both will give the 
distribution of initial crack size in the cylinder either originating from the manufacturing 
process or shortly after being put into service.  
 
 
6.4.3 Crack Frequency of Occurrence 
The number of cracks detected as a result of UT inspection of the cylinder per 
unit volume is given by n.  The actual number of flaws in the detectable range in the 





nn =                                                        (6.49) 
Some of the cracks will be missed by the instrument if they fall below the threshold 
range, xth.  The total number of cracks including those that are outside the calibration 






































nn                                        (6.51) 
 
Evaluating this integral with the maximum likelihood values of the parameters of the 
distribution,  and $ will give us the total number of cracks in the cylinder.  Dividing this 
result by the respective surface area of the cylinder segment under consideration, will 
give us the crack existence frequency, D. 
A
n t=ρ                                                       (6.52) 
The probability of a crack being present is assumed to be controlled by the surface area of 
the section of the cylinder being considered and is different for the three sections 
considered, namely; inside sidewall, outside sidewall and transition regions of top and 
bottom.  The thickness of the cylinder does not impact on the crack existence probability.   
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The probability of having N cracks in a section area of A is a Poisson distribution and is 
given by [100] the following expression. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
!N
AexpANP N ρ−ρ=     (6.53) 
     
The crack existence probability is equal to one minus the probability that no crack exist.  
This is given by the expression: 
( )Aexp1p ρ−−=     (6.54) 
 
This is approximately equal to: 
p ≈ ρA     (6.55) 
 
By similar reasoning, the probability of having exactly one crack is equal to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
!N
AexpA1P ρ−ρ=     (6.56) 
If pA is very small then this reduces to the expression 
P(1) ≈ ρA      (6.57) 
 
This shows that the crack existence probability is equal to the probability of 
having one crack, which can be evaluated from the crack density expression in Equation 
6.52, if the number of cracks and the surface area under consideration is known. 
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   (6.58), (6.59) 
 
The method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [40] can be used to 
estimate the parameters of the Weibull distribution.  The assumed Weibull function is 
evaluated to obtain the values of the parameters which would maximize this function for 
the data collected on crack sizes present in the cylinder.  Based on the data the Likelihood 
of the data found is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0n0302010n030201 xLxLxLxLx, , x, x, x; ,L … =βα   (6.60) 
 
assuming that the process of generating each data-set is independent.  This value of the 
total likelihood is maximized with respect to the parameters " and $ .  
6.4.4 Crack Distribution with Repairs 
The crack depth distribution after welding repairs is similar to the procedure used 
to develop the initial crack distribution in Section 6.3.  The main difference is that a 
lognormal distribution will be used for the prior crack distribution as given by Equation 
6.3.  The parameters for this distribution can be evaluated if data exist on the number of 
cracks in cylinders after being weld repaired.  In the absence of data the weld defects and 
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variables considered in the Chapman Model [81] can be used to map the welding 
procedure, base material and type of defect to derive the model parameters.  A summary 
of the variables are shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
The detailed mapping procedure will not be attempted here.  This procedure is 
similar to that done in the Nuclear Industry when data is not available in quantitative 
modeling exercises [101].  Essentially a probabilistic judgment is made on the 
applicability of each variable when welding Inconel tubes to CNG cylinders.  The 
probabilities are aggregated for all the variables and the factor derived can be used to 
update the prior distribution of weld defects by using Bayes theorem.  The likelihood 
function would be the cumulative distribution that best represents the mapping results. 
 
A methodology has been developed for the estimation of the generic initial crack 
distribution and procedures described for developing this distribution from inspection 
results after manufacturing, in-service or after repairs.  The generic initial crack size 
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Figure 6.7  Summary of Weld Variables and Defects Considered In Chapman Model 
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CHAPTER 7:  CYLINDER FREQUENCY OF FAILURE 
NUMERICAL PROCEDURES 
 
Numerical methods are required to evaluate the probability of failure due to the 
distributed nature of the crack size and the complicated nature of the stress history.  The 
need to use numerical procedures is even more evident because the input parameters to 
the crack growth relationship are random in nature and as such have to be sampled at 
intervals.  A random crack is sampled from the initial crack distribution.  This crack is 
then grown using numerical integration until leakage occurs by the crack growing 
through the sidewalls or due to unstable crack which growth causes rupture.  The 
parameters of the fatigue crack growth relationship are distributions and are sampled, 
employing the same kind of sampling scheme, as with the initial crack size distribution.  
At each stage of crack growth the crack length and depth are checked using the fracture 
criterion to determine if rupture is likely to occur.  If none of the criterion suggest that the 
crack will become unstable crack growth will continue until it grows through the sidewall 
and leakage occurs.  The number of filling cycles to cause rupture or leakage is noted 
within the useful life of a cylinder and is expressed as the number of cycles to failure. 
 
The probability of a leak or complete rupture of a CNG cylinder is equal to the 
probability of cracks with depth larger than the wall thickness, or cracks larger than the 
critical size for one of the unstable crack growth criterion selected.  In the case being 
considered for corrosion fatigue crack growth, the factors that define the physical model 
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are described by parameters which are random variables.  Some form of numerical 
scheme is required.  
 
Monte Carlo simulation is the numerical technique that is used in light of its 
simplicity and its computation appeal.  Other techniques using variance reduction 
techniques such as Latin Hypercube sampling could have been used to improve the 
efficiency of the calculations and the accuracy of the results for the number of iterations 
used.  The procedure for using Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the frequency of 
occurrence of failure within the specified lifetime of a typical cylinder can be done by 
randomly selecting a crack, based on the crack size distribution.  The probability of 
selecting a given crack is controlled by the generic initial crack size distribution and the 
probability of detecting this size crack.  This crack is then grown through a stress history 
or several cycles of filling and emptying the cylinder using the corrosion-fatigue crack 
growth relationship.  Values of the parameters of the crack growth relationship are 
randomly selected from the uncertain distributions of these parameters, and used in the 
crack growth calculations.  The crack growth occurs in increments and the crack size at 
the end of each interval is compared with the critical crack size.  Failure is deemed to 
occur if unstable crack growth is predicted by any of the failure criterion or the crack 
grows through the wall of the cylinder.  The number of cycles to rupture or leakage is 




Sampling is performed a large number of times using a code written in the symbolic 
computational software MATHCAD.  Statistics are gathered on the number of cycles to 
failure.  A cumulative distribution as well as a density function is developed.  The 
frequency of postulated failure, whether leakage or rupture, can be determined from the 
cumulative distribution, for any number of cycles considered to be in the useful life range 
of for a typical cylinder.  The probability that failure occurs at or before the number of 







f =≤ l                                               (7.1) 
 
where Nf is the number of cycles (or time) to failure,  Nf* is the number of simulations 
that predict that a failure will occur and N is the total number of iterations.   
 
To improve computational efficiency the assumption is made that if multiple 
cracks are present in the cylinder, they do not coalesce but grow independently to cause 
failure.  With this assumption the result obtained above for a single crack is 
approximately equal to the result if several cracks are present.  We can therefore ignore 
the probability of failure conditioned on the number of cracks present in the section of the 
cylinder under consideration, and compute this probability on the basis of a single crack 
resulting in a failure.  This completes the procedure for the determination of the 
frequency of failure of a typical compressed natural gas cylinder.  A summary of the 
other assumptions follow that were necessary follows in Section 7.1. 
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The generic initial crack distribution will be developed using the Bayesian procedure 
detailed in Chapter 6.  This initial crack distribution will be one of the inputs to the 
sampling scheme and as such will be calculated first before the frequency of failure is 
determined.  The structure of the Monte Carlo scheme will be described and the results 
calculated will be presented.  A summary of all the assumptions used in the numerical 
procedure are detailed below. 
 
7.1 Summary of Numerical Procedures Assumptions 
 In order to understand the results of this analysis and to define the quality of the 
prediction as well as identify areas for future research, the major assumptions are 
summarized below as follows: 
a) Micro-cracks are present in the cylinder as a result of the manufacturing process 
and these will propagate by corrosion fatigue to failure. 
 
b) The cylinders will operate in an environment where contaminants are present in 
such quantities that the partial pressures present will cause corrosion fatigue to be 
an important failure mechanism. 
 
c) Cylinder life is controlled by corrosion fatigue only. 
 
d) Fatigue crack growth data previously obtained is relevant and applied to the 
assumed filling rates of CNG vehicles of 0.05 Hz. 
 




f) Pressurization is between 300 at empty and 3000 psi when cylinder is full. 
 
g) Variation in the stress amplitude associated with the filling and utilization of CNG 
between cycles is not taken into consideration. 
 
h) Fatigue life is controlled by crack growth through the sidewalls or ends including 
the transition region and crack can grow from outside in or vice versa. 
 
i) The growth rate of each crack is not affected by the presence of other cracks and 
the cracks do not coalesce to form a single larger crack. 
 
j) The crack growth law will be assumed to apply to cracks partially and even 
completely through the wall of the cylinder 
 
The two failure modes considered in this analysis are cylinder leakage and 
cylinder rupture.  These will be evaluated separately.  Crack growth can occur from the 
inside surface or from the outside.  We have determined that inside surface cracks will 
most likely cause a failure due to the presence of a higher crack driving force.  The result 
for both inside and outside surface cracks will be computed in order to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
 
7.2 Generic Initial Crack Size Distribution 
The prior initial crack distribution described in Chapter 6, consist of the initial 
crack depth distribution updated by the inspection probability of detection using Bayesian 
methods.  This is further updated to get the generic posterior distribution of the initial 
crack depth.  The average value of this distribution is used in the assumed exponential 
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distribution of the initial crack depth, to give the initial crack distribution.  The procedure 
to numerically integrate the product of the likelihood function and the prior distribution 
was discussed in Chapter 6.  This routine is written in MATHCAD. 
 
The limits of the numerical integration were adjusted to improve the convergence of the 
results.  Upper limit of infinity caused some convergence problems so an “if statement” 
was inserted to adjust the upper limit of the integration to a large enough value to ensure 
that the integration covered as much area under the curve as is possible while avoiding 
the computational difficulties.  The prior and posterior distributions of the initial crack 
size parameter are shown in Figure 6.1.  The crack depth parameter distribution was 
updated by the probability of detection distribution given by Equation 6.15 and crack size 
results that was reported in the literature [3 - 4], [7], [74].  The crack size distribution is 
exponentially distributed, and the average parameter from the Bayesian updating will be 

















Figure 7.1   Updated Crack Depth Parameter Distribution 
 
f(a0) = 54.67 exp(- 54.67*a)    (7.2) 
 
7.3 Monte Carlo Simulation Procedure 
The procedure to compute the frequency of occurrence of cylinder failure was coded 
in MATHCAD.  A simplified flow chart of the procedure is shown in Figure 7.2.  Steps 
involved in the procedure include setting up the numerical scheme in terms of the number 
of trials and using Simpson Rule [102] to perform the crack growth.  The basic steps in 
the process are summarized as follows: 
1. Select the number of trials (iterations) and the number of crack growth 
increments.  The larger the number of iterations and crack growth increments, the 
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more accurate the results. 
2. Select the initial crack size from the crack size distribution using a random 
number generator to select the probability to be sampled. 
3. Perform the crack growth through the assigned crack growth increments using 
Simpson Rule. 
4. Check the crack at each growth step for failure whether through leakage or 
rupture. 
5. Aggregate the iterations that result in each failure type and develop distributions 
of each.  This is then used to determine the frequency of cylinder failure from the 
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Figure 7.2   Flow Chart of Numerical Procedure 
 
The numerical procedure is subject to the limitations and assumptions accepted for the 
crack growth model and the fracture criterion chosen.  The process is limited to single 
cracks in a CNG cylinder that grows to become unstable causing rupture or through the 
wall causing leakage.  The calculation steps are now described in some detail with some 
of the key results.   
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7.4 Sampling Scheme Definition 
The crack size distribution is represented by the crack depth a, with the aspect 
ratio, assumed to be a deterministic quantity to include a wide range of crack shapes as is 
computationally possible.  The crack depth can take values between 0 and the wall 
thickness of the cylinder t.  The aspect ratio can take values of 1 representing a semi-
circular crack the half length equal to the wall thickness at leakage, 0.2 and 0.4 
representing a much sharper crack profile.  The stress intensity factors for all three aspect 
ratios will be computed and the profile predicting the highest value will be used in the 
corrosion-fatigue crack growth calculations.  Crack shape is expected to remain semi-
elliptical even when leakage has taken place. 
 
The generic initial crack size is chosen based on the probability of occurrence 
based on the crack size distribution and the Monte Carlo sampling scheme.  Since most of 
the cracks that exist in the cylinders will not result in leakage of a cylinder within some 
reasonable lifetime, stratification schemes would be useful to improve the efficiency of 
sampling procedure.  Once such method is the variance reduction technique used is the 
stratified sampling method.  This method will be used in the future to improve the 
accuracy of the results and to improve the computational efficiency. 
  
For the Monte Carlo simulation procedure, the number of trials selected was 
5x105.  This large number of trials while it was time consuming to calculate gives a 
reasonable probability of the likely occurrence leakage or rupture.  Each selected crack 
 
 180
size was broken down into 50 increments and the numerical integration performed to 
determine the number of cycles required for this crack growth increment.  The total 
number of cycles to failure is the summation of the incremental crack growth cycles.  
 
7.5 Corrosion-Fatigue Crack Growth Computation Procedures 
Crack growth calculations were performed for typical cylinder geometry for 
cracks occurring on the inside as well as the outside of the transition regions and 
sidewalls of both the flat-bottom and the hemi-spherical designs.  The results for both 
designs and location of the crack are compared in analyzing which cylinder type is more 
susceptible to failure.  Crack growth calculations will be performed using the 
deterministic model and compared with the results from the probabilistic model to show 
the superiority of this model in calculating the frequency of failure of CNG cylinders.  
The routine coded in MathCAD consist of the six basic steps shown below: 
1. Select a crack size from the initial crack distribution 
2. Calculate the corresponding value of the cyclic stress intensity factor for 
the three possible crack shapes. 
3. Identify the crack shape which gives the highest stress intensity factor. 
4. Evaluate the number of cycles through each increment of crack growth 
assuming constant cyclic stress intensity factor. 
5. Determine whether crack growth will lead to rupture or leakage and the 
number of cycles leading to failure. 
6. Plot a histogram of the number of cycles leading to rupture and leakage. 
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A flow chart of the algorithm used in the crack growth calculations and subsequent 
determination of failure is shown in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3   Crack Growth Algorithm 
 
The sub-critical crack growth has been assumed to occur as a result of fatigue 
crack growth that has been environmentally accelerated by corrosion products in the 
CNG cylinder resulting in the failure mechanism of corrosion fatigue.  Fatigue crack 
growth is assumed to occur under linear elastic conditions until the crack grows through 
the sidewall of the cylinder.  For simplicity in calculations the cyclic stress intensity 
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factor is assumed to remain constant throughout each increment of crack growth.  What 
this means is that the effect of the extension of the crack during each increment of crack 
growth interval has no effect on the stress intensity factor used for subsequent crack 
growth in each interval.  This is a reasonable assumption as the crack growth intervals are 
incrementally small, thereby negating the effect of any variation in the stress intensity 
factor between intervals.  EPFM failure criterion as well as LEFM is used in the analysis 
of the onset of unstable crack growth and rupture of a typical CNG cylinder.   
 
The deterministic and probabilistic growth models of crack are discussed in 
Chapter 3.  Equations for the employed in the crack growth relationship are shown below.   
 



















=   (Deterministic Model) 
 
  da/dN = C(∆K)m     (Probabilistic Model) 
 
where    minmax KKK −=∆  




KR =  
 
For the deterministic crack growth relationship the parameters A1,n1,A2,n2, and Kc are 
constants and are inputted as such in the MathCAD routine.  R is the ratio of the 
minimum to maximum loads in each fatigue cycle. The parameters C and m in the 
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probabilistic model are random variables which changes from replication to replication.  
The distributions for each variable were developed in Chapter 3. 
 
In calculating the cyclic stress intensity factor the load for the sidewall is considered 
differently than the transition region for the two designs a follows: 
(a) Uniform stresses across the sidewall cross-section, and  
(b) Combined bending and tension stresses linearized across the cross 
section as shown in Chapter 4. 
In both cases the stress intensity factor is calculated by combining the load with the 
influence coefficients and the boundary correction factors. 
 
The first failure mode that has to be evaluated is fracture leading to catastrophic 
rupture of the cylinder.  This will only occur when unstable crack growth is predicted by 
one of the fracture criterion chosen.  If this is not predicted to occur then leakage will be 
the resulting failure mode.  Leakage is likely to occur when the crack grows through the 
wall of the cylinder.  Under LEFM considerations this would be confined to Stage II 
crack growth alone where fast fracture does not occur, but result in leakage of CNG to 
the atmosphere notwithstanding.  If the crack size is such that the critical stress intensity 
factor is exceeded then Stage III unstable crack growth will occur leading to fast fracture 




The crack growth life, in terms of cycles to failure, may be calculated using the crack 
growth relationships shown in Equation 3.40. The procedure may be generally described 
by the following: 
 
If  
     ( )Kf
dN
da
=        (7.3) 
 








daN                                                        (7.4) 
 
where ai is the initial crack depth and af is the final (critical or thickness of cylinder) 








daN                                                    (7.5) 
 
Because ∆K is a function of the crack depth and the boundary correction factors are 
dependent on crack length, cylinder geometry, etc, no closed form solution of the integral 




The procedure for performing the more complex numerical computation in determining 
the fatigue life of CNG cylinders takes into consideration the dependency of the stress 
intensity factor and correction factors on crack geometry as well as the distributed nature 
of the crack growth and failure criterion parameters.  For this procedure Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques and numerical integration using Simpson’s Rule is utilized.  The 
Monte Carlo sampling scheme has already been discussed in Section 7.4.  The numerical 
integration procedure is now discussed in some detailed. 
 
Crack growth is broken up into ranges based on the crack depth at which the 
influence coefficients shown in Table 4.1 - 4.4 are applicable and the crack shape defined 
by the a/c ratio.   Only influenced coefficients for t/R ratio of 0.1 is used in the 
calculations as this is more consistent with thickness to radius ratios found in a typical 
CNG cylinder.   
 
For a generic loading profile Gj the ranges are assigned as follows: 
G1j for a/c = 0.2 
G2j for a/c = 0.4 
G3j for a/c = 1.0 
Each influence coefficient is further broken down according to the following crack depth 
ranges: 
Gnj1 for 0 < a/t ≥ 0.2 
Gnj2 for 0.2 < a/t ≥ 0.5 
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Gnj3 for 0.5 < a/t ≥ 1.0 
 
The values assigned to the influence coefficients from Table 4.1 – 4.4 were for the 
deepest points at the crack front.  That is where 
 
  2φ/π = 1.0          (7.6) 
 
 In order to perform the numerical integration, the ranges of crack depth is divided 
up into increments, ∆a.  The increments in each range are assigned equal sizes because of 
the simplicity of the crack growth curve shown in Figure 3.3. Alternatively the 
increments could be chosen such that each succeeding crack growth increment is a fixed 
ratio of each other.  This would ensure that the increments are sufficiently small to 
capture the steepest sections of the curve while improving efficiency of sampling for 
relatively flat sections.  The number of crack growth increments assigned to each range is 
fifty (50).   
 
Another important assumption made in order to simplify the crack growth 
procedure is that the crack growth rate remains constant during the interval.  If conditions 
are such that the crack size is initially below threshold conditions, the life is infinite.  
Checks are performed at each replication and subsequent iterations as follows: 




• Initial crack size at each replication and an infinite life is assigned for Nf if 
∆K for that crack size is less than ∆Kth.   
• If the crack size exceeds any criterion which would predict unstable crack 
growth. 
 
The critical crack size is determined from the various failure criteria.  A random value of 
the fracture toughness distribution is sampled in much the same way that the other 
distributions are sampled.  Constant values are also assigned where the failure criterion is 
deterministic in nature.  This critical crack size is compared with the crack size, after 
each iteration, and the number of cycles to failure noted if conditions for rupture is 
predicted.  If this does not suggest that cylinder cracking instability and rupture will 
occur, then the crack growth algorithm will continue until leakage occurs.  The 
replication is stopped at this point.   
 
The crack growth rate for each increment is evaluated at the ∆K for the crack size 
at the midpoint of the increment and incremental cycle increase ∆N for that increment is  
 
dN
daaN ×∆=∆      (7.7) 
 
The number of cycles to failure whether this be leakage or rupture is then the summation 
of the incremental ∆Ns and the growth relationship between a and N is obtained by 
summing ∆as and ∆Ns.  The number of cycles to failure is therefore the sum of the 
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number of cycles to grow a crack from the initial crack size through each range of crack 
growth until conditions for rupture is detected or the crack grows through the wall of the 
cylinder. 
 
The cumulative distribution and density function for the number of cycles to 
failure is determined by computing the probability of having a failure before a certain 
number of cycles using the summation process above.  Since a Monte Carlo technique is 
used to estimate the failure probabilities, these estimates will have some sampling errors.  
In Section 7.6.4 the variance of these probabilities will be evaluated.  The variances will 
be used to construct the confidence intervals for the estimated frequency of failure. 
 
If leakage is the failure mode that is estimated to have occurred, then the crack 
size at leakage is noted for analyzing before the consequence of such a leakage can be 
determined.  A method was developed using crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) 
methods to determine the size of the opening and as a result the leak rate of CNG to the 
atmosphere.  The procedure developed for leak rate determination and evaluation of the 
consequence of a cylinder leak rupture is described in Chapter 8.   
Calculations for the frequency of cylinder failure were completed for: 
1. Cracks on the inside of the cylinder sidewall 
2. Cracks on the outside of the cylinder sidewall 
3. Cracks on the inside of the transition region and ends. 
4.  The initial crack size distribution. 
 
 189
7.6 Frequency of Cylinder Failure Results 
Three numerical schemes were written in MATHCAD to perform the 
calculations, as described in the computational procedures, for each segment of the crack 
growth process.  The routine calculates the frequency of failure for cracks on the inside 
and outside of the sidewall cylindrical portion, and the inside of the transition region.  
Since cracks in these regions are assumed to originate independently and will grow to 
cause failure they are considered separately in the risk analysis and the results combined 
in the determination of the overall risk. 
 
7.6.1 Stress Intensity Factor Results  
The ratio of crack depth to cylinder thickness in the sidewall of the cylindrical 
portion is plotted with the stress intensity factor, for the three aspect ratios of 0.2, 0.4 and 
1.0, shown in Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5 and 7.6 for cracks originating on the inside, outside 
and the transition region respectively.  In the graphical output from the stress intensity 
factor determination routine, the stress intensity factor converges for the three aspect 
ratios for crack depth below 25% of the cylinder thickness for the cylindrical portion.  
Above relative crack depth of 0.25, the stress intensity factor diverges relative to the 
initial crack aspect ratio, the sharpest crack showing the greatest relative increase.  This is 
expected as the stress intensity factor is governed by the stress distribution at the crack tip 




For the transition region the relationship between the stress intensity factor and the 
relative crack depth is similar to the cylindrical sidewall.  The major difference being 
total convergence below 25% relative crack depth and significantly more divergence as 
the crack grows through the wall of the cylinder.   The stress intensity factor for the 
transition region is considerably more at smaller relative crack depth.  This is due to the 
combined stresses present.  As the crack grows through the wall, the stresses at the crack 
tip will change from compressive to tensile.  This is evident in the results for the 
transition region.  Catastrophic failure is therefore much more likely to occur early in the 
crack growth process for the transition region than for the cylindrical portion.  The 
reverse holds as the crack grows through the sidewall.    
 
Overall the sharpest crack with the 0.2 aspect ratio gives the highest stress 
intensity factor for crack growth across the thickness of the cylinder.  The results for this 






Figure 7.4 Cylindrical Inside Crack Stress Intensity Factor vs. Crack Depth  
 
Figure 7.5 Cylindrical Outside Crack Stress Intensity Factor vs. Crack Depth 

























































Ratio of Crack Depth to Cylinder Thickness 





Figure 7.6 Transition Inside Crack Stress Intensity Factor vs. Crack Depth 
 
7.6.2 Frequency of Cylinder Leakage Results 
Cylinder leakage will occur when the crack grows through the wall without any of 
the criteria for rupture being achieved.  Figures 7.7 and 7.8 shows the corrosion-fatigue 
life of a typical cylinder follows an exponential distribution with initial crack size for 
both the deterministic (See Appendix 1 and 2) and probabilistic crack growth 
relationship, in the cylindrical portion.  The probabilistic model predicts shorter fatigue 
life for the same initial crack size.  In fact the fatigue life is significantly under predicted 
for smaller initial crack sizes when the results of the two models are compared. 
 




























Figure 7.7  Probabilistic Model Simulated Fatigue Life vs. Initial Crack Size 
For Cracks on Inside Sidewall of Cylinder 
 
 
Figure 7.8  Probabilistic Model Simulated Fatigue Life vs. Initial Crack Size 
For Cracks on Outside Sidewall of Cylinder 
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The corrosion-fatigue life of cracks originating on the inside of the cylinder was in 
general less than for cracks originating on the outside.  This is expected because the crack 
driving force on the inside is expected to be greater and as such will propagate faster for 
each increment of crack growth. 
 
 In the transition region a similar relationship between the initial crack size and the 
fatigue life is shown in Figure 7.9.  The deterministic model predicts much shorter life 
than the probabilistic model.  Cracks have been shown to occur most often in the 
transition region so the results are therefore even more significant. 
 
 
Figure 7.9  Probabilistic Model Simulated Fatigue Life vs. Initial Crack Size For 
Cracks on Inside of Transition Region of Cylinder 
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The cumulative distribution of cylinder leakage at different filling cycles for all the initial 
crack sizes considered is shown in Figures 7.10 – 7.12 for cracks on the inside, and 
outside of the cylindrical sidewall and the inside of the transition region respectively.  
The histogram of the binned number of times a simulation predicted leakage would occur 
for a particular crack size is shown in Figures 7.13 – 7.15.  Fitting a curve to the 
histogram results gives us the probability density function of the number of cycles to 





Figure 7.10 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Leakage 
For Sidewall Inside Cracks  
 



















Figure 7.11 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Leakage 





Figure 7.12 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Leakage 
For Transition Region Inside Cracks  
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Figure 7.13 Probability Density Function of Simulated Probability of  




Figure 7.14 Probability Density Function of Simulated Probability of  
Cylinder Leakage For Sidewall Outside Cracks  
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Figure 7.15 Probability Density of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Leakage 
For Transition Region Inside Cracks  
 
 The probability of cylinder leakage is predicted to be higher for the probabilistic 
model for all the crack sizes considered.  The histogram data suggests that the cylinders 
display a bimodal failure mechanism.  This is explained by the fact that the crack growth 
has two characteristic regions where the rate of crack growth is different due to crack 
blunting and plastic relaxation of the stresses at the crack tip.  Cracks which are above a 
certain size will propagate to failure very quickly due to the high stress intensity factor.  
Smaller size cracks will grow rapidly at first and then slow down considerably, requiring 
much longer cycling before failure will occur.  This validates the probabilistic model 
which also allows the uncertainty of the results to be evaluated. 
 
From Figure 7.10 - 7.12, the probability of leakage of a cylinder increases with 
the number of filling cycles that a typical bus has undergone.  This is consistent with the 
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corrosion-fatigue mechanism which is a gradual degradation process governed by the 
crack growth relationship.  The age of a bus selected from that population is random and 
as such the mean time to leakage and frequency of occurrence, for a typical bus in an 
entire fleet can be derived from the number of cycles that is predicted by the cracks 
growth relationship and the number of filling cycles per year.  This is expected to be 
constant for a typical bus in a fleet. 
 
 The desired life for a typical CNG fueled bus is 15 years [2].  This amounts to 10, 
958 cycles at two filling cycles per day.   For a cylinder to leak in this number of cycles 
and less, initial crack size has to be greater than 0.02 for cracks on the inside, 0.015 for 
cracks on the outside and  0.035 for cracks on the inside of the transition region, as 
shown in Figures 7.7 -7.9.  The frequency of leakage failure on a annualized basis 
assuming a constant rate model, for the cumulative distribution shown in Figures 7.10 – 
7.12 and a designed filling cycle life of 10,958 is summarized in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Frequency of Release of CNG from Through Wall Crack 





Crack on Sidewall Inside Surface 0.08 5.56x10-3 
Crack on Sidewall Outside Surface 0.07 4.84x10-3 






Higher number of filling cycles would impact adversely on the frequency of failure.  
Similarly fewer filling cycles would produce a smaller number of failures per year.  Two 
fillings per day are considered conservative and therefore the frequency of leakage used 
in the calculations of the risk would give results that are conservative for a typical bus.   
 
7.6.3 Frequency of Cylinder Rupture Results 
Three criteria were chosen for determining when cracks in the cylinder would 
become unstable resulting in catastrophic rupture of a typical cylinder.  The deterministic 
model predicted that rupture could occur within a reasonable lifetime of a cylinder only 
from the EPFM criterion of critical crack length.  The probabilistic model predicted that 
rupture could occur with both the LEFM and EPFM criteria.  This applied to cracks on 
the inside and outside of the cylindrical sidewall as well as cracks on the inside of the 
transition region as shown in Figures 7.16 – 7.21. 
 
Figure 7.16  LEFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  
Initial Crack Size For Cracks on Inside Sidewall of Cylinder 
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Figure 7.17  LEFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  





Figure 7.18  Figure LEFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  
Initial Crack Size For Cracks on Inside of Transition Region of Cylinder 
 



















Figure 7.19  EPFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  
Initial Crack Size For Cracks on Inside Sidewall of Cylinder 
 
 
Figure 7.20  EPFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  
Initial Crack Size For Cracks on Outside Sidewall of Cylinder 
 






































Figure 7.21  EPFM Predicted Cycles to Rupture vs.  
Initial Crack Size For Cracks on Inside of Transition Region of Cylinder 
 
On closer examination it can be seen that the critical crack length criterion predicts that 
cylinder rupture would occur because of unstable crack growth, for all cracks growing 
through the cylinder with an aspect ratio of 0.2.  In fact all cracks with aspect ratios of 
0.22 and less will cause rupture of the cylinder.  In developing the initial crack size 
distribution, ideally the crack size is a joint distribution of the crack depth and aspect 
ratio.  Since no data were available to estimate the aspect ratio distribution, only the 
initial crack depth distribution was developed. 
 
In the absence of data for this analysis it will be assumed that crack aspect ratios 
are uniformly distributed between a thumbnail crack with aspect ratio of 0.167 and a 
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semi-circular crack of aspect ratio 1.0.  It has been found that cracks [103] with aspect 
ratios less than 0.167 is highly unlikely (probability being 1x10-6), so this will be the 
sharpest crack presumed to exist in the cylinder at any one time.  The cumulative 











b    x           1
b  x a          
a   x           0
)x(F a-b a-xX       (7.8) 
 
The probability of cracks in the range 0.167 – 0.22 is therefore equal to  
 
     
0.22 - 0.167F(0.22)  
1-0.167
              0.064
=
=
      (7.9) 
 
The probability of rupture given that a crack with aspect ratio less than 0.22 is in 
the cylinder must be multiplied by the likelihood of the existence of such a crack to get 
the unconditional probability of failure.  The EPFM criterion along with the probability 
of existence of crack of this shape gives the highest probability of cylinder rupture and 
will be used to derive the frequency of cylinder rupture.  
 
Aspect ratio distribution has been found elsewhere to be lognormally distributed 
[62], [104].  Assuming a uniform distribution will give a higher probability of existence 
of cracks with aspect ratios below 0.22.  The frequency of rupture predicted will be less 
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conservative than would be obtained in reality.  This will have to be addresses in the 
future research when an aspect ratio distribution is developed. 
 
 The conditional cumulative failure distribution is shown in Figures 7.22 – 7.24. 
 
Figure 7.22 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Rupture  
For Sidewall Inside Cracks  
 
 
Figure 7.23 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Rupture For 
Sidewall Outside Cracks  
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Figure 7.24 Cumulative Distribution of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Leakage 
For Transition Region Inside Cracks  
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Figure 7.25 Probability Density Function of Simulated Probability of  
Cylinder Rupture For Sidewall Inside Cracks  
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Figure 7.26 Probability Density Function of Simulated Probability of  
Cylinder Rupture For Sidewall Outside Cracks  
 
 
Figure 7.27 Probability Density of Simulated Probability of Cylinder Rupture 
For Transition Region Inside Cracks  
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By similar reasoning the frequency of cylinder rupture can be derived from the 
unconditional probability of cylinder rupture using a constant failure rate model to get the 
annualized frequency of failure.  The results are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Frequency of Release of CNG from Cylinder Rupture 





Crack on Sidewall Inside Surface 5.09x10-3 3.40x10-4 
Crack on Sidewall Outside Surface 4.45x10-3 2.98x10-4 




As in the case with leakage of CNG from the cylinder, higher number of filling cycles 
would impact adversely on the frequency of rupture.  Similarly fewer filling cycles would 
produce a smaller number of failures per year.  Two fillings per day are considered 
conservative and therefore the frequency of cylinder rupture used in the calculations of 
the risk would give results that are conservative than for a typical bus. 
 
7.6.4 Frequency Uncertainty Analysis  
 The probability of failure was estimated using a Monte Carlo technique.  This 
procedure is subject to sampling errors.  An unbiased estimator of the variance of the 
mean frequency will now be developed.  This variance can be used to construct 
confidence intervals of the estimated probability of leakage and rupture along with 
corresponding annualized frequency of occurrence of failure. 
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The estimator of the probability of failure before the assumed lifetime of filling cycles is 
given by Equation 7.1 which is repeated here. 
 
     t) P(t   )t(F FN
)t(NF ≤≈=      (7.10) 
where  
N is the total number of trial or replications.  
NF(t) is the total number of iterations that predict that leakage or rupture will 
occur at or before the specified lifetime of 10, 985 filling cycles. 
P( tF < ) is the true, but unknown probability that cylinder leakage or rupture will 
occur at or before the design lifetime. 
 
At the end of each iteration the cylinder is either in a failed state, that is it has leaked or 
ruptured, or not.  These are two mutually exclusive states and so we could use the 
Bernoulli distribution to map from the sample space of failed or not failed to the integer 
values, 0 or 1.  A random variable can therefore be defined such that; 
 





 t.after time failednot  hascylinder   theif 0
 t,in time failed hascylinder   theif 1
  )t(Ii    (7.11) 
 




In terms of Ii(t), the number of times leakage or rupture is predicted to occur over the 
entire simulation space is given by; 
 





iF )t(I  )t(N        (7.12) 
 
Similarly the cumulative distribution of failures is estimated by  
 







= =        (7.13) 
     
 It can be shown [40], [88] that an unbiased estimator of for the variance of F(t) is  
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 Using Taylor series expansion [105], about the mean frequency of failure, the 





Table 7.3 Variances of Frequency of Release of CNG from Cylinder re 
Gas Leakage Initiating Event Variance for  
Frequency of 
Leakage 
Variance for  
Frequency of 
Rupture 
Crack on Sidewall Inside Surface 7.92x10-4 5.04x10-5 
Crack on Sidewall Outside Surface 2.05x10-4 1.30x10-5 




The physics of failure model that was developed gave more conservative results 
for the frequency of cylinder failure by leaking and catastrophic rupture than the previous 
results that was derived from generic data [1].  The results from this model while they are 
conservative is expected to be more accurate since it captures the random nature of the 
crack growth process by the parameters being distributions, while it accounts for the 
threshold conditions from which crack growth will start, which the deterministic model 
did not.  
 
These results will be combined with the likelihood of subsequent events to the gas 
being released and a fire starting, or explosive event occurring to get the frequency of 
fires occurring.  The consequence of various fire scenarios will be combined with the 
frequency of occurrence to give the fire fatality risk.  The consequence of each release 
















CONSEQUENCE OF FIRES AND FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
The use of compressed natural gas (CNG) has been growing in transit and other 
fleet vehicles in response to increasingly stringent emissions standards.  While CNG has 
some benefits related to reduced emissions compared with other fuels, its use also 
introduces new and different fire safety risks relative to these other fuels.  The purpose of 
this analysis is to determine the consequences of different fire incidents occurring for a 
typical bus that uses CNG as fuel. 
 
 Previous studies promoting the use of CNG as a viable vehicular fuel  
[106 - 108], have suggested that CNG represents a reduced fire risk relative to traditional 
liquid fuels because the fuel system construction is more rugged and because CNG is 
lighter than air and consequently would be expected to dissipate in the atmosphere if 
released accidentally.  While this may be true for many external releases of CNG, it is not 
true for CNG released within or beneath a vehicle or a structure.  Under these 
circumstances, CNG can accumulate within the enclosure until it reaches a flammable 
concentration, at which point the CNG-air mixture can ignite and propagate, in some 
cases with explosive forces resulting in multiple fatalities. 
 
For the typical bus considered in this analysis CNG is stored in steel cylinders and 
is delivered through a fuel delivery system to the vehicle engine.  There are a number of 
scenarios where CNG represents a potentially significant fire hazard as a vehicular fuel.  
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Most of these scenarios involve the loss of containment of CNG from the fuel system and 
subsequent ignition of the discharged CNG.  In Chapters 2 – 7 of this analysis a 
probabilistic model was developed of the predominant failure mechanism found in CNG 
cylinders, corrosion-fatigue, and a methods demonstrated for analytically determining the 
frequency of release of CNG due to the degradation of the containment.  Two types of 
releases were determined to be possible.  These are instantaneous, as from a ruptured 
cylinder, when a crack grew to become unstable, or gradual, when a crack grew through 
the wall of the cylinder but not satisfying the criteria for fracture to occur.  The latter 
failure mode is describes as leak before break scenario.   
 
  The CNG may be ignited immediately upon release or the ignition may be 
delayed.  The matrix in Table 8.1 is used to generally identify the different loss of 
containment scenarios and ignition modes. 
 
Table 8.1 CNG Release and Subsequent Scenario 
CNG release mode Ignition mode 
Instantaneous Immediate Delayed No Ignition 
Gradual Immediate Delayed No Ignition 
 
If ignition occurs in each of these scenarios, different types of fires are expected to 
develop.  Table 8.2 shows the types of fires resulting from the release of CNG from a 
typical cylinder and subsequent ignition. 
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Table 8.2 CNG Fire Scenarios 
CNG release mode Ignition Mode Expected Consequence 
Immediate Fireball Instantaneous 
Delayed Vapor cloud explosion or flash fire 
Gradual Immediate Jet flame 
 Delayed Vapor cloud explosion or flash fire 
  
The potential for fire fatality or other severe effects are dependent on the volume 
occupied by the fire and the heat flux generated.  The actual relative volume of 
atmosphere rendered flammable by an accidental release of CNG into the atmosphere 
will depend on the nature of the release (i.e., instantaneous or gradual), the nature of the 
ignition (i.e., immediate or delayed) and the nature of the mixing of the CNG with the air 
in the atmosphere (i.e., buoyant plume, momentum jet or uniform dispersion).  Enclosure 
effects will influence the mixing and accumulation of CNG in the atmosphere, such as for 
CNG releases within buildings (e.g., parking or service facilities) or within vehicle spaces 
(e.g., engine, cargo or passenger compartments).   
 
CNG released from a cylinder through an orifice, such as a long through-wall 
crack in the cylinder with a wide mouth opening, is likely to issue as a 
momentum-dominated jet propelled by the pressure difference between the cylinder and 
the atmosphere.  In free surroundings, the only external forces influencing the jet are 
gravitational, or buoyancy, forces.  For natural gas, with a specific gravity relative to air 
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of about 0.56, these buoyancy forces will cause the jet to rise.  Thus, a natural gas leak 
under pressure will have the characteristics of a pure jet in the vicinity of discharge and 
the characteristics of a buoyant plume at distances further away from the point of 
discharge.  For a small leak such as a pin-hole crack, the leaking CNG will have little 
initial momentum and will act as a purely buoyant plume. 
 
 With the multitude of potential release, ignition and enclosure scenarios, it is 
difficult to generalize about the potential for ignition in a particular scenario.  This would 
require a detailed analysis of the fluid dynamics of a release along with a probability 
distribution for the positions and intensities of potential ignition sources.  The heat flux 
generated at points in and adjacent to the fire are determined and checked for its lethality 
effects. 
 
The objective of the consequence analysis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Determine the expected types of CNG release from a failed cylinder. 
2. Simulate each type of gas release to determine how it disperses and the potential 
for formation of a flammable mixture. 
3. Assess the likelihood of a fire or explosion from this mixture. 
4. Determine the heat flux generated from the fire event at specific distances. 
5. Identify lethal exposures to heat flux. 
6. Compute the fire and explosion fatality for passengers and others, potentially 
exposed to the lethal heat flux. 
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Some of the most important fire scenarios resulting from CNG being released and the 
subsequent events that follow are now discussed.  The detailed simulation of a release 
and the fire modeling calculations of the consequence of each fire event will follow. 
 
8.1 Consequence Severity Factors 
How natural gas is dispersed in the atmosphere from a failed cylinder depends on 
many factors.  The most important factors are: 
 Physical and chemical properties of the gas. 
 Meteorological characteristics in the vicinity of the CNG release. 
 Location of the gas release. 
 Relative location of obstructions to gas and air motions. 
 Ventilation characteristics.   
The consequence of a fire resulting from the accidental release of natural gas is 
determined by the following factors:  
• Volume of gas contained before release. 
• Pressure at which gas is contained. 
• Rate of gaseous release. 
• Duration of release. 
• Ignition source and the type of fire produced. 
• Thermal energy released. 




To determine the lethality of each fire scenario, location is of paramount importance.  
This is so because the number of persons occupying the exposure zones is dependent on 
the bus location.  The accident scenes chosen cover existing situations that a CNG bus is 
likely to be found in based on normal use.  There is a likelihood of a bus being present in 
any one of these location.  This likelihood is computed from the frequency at which a bus 
is expected to be in each location.  The accident scenarios chosen for the consequence 
analysis are:  
 Vehicle fire in parked or storage facility. 
 Vehicle fire in a station affecting CNG equipment. 
 Vehicle fire due to collision or otherwise on suburban roadway. 
 Vehicle fire due to collision or otherwise on urban roadway. 
 Vehicle fire in tunnel or under bridges. 
 
Fires occurring at the described locations will determine the number of persons exposed 
to thermal radiant fluxes that would result in fatalities. 
 
8.2 Types of Fire Scenarios  
The types of fires contemplated from any release will now be detailed to provide 
understanding of the comparative thermal radiation effects and the potential for other 
fatalities.  Figure 8.1 gives a logical basis of describing each fire scenario.  The 
consequences of fires in terms of its effects and the potential for fire fatality are shown at 
the end of the propagated fire event.   
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Each incident and its outcome have a different likelihood of occurrence.  A qualitative 
analysis of the consequences of each fire scenario will be done.  The objective of this 
qualitative analysis is to identify all the possible sources of fatality associated with each 
fire scenario.  Based on engineering judgments and the dynamics of fire initiation and 
propagation, if the likelihood of occurrence of an outcome is low, then this effect will be 
ignored in the quantitative analysis.  Severity of each outcome of a fire scenario, in terms 
of the numbers of fatalities expected, will be computed in the quantitative analysis.  The 
results will incorporate factors such as type of release, location of bus and the number of 


























Shock Wave Pressure Effects 
























































Some of the fire scenarios identified in Figure 8.1 are accompanied by explosions.  The 
energy contained in the high pressure gas of an explosion is dissipated as a shock wave as 
the gas is rapidly equilibrated.  Explosions associated with CNG cylinder failures occur 
either as a result of the catastrophic ruptures of the pressurized cylinder or from the 
combustion of a flammable natural gas/air mixture.  The effect of an explosion depends 
as in the case of fires on the location, whether in a confined or un-confined state.  The 
consequence of concern in CNG related explosions are shock wave overpressure effects 
and the generation of projectiles.  In some instances explosions are accompanied by fires.  
In such instances the thermal radiation effects and pressure effects are considered.  In 
cases where dispersion of the fuel is not achieved an explosion is less likely.  For this 
reason shock wave effects will be ignored, unless it is the only outcome expected in the 
consequence analysis in such circumstances.  This will give a conservative estimate of 
CNG fire fatalities as in all instances when explosions are possible fatalities could arise 
because of the effects of the explosion or its combined effect with thermal radiation.  
 
 Each of the fire scenarios will now be analyzed qualitatively to determine the 
likelihood of producing lethal thermal radiation effects, projectiles and shock waves.  The 
fires and explosions that will be analyzed based on the outcomes shown in Figure 8.1 are: 
1. Fireball 
2. Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion and Flash Fire 
3. Confined Explosion 
4. Jet Fire 
5. Cylinder Physical Explosion 
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8.2.1 Vapor Cloud Explosion and Flash-Fire 
When a large amount of CNG is rapidly dispersed to the atmosphere, a vapor 
cloud forms and disperses.  The pathways to the formation of a vapor cloud are shown in 
Figure 8.1.  If this cloud is ignited before the mixture disperses below the lower 
flammable limit, an unconfined vapor cloud explosion and or a flash fire will occur.  
Ignition of the vapor cloud results in sufficiently rapid propagation of the flame to cause 
overpressure and shock waves.  In general the qualitative requirements for a vapor cloud 
explosion are as follows: 
 A relatively large quantity of natural gas. 
 A highly energetic ignition source or 
 An obstructed environment supportive of turbulence-induced flame 
accelerations. 
 
Except for the presence of the ignition source, all the other factors are expected to 
be present in the event that a cylinder failure by rupturing.  Vapor cloud explosion is 
therefore very likely to occur with the catastrophic rupturing of a CNG cylinder and there 
is delayed ignition of the gas released.  
  
If a CNG cylinder fails by leaking, the rate of release and formation of a vapor 
cloud is much less than in the case of cylinder rupture.  If dispersion and accumulation 
followed by delayed ignition occurs then vapor cloud explosion is a possible outcome to 
follow leaking of a cylinder.  The most likely scenario however if there is delayed 
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ignition of natural gas released from a crack is that a flash fire will be produced without 
significant overpressure effects.  A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a natural 
gas-air cloud resulting from a release of flammable CNG into the open air.  Flash fire 
results from ignition of a natural gas cloud when there is essentially no increase in the 
combustion rate and consequently no significant build-up of pressure.   
 
 In most instances a vapor cloud explosion accompanies a flash fire inside an 
enclosure such a bus, maintenance building or bus depot.  Strong blast pressures are 
associated with high flame speeds.  In turn, high flame speeds are associated with 
turbulence-enhanced burning rates or with constrictions caused by obstructions in the 
flow field.  Confinement of a vapor cloud within an enclosure will increase the potential 
for a vapor cloud explosion, although overpressures may be related simply to restrictions 
on the free expansion of the combustion gases by the enclosure boundaries.  The thermal 
radiation produced if vapor cloud explosion occurs with a flash fire is of a lower intensity 
than a fireball but covering a wider area. 
 
Vapor cloud explosions are relatively unusual however if leakage occurs outdoors, 
because several features need to be present for a vapor cloud explosion with damaging 
overpressure, to occur.  These include: 
 The released natural gas must achieve a flammable mixture in the atmosphere and 
at suitable conditions of temperature and pressure. 
 A cloud of sufficient size must form prior to ignition; 
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 A sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range to cause 
extensive overpressure; 
 The blast effects can vary greatly and are determined by the speed and structure of 
flame propagation.  In most cases the mode of flame propagation is deflagration; 
under extraordinary conditions, a detonation might occur. 
 
A flammable natural gas cloud may be ignited by a number of occasional sources 
once it is formed.  These ignition sources include lighted cigarettes, bus and other vehicle 
exhaust, electrical wiring and the engine compartment temperature.  The effect of ignition 
is to terminate the spread of the natural gas cloud in that direction.  Flash fires will 
expand in all directions once combustion has started.  Initially it will expand upwards 
because of buoyancy effects.  The likelihood of ignition of a natural gas cloud depends on 
the probability of the existence of an ignition source.  This is dependent on the number of 
such ignition sources and the location of the bus.  The possibility of ignition early in the 
cloud formation or later, to give full effect of a vapor cloud explosion or flash fire is also 
dependent on the location of the bus.  Traffic too will be considered as part of this 
analysis of the likelihood of ignition.  
 
The consequence of interest with a vapor cloud explosion is the effects of the 
shock wave produced.  In a flash fire scenario the main consequence of interest is the 
thermal radiation produced and direct flame contact.  The size of the vapor cloud before 
ignition to a large extent determines the area of possible direct flame contact.  Radiation 
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effects on a target depend on its distance from flames, flame geometry and emissive 
power, local atmospheric transmissivity and cloud size.  
 
Where shock wave effects are significant in the consequence analysis, equivalent 
TNT models will be used to assess the effects on humans and the potential to produce 
fatalities. Assumptions will be made of ideal blast wave correlations based on shock 
wave energy to TNT equivalent energy.  The limitation to the theoretical validity due to 
the differences between TNT detonations and vapor cloud deflagrations are ignored in 
this assumption.  Leakage from a crack will be simulated with the computational fluid 
dynamics code and several ignition cases applied to this release of natural gas.  The fire 
fatality predicted by the case that is most likely to occur, will be used in the consequence 
estimation for flash fires.     
 
 8.2.2 Fireball 
Catastrophic rupture of a pressure vessel containing CNG will result in a rapid 
increase in the volume of the gas.  This rapid mixing with air in the presence of an 
ignition source will form a fireball as soon as a flammable mixture is achieved.  A sudden 
increase in volume of over 200 is usually required for a fireball [109] to occur.  The 
estimation of the likelihood of ignition and consequence of fireballs is similar to the case 
of flash fire.  Only the differences in analyzing the effects of a fireball will be discussed 





The effects of interest in a fireball are: 
 Thermal radiation 
 Shock wave effects as the escaping gas expands in the atmosphere 
 Highly energetic particles generated during the explosion and fire 
Pressure effects from a fireball itself is limited in magnitude as ignition is instantaneous 
and burning is accompanied by further mixing and more burning which sustains the 
fireball.  The pressure effect from the initial rupture of the CNG cylinder is considered 
separately.  It should be noted that if the rupture was due to heating of the CNG cylinder 
as in a non-CNG fire or adjacent cylinders, then effects of fragmentation and shock wave 
would be relevant.  Only rupture from degradation of a CNG cylinder is being considered 
in this analysis as the pressure relief devices are assumed to work and will release the 
contents of the cylinder before rupture will occur.  This however will add to the volume 
of fuel available to the fire ball and significantly increase the dimensions of it. 
 
Thermal radiation effect is the outcome that is of most significance in estimating 
the consequence of a fireball.  More specifically the intensity as a function of time is the 
radiative characteristic that is of importance.  This is so because the response of human 
skin to thermal radiation from a fire is dependent on the intensity and duration of 
exposure [110]. The burning time of large fireballs is less than ten seconds [111] which 
makes the duration of the radiation heat pulse comparable to that of a nuclear explosion 




The unconfined volume of the natural gas released when the cylinder ruptures, will burn 
as an unsteady turbulent diffusion flame in which buoyancy is induced by the burning 
process.  The volume of the cloud and combustion process could be increased by the 
entrainment of ambient air at the edge of the burning cloud.  Buoyancy-induced forces 
could lift the cloud to a semi-steady height.  Thermal flux models [113], derived from 
empirical correlations from experiments with pure methane will be used to estimate the 
effects of a natural gas fireball.  The thermal effects will be calculated by considering 
atmospheric transmissivity and surface emitted heat flux that for what would be a rapidly 
changing thermal flux.  Assumptions will be made in determining exposure zones. 
 
8.2.3 Jet Flame 
A Jet Flame is formed from the pressurized release of CNG from a crack in the 
presence of an ignition source.  This fire scenario tend to be localized in effect unlike the 
two types of fires mentioned above and the main concerns is to establish the potential for 
affecting other components rather than for affecting large numbers of people in the 
vicinity of a bus.  Issues of flame height, trajectory and gas release velocity are important 
to determine the potential for lethal results. 
 
In analyzing the outcome of jet flames, the effects of impingement on adjacent 
cylinders will no be investigated.  Thermal radiation is the only consequence considered 
to be important and the following will be looked at in estimating the thermal effects: 
 Discharge rate of natural gas. 
 Fire duration and total heat released before flame burn-out. 
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 Estimated radiant fraction. 
 Transmissivity of the atmosphere. 
 Incident thermal radiation in the exposure zone. 
 Thermal effects and potential for fatality. 
 
The technique used in analyzing jet flames is similar to that used to analyze flares 
[114].  The assumption is that the radiant fraction of total combustion energy is derived 
from a point source along the jet flame path.  Flame length and diameter will be 
estimated from theoretical models developed [115 - 116] with appropriate assumptions to 
determine actual length.  No consideration will be given to the effects of cross wind on 
flame length even though this will give conservative results. 
 
8.2.4 Confined Explosion 
Ignition of a flammable mixture of natural gas inside a bus or depot can result in a 
deflagration or detonation.  The confined explosion inside of a bus or building that is not 
vented for explosions usually will result in a deflagration.  In a deflagration the 
combustion wave propagates away from the source at subsonic speeds, while supersonic 
speeds are achieved in detonations.  Estimation of the peak pressure associated with the 
flame speed is required in order to determine the effects of the shock wave.  Only 
pressure effects are considered as failure of structures and the implications for other 





Some simplifying assumptions are made in determining the pressure rise from a confined 
explosion.  These include: 
 Heat loss is neglected as the explosion occurs sufficiently quickly. 
 The pressure in the bus is uniform at any given time during the 
explosion for a deflagration. 
 Maximum pressure rise is proportional to the mass fraction of the bus 
that is occupied by the gas/air flammable mixture. 
 
8.2.5 Physical Explosion 
The catastrophic rupture of a CNG cylinder will result in a release of the stored 
energy in the form of a shock wave.  Fragments produced in the explosion will also be 
accelerated forming projectiles.  In analyzing the consequence of physical explosions 
only the effects of the shock wave will however be considered.  This is so because 
unstable crack growth leading to rupture as a result of corrosion fatigue is not expected to 
produce many fragments. 
 
Failure of the cylinder will be assumed to occur at the maximum fill pressure of 
3000 psig.  All of the energy released in bursting of the cylinder will be assumed to be 
absorbed in producing the shock wave.  This will give the maximum blast pressure from 
the shock wave.  Implicit in this assumption is that no kinetic energy will be lost to 
fragments, no heating of the ambient air takes place by the released air and that at the 
point of failure brittle fracture occurs.  These assumptions should not affect the validity 
of the results for a physical explosion of a CNG cylinder.  This is so because the gas is 
 
 230
assumed to be at ambient temperature at failure and no energy is required to propagate 
the crack once unstable crack growth is predicted by the applicable failure criterion in 
Chapters 5 and 7.       
 
8.3 Consequence Analysis Computational Procedures 
Deterministic modeling will be used to quantify fire and explosion intensities that 
could lead to fatalities from the outcomes of the various fire scenarios discussed.  The 
models estimates discharge rate of fuel released, dispersion hazards, fire and explosion 
risks including overpressure rupture and fragmentation hazards.  Analyzing the 
consequence in terms of loss estimates, is  primarily done by estimating the heat release 
rate, flame height, exposure temperature from fire plume modeling and estimating the 
time to achieving critical damage thresholds.  
 
 Quantifying the thermal radiation intensities of a fireball will be done using 
analytical models developed in laboratory scale experiments by Fay J.A et al [117].  Heat 
flux of a flash fire will be estimated from theoretical models developed by Raj P.K. et al 
[118] for burning of a large unconfined vapor cloud.  Equivalent TNT models [119] will 
be used to determine the outcomes of physical explosion of the cylinder, confined and 
unconfined vapor cloud explosion.  Fire inside the bus will be simulated using a 
computational fluid dynamics code, FDS, developed by the Energy Research Laboratory 
of the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
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On the basis of the results of the calculated outcomes further calculations are done in 
order to arrive at the fire fatality associated with each fire scenario.  Those calculations 
include:  
 Calculates worst-case fire and explosive intensities, associated with each gaseous 
release that is ignited. 
 Estimates fatalities from the heat flux and duration combination along with the 
explosive energy outcomes from each scenario.  
 Plots the effect distances in determining the number of persons that would be 
affected based on the estimated occupation of the affected zone. 
 
In general the calculated worst-case conditions are assumed for each of the fire 
scenarios.  Both for the outcome of the fire scenario and the amounts of people affected.  
No mitigation will be considered as the time scale of events are expected to occur within 
one minute which would not give enough time for emergency response including 
evacuation.  Each type of cylinder failure will be considered separately and the type of 
fire resulting will be analyzed based on the type of release, gas dispersion and subsequent 
ignition.   
 
8.3.1 Modeling of a Jet Flame Outcome 
A jet flame is will develop when the natural gas from a crack that has grown through the 
wall of a cylinder is ignited immediately.  The dynamics of the flame is determined by 
rate of release as other factors such as obstruction and wind are ignored.  The steps in 
determining the outcome in term of thermal radiation produced is shown schematically in 
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Figure 8.2.  Since the release of natural gas from a crack invariably occurs at high 





CNG Leak Rate Estimation
Fire Simulation and Heat Release
Estimate Radiant Heat Fraction
Determine Exposure Factor
Estimate Transmissivity
Compute Incident Thermal Radiation
Estimate Thermal Effects
Compute Fire Fatality Consequence
 
Figure 8.2 Flow Diagram of Jet Fire Consequence Calculations 
 
 In order to simulate the fire, the gas release rate had to be determined first.  A 
method using crack tip opening displacement methodology was developed to quantify the 
release rate of natural gas.  CNG released from a crack with a displaced opening in the 
 
 233
cylinder wall, is likely to issue as a momentum-dominated jet propelled by the pressure 
difference between the cylinder and the atmosphere.  In free surroundings, the only 
external forces influencing the jet are gravitational, or buoyancy, forces.  For natural gas, 
with a specific gravity relative to air of about 0.56, these buoyancy forces will cause the 
jet to rise.  Thus, a natural gas leak under pressure will have the characteristics of a pure 
jet in the vicinity of discharge and the characteristics of a buoyant plume at distances 
further away from the point of discharge.  For a small leak, e.g., through a hairline crack 
(no displacement at the mouth) in the cylinder wall, the leaking CNG will have little 
initial momentum and will act as a purely buoyant plume.  A methodology developed for 
quantifying the leak rate from the former crack is now discussed. 
  
8.3.1.1 Methodology for Determining Leakage Rate of CNG from Crack through 
Cylinder Wall 
A defect that grows to become a through wall crack will result in leakage if the 
cylinder strength is not exceeded at the time of failure.  This is described as leak-before 
break (LBB) failure.  To estimate the leakage and thereby the potential for mixing and the 
formation of a flammable mixture, the flow rate through the crack has to be estimated 
which therefore requires the estimation of the crack opening.  The probability of 
detecting the leak depends on its size and flow rate of gas.  This probability along with 
the likelihood of detection will evaluated when analyzing events subsequent to initial the 




The method of crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) can be used to estimate the size 
of the opening when a LBB failure occurs.  Crack opening is assumed to have the 
following properties: 
 (a) Crack opening is rectangular with a constant opening, *. 
 (b) Crack has constant length of 2c, where c is the crack half length. 
 (c) RMS surface roughness is assumed to be 10 %. 
Tortuosity of typical naturally occurring cracks is uncertain as is surface roughness.  
Fatigue cracks have been known to be relatively straight in the depth direction with 
relatively little meander.  Roughness of the crack of 10 % is believed to be reasonable 
[57]. 
 
Initial conditions for the leakage flow of CNG are taken at typical cylinder 
operating conditions of pressure of 3000 psig and temperature between 30 and 120 °F.  
The effects of reduction in flow across a section of the cylinder was not considered nor 
was the effect of obstructed flow resulting in discharge resistance caused by the presence 
of objects in the flow path outside of the cylinder. 
 
Critical flow of gas for simple geometries will be used to estimate the actual flow.  
We will only consider isentropic gas flow from the crack.  Using the Euler’s equation of 
motion for an inviscid fluid in compressible critical flow [120], the upper bound gas flow 













     (8.1) 
 
From the equation of continuity, the mass flow rate per unit area (mass velocity) 
     
   V
A
wG ρ==      (8.2) 
 
This implies that from the Euler equation 
 







−=     (8.3) 
 
The variation of the states of the gas along the lines of constant entropy between 
the inside surface of the crack and the outside can be defined in a control volume as 
shown in Figure 8.3.  The inside surface when the gas velocity is zero is one isentropic 
state.  The isentropic stagnation pressure (p0) is the normal cylinder pressure.  This 























Figure 8.3 Flows between Stagnation and Other Sections [115], [120]  
 
Since the leak from the crack is an isentropic process, the entropy at any point is 
equal.  The enthalpy per unit mass at any state and the density may be expressed as 
functions of the entropy and pressure at that point as follows: 
 






   (8.4) 
 
Charts have been created for CNG representing the equations of state [121].  The value of 
the stagnation enthalpy, h0, is independent of whether or not entropy change occurs since 
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Figure 8.4 Typical Variations of Flow Properties in Isentropic Flow [120] 
  
For a given stagnation condition performance curves can be constructed for the gas under 
any pressure change scenario.  Typical curves for gases and vapors are shown in Figure 
8.4.  A most interesting feature of typical isentropic flow properties is that there is a 
maximum in the flow per unit area.  The pressure ratio, (p/p0) where the flow is 
maximized is called the critical pressure ratio.  For CNG this pressure ratio is found to be 
approximately 0.542 [120].  This means that gas flow from the crack to the outside at 
atmospheric pressure will be experiencing choked flow.   Under these conditions the 
velocity becomes constant at its maximum value. 
 






























     (8.5) 
 
where k, is the ratio of the specific heats at constant pressure and constant volume [120]. 
Substituting for the mass velocity, G, which is equal to w/A from Equation 8.5 and 
simplifying the expression we get  














=    (8.6) 
 
The maximum flow from the crack is therefore only dependent on the initial pressure to 
density ratio.  Assuming that natural gas is a perfect gas, the pressure to density ratio is a 
constant with a value of 1.4 x 105 m2/s2   
(1.51x106 ft2/s2). Using the value for methane which, has properties almost identical to 
natural gas, k, has a value of 1.32.  Substituting these into Equation 8.6, the maximum 
velocity for the natural gas flow velocity through the crack is: 
 
   ft/s 820or  m/s 250Vmax =    (8.7) 
 
The crack opening displacement, *, is then combined with the maximum velocity to 




Crack opening displacement is influenced by plastic deformations at the crack tip and the 
cylindrical nature of the CNG vessel.  Bulging of the cylinder at the crack site due to 
shell effects can significantly increase the crack opening displacement above say a flat 
plate in tension.  Ideally these should be considered in calculating the crack opening 
displacement.  The opening displacement of a typical crack is shown schematically in 
Figure 8.5.  
 
Estimate of crack opening displacement is best determined by use of elastic-
plastic relations between J-integral values and opening displacement.  For purposes of 













Elastic crack tip opening displacement is given by Equation 8.8, where the stress 









=δ     (8.8) 
 
 The plastic component is derived from an assumption that under plastic 
conditions the sections of the cylinder adjacent to the crack rotates about a hinge.  The 
plastic displacement at the crack mouth, Vp, is related to the crack opening displacement 
by the relationship shown in Equation 8.9. 
 








=δ    (8.9) 
where, rp , is the plastic rotational factor, a constant between 0 and 1 that defines the 
relative position of the apparent hinge point. 
 
 Because of the complexity involved and the absence of relevant data to accurately 
determine the crack opening displacement due to plasticity, only the elastic relationship 
will be used.  This will give a conservative size for the crack opening, *, and would 
represent a lower bound value of the opening displacement of a through wall crack    
 
The lower bound opening displacement for a through wall crack of length 2c, in a 
cylinder subjected to a constant pressure, can therefore be determined from Equation 8.8 
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once the stress intensity factor is known.  The minimum value of c is the thickness of the 
cylinder in accordance with the assumption of cracks having length of least twice the 
depth.  The stress intensity factor at the crack tip will be used to determine the crack 
opening displacement.  The flow rate, Q, from the rectangular crack opening is 
determined by multiplying the cross-sectional area of the crack opening by the velocity of 
gas through the opening. 
 
   maxVc2AVQ δ==     (8.10)  
  
8.3.1.2 Numerical Calculations of Leak Rate through Cylinder Wall  
The maximum velocity of gas release from the crack in the cylinder wall is given by 
Equation 8.7.  Equation 8.8 gives the crack opening displacement.  The stress intensity 
factor that will be used to calculate *, is the maximum for the different crack aspect 
ratios.  Using crack with an aspect ratio of 0.2, the stress intensity factor, just prior to the 
crack growing through the cylinder wall, Kt can be determined from the stress intensity 
factor relationship in Chapter 4 for cracks in the sidewall and the transition region.  The 
respective equations are Equation 4.7 and 4.9 which are repeated here. 
  















pRKI   (8.11)  

















From the stress concentration factor calculations, the maximum value is equal to 85.8 ksi-
√in. Substituting into Equation 8.11 and 8.12, for the stress intensity factor and the other 
material properties, * can be computed.  The calculated crack opening displacement and 
flow rate results are: 
 
     32.486 10  in−δ = ×     (8.13) 
 
   3Q 77.06 in / s=     (8.14) 
 
8.3.1.3 Thermal Radiation from a Jet Flame and Effects 
Immediate ignition of the plume of gas exiting the crack in the cylinder wall will 
result in a jet flame.  The primary output of modeling a jet flame is the thermal radiation 
that it produces and is received at adjacent cylinders and on people in the vicinity of the 
fire.  Fire duration is also estimated as it affects the potential for fire fatalities. 
 
 Combustion in a jet fire is believed to occur in the form of a strong turbulent 
momentum jet flame in a cross-wind [115], [113].  In order to compute the thermal 
effects we need estimate the flame length, heat released and the radiant fraction incident 
on a certain location.  In the ensuing analysis the effects of cross-wind on flame shape 
and size will be ignored.   
The length of a turbulent jet flame is has been shown by Hawthorne and Hottel [124], 
based on experimental data, to be approximately constant for natural gas being 
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discharged from a given nozzle diameter.  A larger nozzle diameter will sustain a longer 
flame for the same velocity.  In this analysis we will conservatively assume that the flame 
diameter is approximately half the length of the crack from which the gas is being 
released.  This flame length remains constant even with increased fuel flow rate [115].  
The relationship between flame length and diameter is shown in Equation 8.15. 
 






L   = length of turbulent flame
 =  moles of reactant per mole of product 
          for stoichimetric natural gas - air mixture
C   = fuel concentration in stoichimetric mixture
M ,M  = molecular weigh
α
F j 
t of air and natural gas
T ,T  = adiabatic flame temperature and jet absolute temperature
 
 
Using the properties for methane which is the major constituent of natural gas, the 













 =  1.0
C   = 0.091
M  = 28.84
M  = 16
 = 7.4
α
       (8.16) 
Substituting into Equation 8.15 we get the constant for the flame length to diameter ratio 
to be 
   
j
L
d  208.4=      (8.17) 
 
Using the assumed diameter of flame of half of the crack length, we get the flame length, 
L, to be 
   L 328.2 inches
   = 27 feet
=       (8.18) 
 
All the models available references a circular nozzle velocity so the equivalent 
circular opening for the velocity and flow rate computed in Equations 8.7 and 8.14 will 
be used.  This equivalent jet velocity is used to determine if flame blow-out stability is 
exceeded and therefore the inability to sustain a jet flame.  Flame instability is established 
to be the point when the burning velocity is just less than the flow velocity anywhere in 
the jet downstream of the base of the jet flame.  The critical value of the release velocity 
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of natural gas from the crack for blow-out to occur will depend on the burning velocity, 
density ratio and Reynolds number based on flame height along the axis of the jet.   
 
Two established thermodynamic principles will be relied on to establish whether 
or not flame blow-out will occur.  The first is based on the distance along the axis of the 
jet where the mean fuel concentration falls to the stoichiometric level.  In a flame 
dominated by a momentum jet, the base of a stable flame will be lifted from the surface 
of the cylinder.  It is unlikely that the base of this lifted flame will be downstream of the 
point along the jet where the fuel concentration is predicted to fall to the stoichiometric 
level.  This distance along the axis of the jet is independent of the gas discharge velocity 
and is given by [125] 
   ( )e e
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H is the distance along the jet axis where the mean fuel concentration 
       falls to the stoichiometric level.
d effective nozzle diameter







 in the stoichiometric mixture 
       of fuel and ambient air 
is the density of natural gas






The effective nozzle diameter accounts for density differences between the jet and the 
ambient air.  A relationship between the nozzle diameter and the effective diameter was 
given by Thring and Newby [126]. 
 
    ( )eed d ∞ρρ=        (8.20) 
 
Using a diameter at two orders of magnitude greater than the crack opening displacement 
computed in Equation 8.13, we can effectively account for any possibility that plasticity 
would result in a much wider crack opening. 
    d 0.2486=        ( 8.21) 
 
Substituting into Equation 8.20, the effective diameter was calculated. 
 
   ed 0.1844 inches=       (8.22) 
 
Methane as the predominant fuel in natural gas, the properties to be used to 
compute H, is as follows: 














      (8.23) 
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Substituting the chemical properties of methane and the equivalent diameter into 
Equation 8.19, the result for the distance along the jet for formation of a stoichiometric 
concentration is  
 
    H 8.39 inches=      (8.24) 
 
The second principle is the critical exit velocity at blow-out of natural gas from 
the crack, forming a jet flame.  This velocity is dependent on the stoichiometric distance, 
the maximum laminar burning velocity, the kinematic viscosity of natural gas and the 
ratio of the density of natural gas and ambient air.  The laminar burning velocity is used 
because the maximum turbulent burning velocity will depend on the laminar velocity 
along with the local turbulence parameters and the fuel concentration at exit from the 
crack in the cylinder.  This relationship has been expressed using dimensional analysis 
[127] as shown in Equation 8.25. 
 
    ( )e e
u
U
HS f R ,
ρ
ρ∞=      (8.25)  
where     e
eH u
R HS ρµ=      (8.26) 
 
is the Reynolds number based on the length along the axis of the turbulent jet that the 
mean concentration equals the stoichiometric level, H, shown in Equation 8.26.   
The universal stability limit of hydrocarbon jet flame based on research by Kalghatki 
[115], [128] is given by Equation 8.27. 
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    ( )6e H HU 0.017R 1 3.5x10 R−= −    (8.27) 
 
The critical velocity at jet exit for natural gas is derived from Equation 8.27 and shown in 
Equation 8.28. 











U  non-dimensional critical velocity at exit from crack for a stable flame
 the natural gas density at exit from the cylinder
 the ambient air density









S  maximum burning velocity
R  Reynolds number






Using the properties of natural gas and using the previously computed value of H, 
we can determine the critical at exit from the crack for blow out to occur.  The properties 














S  0.52 m/s






     (8.29) 
 
Substituting the values into Equations 8.26-8.38, we get the critical velocity of the gas 
discharge from the crack to be equal to  
 
   eU 131.7 m/s=        (8.30) 
 
The critical velocity computed is less than the flow velocity of natural gas from the crack, 
so blow-out is expected to occur.  This result is consistent with the stability curves for 
various hydrocarbon fuels shown in Figure 8.6.  From this figure the minimum jet 
discharge diameter for methane under conditions of choked flow, to sustain a stable 
diffusion flame is 41.4 mm.  This dimension is larger than the maximum postulated 
opening in the cylinder wall. 
 
We can therefore conclude that a flame cannot be sustained from the leakage of 
natural gas from a crack in a typical cylinder even if an ignition source is present.  The 
result above was derived even without consideration for a cross wind and would be the 
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limiting conditions for a turbulent jet flame from a leak in a CNG cylinder in still air.  
The only fire scenario of interest for leakage of natural gas from a crack in a typical CNG 
cylinder is therefore the accumulation of gas and the delayed ignition, causing a flash 
fire.  This will now be examined. 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Stability Curves for Various Hydrocarbons Where Nozzle Exit Velocity Is 
Choked At Blow-Out [130] 
 
8.3.2 Modeling Fireball Outcomes  
A fireball is produced when there is a catastrophic rupture of a CNG cylinder and 
immediate ignition of the released gas.  This requires the ignition source to be present and 
in sufficient strength to cause ignition of the fuel rich discharge in the flammable regions. 
The subsequent impingement of the flame produced in a flash fire or fireball caused by 
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leakage and rupture of one cylinder will cause the pressure relief device on the other 
cylinders to discharge gas, thus causing a fire ball of much larger proportions.  
The step wise procedure to estimate the outcomes of a fireball is shown in Figure 8.7.  
Considerations of overpressure and fragmentation of a cylinder is covered in the other 
sections.  Primarily the outcome that will have the greatest effect in terms of fire fatality 
is thermal radiation.  Even though fuel rich natural gas vapor clouds are expected to burn 
rapidly, no significant over-pressure results from this fire scenario which could result in 
fatalities.  On the other hand thermal radiation from the burning gases, are expected to be 
sufficiently intense to be considered hazardous.   
 
The models for determining the emitted thermal flux are derived from empirical 
correlations from laboratory experiments using methane [131].  The radiation incident on 
a source in the affected area is computed by considering the atmospheric transmissivity, 
emitted flux and the view factor which is the degree to which a target would be exposed 
to the incident radiation.  Once the radiation received is calculated then the effects can be 
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Due to Missile
 
Figure 8.7 Logic Diagram for Explosion and Thermal Radiation Effects of Fireballs 
 
8.3.2.1 Modeling Fireball Thermal Radiation   
The initial volume of the fireball, V0 will be estimated from the initial ground level 
hemispheric flaming volume before buoyant forces lifts it up.  Maximum size, height and 
duration of burning of a natural gas fireball, can be estimated from relationships 
developed empirically for methane in small scale experiments [132], which have been 
validated in actual large scale accidents.  
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    fV 111.22V=       (8.31) 
    1/3fd 5.97V=        (8.32) 
    1/3p fz 9.47V=       (8.33) 







d maximum diameter of fireball (m)
z  maximum height of the visible flame (m)
t   duration of the fireball (s)
V  initial volume of the CNG contained in the cylinder (m )








The transient geometry of the fireball may be expressed in terms of the dimensionless 
time after ignition,η , until burn-out as shown in Equations 8.35 and 8.36 [133].   
 
    0.84td 1.15= η       (8.35) 
    0.66 1/3fz 2.80 V= η       (8.36) 






η =       (8.37) 
 
The initial volume of the fuel-rich natural gas vapor cloud released from the cylinder, at 
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ambient conditions, could be estimated by assuming ideal gas behavior at constant 
temperature.  If the entire water volume of a typical cylinder is released are then 
 
    cyl cyl atm fp V p V=      (8.38) 
where 





p pressure in cylinder after filling
V water volume of typical cylinder considered
p ambient atmospheric pressure






For a typical cylinder being considered the physical properties are as follows: 
 











    (8.39) 
 
Substituting into Equation 8.38 the initial volume occupied by the vapor rich cloud before 
mixing is calculated to be 




V 6.23x10  in
   10.21 m
=
=
    (8.40) 
 
Similarly substituting into Equations 8.31 to 8.34, the estimated maximum volume, 
diameter, height and time to burn out of the fireball is as follows: 
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    (8.41)  
 
The averaged normalized dimensionless heat transfer rateν  for ethane, methane 
and propane, can be plotted as a function of dimensionless time as shown in Figure 8.8.  
The dimensionless heat transfer rate was normalized with respect to the initial volume of 
fuel.  
 
Figure 8.8 Normalized Heat Transfer Rate as a Function of Dimensionless Time for 




It was deduced from the curves in Figure 8.8 that a dimensional scaling relationship exist 
and that the normalized dimensionless heat transfer rate is fuel dependent [134].  This 
could therefore be used to estimate the actual heat transfer rate, as a function of time, at 
any location in the vicinity of the fireball.   The relationship is: 
 
   
( )




4 x z h
q ( ) ν ρ ∆
 π + −  






f fraction of combustion energy which is radiated to the environment
atmospheric transmissivity
density of vapor at ambient conditions (kg/m )






= tance to location of interest (m)
h height above ground level of location of interest from fireball=
 
 
Equation 8.42 will be used in an iterative process to plot a heat flux map around 
the bus in order to determine the effect of a fireball.  The values of the parameters of 
interest to be used to in developing this profile map are as follows: 












     (8.43) 
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The fraction of combustion energy radiated to the environment by the fireball is 
conservatively estimated to be 0.24.  Radiated fraction of heat has been found to vary 
between 0.20 and 0.24 [135] depending on the fireball size.  It should be noted that for 
extremely large fireballs an estimate of 0.20 would over predict the surface heat flux of 
the fireball at the beginning of the burn cycle.  Atmospheric transmissivity accounts for 
attenuation by scattering and absorption of the emitted radiation from a fire by water 
vapor in the air and carbon monoxide, at any arbitrary temperature and composition.  The 
curve in Figure 8.9 [136] is used to estimate the constant value of 0.85, to be used in this 
analysis.  This is a reasonable value based on the assumed relative humidity of the 
atmosphere and the expected path length. 
 




8.3.2.2 Numerical Computation of Fireball Thermal Radiation   
A numerical program written in MatLab was written to determine the time-
dependent thermal flux.  The program was based on solving the Equations described in 
the previous section at incremental time steps from the ignition to the estimated burn out 
time of the fireball.  The real time is used to calculate the non-dimensional time, which is 
then used to estimate the geometry, location and heat flux from the fireball incident on 
receptors designated distances from the fireball.  The chosen time step was every second.  
The natural log of the heat flux results are shown in contour maps for each time step in 
Figures 8.10 – 8.16.   
 
 





Figure 8.11 Heat Flux Contour Map after t = 1 second.  
 




Figure 8.13 Heat Flux Contour Map after t = 3 second. 
 





Figure 8.15 Heat Flux Contour Map after t = 5 second.  
 
Figure 8.16 Heat Flux Contour Map after t = 6 second. 
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From Figures 8.10 to 8.16 the trajectory of the fireball from ignition until flame out after 
approximately 6 seconds is clearly shown.  Figure 8.17 to 8.23 shows similar results for 
the natural log of the heat flux incident on receptors at specific horizontal distances from 
the bus, for constant height of 1.5 meters (5 feet).  These results can be used to estimate 
the effects and potential for fatality for passengers and persons that may be within the 
vicinity of a typical bus who may be impacted by a fireball.  
   
 






Figure 8.18 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 1 second. 
 
 





Figure 8.20 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 3 second. 
 
 





Figure 8.22 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 5 second. 
 
 
Figure 8.23 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 6 second. 
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8.3.2.3 Computation of Secondary Fireball Thermal Radiation  
A secondary fireball will be formed from the fireball caused from catastrophic 
rupture of the CNG cylinder.  The intense heat produced causes the pressure relief device 
on the cylinders to rupture, releasing the entire contents of the other five cylinders.  For 
simplicity the secondary fireball is assumed to burn independently and not interacts with 
the first one.  Also it is assumed that ignition of the secondary fireball will occur when 
the entire contents of the five cylinders are released.  The volume of fuel available to this 
fireball is five times the volume of the initial fireball as shown in Equation 8.44.   
 
     secf f
3
V 5V
     51.1 m
=
=
    (8.44) 
 
Duration of the secondary fireball can be calculated from Equation 8.34 and is 
 
     
secp
t 7.7 s=      (8.45)  
 
The procedure for computing the outcome of the secondary fireball is identical to 
the initial fireball. The results for the natural log of the heat flux at a height of 1.5 m, and 
at specified horizontal distances from the bus, at two second intervals is shown in Figures 
8.24 to 8.28.  It should be noted that a flash fire will produce a secondary fireball as well.  
The results here will be used to estimate the effect and potential for fatality for secondary 




Figure 8.24 Heat Flux Intensity after Ignition, t = 0 second. 
 




Figure 8.26 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 4 second. 
 
 




Figure 8.28 Heat Flux Intensity after t = 8 second. 
8.3.3 Modeling of Vapor Cloud Explosion and Flash Fire Outcome 
The two outcomes of interest associated with the delayed ignition of a CNG 
release that have accumulated over time are unconfined vapor cloud explosion and flash 
fire.  Release of a small amount of CNG has been shown historically to result in a flash 
fire without significant overpressure.  Experimental work [137] shows that some form of 
confinement and vapor cloud turbulence is required for damaging overpressure to occur.  
There is also indication that initial vapor cloud must be above a critical size for flash fire 
to be accompanied by damaging overpressure.  Notwithstanding that the combustion 
process of large vapor clouds are not completely understood and no analytical models 
exist to full describe the chemical reactions and the corresponding physical phenomenon.  
Figure 8.29 is a logic diagram of the steps in calculating the effects of a vapor Cloud 
Explosion and Flash Fire. 
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Correlations for flammable mass versus vapor cloud explosion probability based on 
historical data [138] suggest that there is a probabilistic relationship between the mass of 
fuel released and the likelihood of a vapor cloud explosion accompanying a flash fire.  
This relationship is evaluated in the Likelihood of Ignition section of Part III.  The result 







Simulate Fire and Heat Release
Estimate Radiant Heat fraction
Determine Exposure Factor
Estimate Transmissivity
Estimate Incident Thermal Radiations





Estimate Scaed Distance Parameter
for given Overpressure
Estimate Distance for fatal Overpressure
Determine UVCE Effect Zone for Fatality
Gas Dispersion and Ignition
Mass and Size of Flame Cloud
 
Figure 8.29 Logic Diagram of Vapor Cloud Explosion and Flash Fire Outcomes   
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We can see from the logic diagram that thermal as well as over pressure effects are 
important in modeling the effects of flash fires.  Overpressure effects are significant 
depending on flame acceleration to produce detonation instead of deflagration effects.  
The two most important mechanisms that affect flame acceleration are thermal expansion 
and turbulence.  The presence of the bus structure around the cylinders and the cylinder 
compartment itself, contribute to partial confinement and turbulence.  In the event of a 
flash fire the effects of an unconfined vapor cloud explosion will be present. 
 
 Modeling of the outcome of a flash fire is similar to the procedures for a fireball.  
The main distinction being that the vapor cloud is widely dispersed before ignition takes 
place.  The ignition source is usually away from the natural gas release unlike a fire ball 
where the source is present to cause immediate ignition.  The likelihood of ignition of a 
flash fire is developed in Chapter 10 along with the likelihood of other events subsequent 
to the natural gas release.  In this part of the analysis a flammable mixture and delayed 
ignition is presumed to occur.  Important parameters in analyzing combustion incidents 
are as follows: 
 Flammable limits of natural gas 
 Auto-ignition temperature 
 Heat of combustion 
 Molecular weigh and 




A flash fire is in the form of a propagating plume, producing an unsteady diffusion flame.  
Models for the effects of radiation are not well developed, however a combination of 
simulation using CFD and analytical modeling will be used to determine the transient 
incident radiation within specific zones.  In the case of vapor cloud explosion a TNT 
model will be used.  This model is based on the assumption of equivalence between the 
flammable material and TNT, factored by an explosion yield term.  
 
8.3.3.1 Estimation of Natural Gas Flash Fire Radiation  
Determining the geometry of the vapor cloud over time is fundamental in 
estimating the thermal radiation field surrounding the diffusion flame.  Estimating the 
emissive power and finally the radiant intensity at a given location, as shown in Figure 
8.29, is important in determining the thermal effects of a flash fire.  As was said earlier 
the two conditions for a burning cloud; presence of an ignition source away from the gas 
release; and a flammable mixture of natural gas is presumed to exist.  The dispersion of 
the natural gas before ignition, flame propagating velocity, geometry and thermal 
radiation will now be estimated.  
  
8.3.3.2 Modeling of Natural Gas Dispersion 
Theoretical predictions have shown that natural gas released from high pressure 
storage could be heavier than air at exit [139 - 140].  High pressure release of natural gas 
has been found to disperse as a dense cloud [141] close to the floor and does not rise 
immediately.  Analytical results show that the large pressure difference between a CNG 
fuel cylinder and the atmosphere expands the released gas adiabatically.  During 
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expansion the gas exiting from a crack becomes cold (calculated to be – 2600 F or 112 K), 
increasing the density to approximately 1.5 times greater than that of surrounding air.  
 
The fuel rich discharge jet of gas, initially above the upper flammability limit, 
undergoes turbulent mixing with ambient air, resulting in a flammable mixture at the 
edges of the vapor cloud [142].  This occurs because the high velocity release from a 
crack produces a momentum dominated jet which moves the gas in the direction of the 
gas jet and causes rapid mixing with air.  Analyses have shown that the diluted gas 
continues to move along the jet axis or in the direction it is deflected by a solid object.  
This continues until the magnitude of the inertial forces due to the initial momentum 
diminishes and the cloud then becomes a buoyant plume, remaining close to the ground 
for a significant amount of time.  Crosswind will affect the dispersion and shape of the 
final vapor cloud.  Some simplifying assumptions will be made for the purposes of this 
analysis as follows: 
 The release of natural gas, mixing and formation of a buoyant cloud 
occurs in less than five minutes. 
 This cloud will be formed adjacent to the typical bus configuration shown 
in [1]. 
 The shape of the cloud is rectangular and follows the profile of the bus 
undercarriage. 




The extent of the vapor cloud could be estimated by assuming ideal gas behavior at 
constant temperature and using the same procedure as shown in Section 8.3.2.1.  
Equation 8.46 was used to estimate the initial volume of natural gas at ambient conditions 
that was released 
    cyl cyl atm fp V p V=      (8.46) 
where 





p pressure in cylinder after filling
V water volume of typical cylinder considered
p ambient atmospheric pressure







Using the same typical cylinder physical properties as follows: 
 











     (8.47) 
The volume occupied by the vapor rich cloud before mixing is calculated to be 
     5 3fV 6.23x10  in=     (8.48) 
 
From this we can estimate the volume of air-natural gas mixture that would be 
rendered flammable by leaking the entire contents of the cylinder from a crack.  The 
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flammable mixture would be bounded by the upper and lower flammability limits of 
natural gas, which is approximately 15 and 5 percentage by volume respectively [115].  
Substituting these values we get the maximum and minimum flammable air-natural gas 
mixture. 
    6 3MaxFLV 12.5x10  in=     (8.49) 
 
    6 3MinFLV 4.2x10  in=     (8.50) 
 
 Using the dimensions of a typical large school bus [143], which are 40 ft long and 
8 ft wide, we can estimate the thickness of the vapor cloud.  The cloud is assumed to 
follow the rectangular profile of the bus undercarriage, extending by 4 ft outside the bus 
profile.  Accounting for the obstructed volume of the bus, the minimum and maximum 
vapor thickness (height of the vapor cloud) is calculated to be: 
 
    max 13.6 ftδ =      (8.51) 
 
    min 7.33 ftδ =      (8.52) 
 
From the above we can conclude that the vapor cloud when fully dispersed would 
surround and completely enclose the bus.  Seepage of natural gas into the bus 
compartment, will therefore likely result in a vapor cloud explosion inside the bus.  The 



























Figure 8.30 Profile of the Unconfined Natural Gas Vapor Cloud [147] 
 
In modeling the flame velocity and thermal radiation we are concerned with unsteady 
diffusive burning of the unconfined vapor cloud.  The dimensions of the cloud were 
determined by assuming uniform mixing of the gas released from the turbulent jet.  Even 
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if that is not the case the results for thermal radiation would not be affected.  This is 
deduced from the fact that the cloud would be diluted with air at the edges.  Ignition of 
the flammable regions will cause a flame to propagate through these regions.  
Combustion then proceeds as an unsteady diffusive burning in which gravitational 
buoyancy forces mix air into the vapor cloud, further propagating the flame and 
ultimately consuming the entire released natural gas vapor. 
 
8.3.3.3 Modeling Unconfined Vapor Cloud Flaming Characteristics  
Immediately following ignition, flames begin to spread in all directions away from the 
ignition source.  Frame travel will be uniform in all directions if the entire mixture is 
flammable and the vapor cloud is over the ignition source.  Initially the flames produced 
are contained within the cloud propagating through regions where the mixture is most 
flammable.  Subsequently the flames become extended in the form of buoyancy driven 
turbulent fire plume above the vapor cloud. 
 
 In the transient period of flame growth an average flame propagation velocity 
with respect to ground can be established.  This is given by adding the wind speed to the 
burning velocity.  The maximum laminar burning velocity of methane flame is found to 
be approximately equal to 0.5 m/s [113], [115].  Laminar flame speed for an unconfined 
methane cloud fire was found to be approximately 3.5 m/s [113].  Turbulent flame 
propagation velocity of natural gas, S, is expected to be similar.  For this analysis we will 




      S 4.0 m/s=     (8.53) 
This will be used to estimate the transient behavior of the flame over time as well as the 
thermal radiation produced. 
 
 Another important transient characteristic of the flash fire that determines the 
amount of thermal radiation that it produces is the ground level width.  A theoretical 
model is given by Raj and Emmons [145].  This model is based on the principle that the 
plume is characterized by the heating source.  That is the rate of burning controls the 
plume characteristics which is itself a function of the gas velocity within the plume.  The 
essential features of the model as it relates to the natural gas vapor cloud bus fire are 
shown in Figure 8.31.  The difference between a flash fire and a fireball can be seen by 
comparing with the equivalent fireball fire in Figure 8.32. 
 
 The flame width as a function of time for experimentally derived values flame 
height-to-width ratio and flame propagating velocity, is shown in Equation 8.54. [145]. 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 23f 1F 12 2 2 1F 3 213 3 3 3ln tanχ +χ+ −π −χ   τ = + − χ +     (8.54) 
and  
 





 χ = ξ  
    (8.55) 




























Figure 8.31.  Schematic Diagram of the Unconfined Burning of a  






















The maximum width of the vapor fire is given by the following equation: 
 

























F ,  is the Flame Froude number
F ,  is the Froude Number
S flame propagating velocity
g acceleration due to gravity
unburnt vapor cloud thickness

















Typically the flame width increases as a function of time until the entire 
flammable vapor is consumed.  Experimental data on methane which is applicable for 
natural gas, shows that the rate of increase in the flame width is slightly less than the 
flame propagation velocity, relative to the ground.  Equation 8.54 can be used to calculate 
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the time-dependent flame width, enabling us to be able to calculate the thermal radiation.  
This is the outcome of interest in quantifying the consequence of a flash fire. 
 
8.3.3.4 Modeling Thermal Radiation from Flash Fire  
The transient nature of the burning process, influenced mainly by the changing 
geometry of the flame, prevents a detailed modeling of the thermal radiation from a flash 
fire.  Heat flux incident on subjects in the affected areas is a combination of several 
factors including: 
 Emissive power of the fire 
 Fire duration and steady state burning period 
 Area of the visible flame 
 Distance to the flame surface 
 The geometry of the flame relative to the observer 
 View factor  
 
Using a simple rectangular flame geometry, the centerline horizontal and vertical view 
factors can be determined using Equations 8.57 and 8.58 [146]. 
 
   ( )2 21 11 X Yh 2 1 X 1 XF tan tan− −π + += γ +    (8.57) 
 





X flame length divided by the observer distance





The incident thermal flux on a subject in the affected area based on the view factors of 
Equations 8.57 and 8.58 is given by Equation 8.59. 
 




0.85,  atmospheric transmissivity
E 157 kW/m , surface emissive power of the flame
τ =
=
  (8.60) 
 
 From the above modeling exercise it is evident that without simplifying 
assumptions, estimating the thermal flux from the complex phenomenon of a flash fire, as 
a result of the burning of an unconfined vapor cloud would be impossible. A numerical 
program would be required to estimate the thermal flux received within a specified 
distance from the flash fire. 
 
8.3.3.5 Computation of Flash Fire Thermal Radiation   
In order to explicitly determine the thermal flux the time-dependent flame width 
must be calculated.  This is calculated from Equation 8.54 at incremental time steps from 
the ignition of the flame to the flame-out time.  The elapsed time for the flame to reach 
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the maximum or asymptotic width, W∞ , is a constant for the particular fuel and is given 
by: 
     Wrise 2St ∞=     (8.61) 
This assumes that the width increases at a constant rate during the flame spread from 
ignition.  The time to flame-out will be assumed to be equal to the flame-out time for a 
fireball as the amount of fuel is the same in both cases.  This is given by Equation 8.61. 
 
The asymptotic width of the flame is the maximum possible width given by 
Equation 8.62.  By substituting for the Froude Number for the natural gas vapor cloud 
and the flame in Equation 8.62, the maximum flame width can be reduced to 
 






∞ = δ    (8.62) 
 
The Froude number is dependent on the upward velocity of the natural gas vapor 
at the base of the flame.  If the vapor cloud is burning freely there is no means of 
estimating this explicitly.  Experiments have shown that the visible flame height to flame 
width ratio is a constant [147].  It has been shown that this ratio can be written in terms of 
the Froude Number, F, the ratio of density of natural gas to that of ambient air, 0′ρ , the 
inverse volumetric expansion ratio for the vapor, ω , and the stoichiometric fuel to air 
mass ratio, r ,  as follows: 














  (8.63) 
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Experimentally determined values for the height to width ratio have been found to be 
between 1.5 and 2.5 for methane gas [147].  A value of 2.5 will be used in this analysis to 
determine the Froude Number.  Substituting values for the thermodynamic properties of 
methane and rearranging we get: 
 
     F 0.56=      (8.64) 
Similarly substituting the flame speed and chemical properties, the flame Froude number 
is      fF 0.40=      (8.65) 
 
The average thickness of unburnt vapor at the start of the fire is equal to 4.1 m.  
From this and the Froude numbers, the maximum width of the flame on the dispersed 
vapor, from Equation 8.62 is equal to: 
     W 4.6 m∞ =      (8.66) 
 
 Similarly we could determine the time required to ramp up the flame width from 
zero to the asymptotic width.  This could be achieved by substituting into Equation 8.61, 
giving the result: 
     riset 0.60 s=      (8.67) 
 
Once the flame width reaches the maximum width the duration is assumed to be identical 
to that of a fireball computed earlier, given that the same amount of fuel is involved and 
the mixing and entrainment of air into this burning cloud is expected to be the same.  
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The thermal radiation is proportional to the area of the visible flame.  This as the flame is 
assumed to be optically thick.  The incident flux also increases with the flame surface 
area are will drop off as burnout occurs.  In addition to the width of the flame the height 
is required to estimate the thermal flux incident on receptors at specified distances from 
the fire.  Flame height as a function of its width for a linear heat source [148] is given by: 
    
CO
1/5H
W 3.35N=       (8.68) 
Where, CON  is a dimensionless number known as the combustion number and ω  is the 
inverse volumetric expansion ratio due to combustion.  They are defined by:  
    ( )QcrC Tp a
1
1+
ω =       (8.69) 












=      (8.70) 
and    2 0 0 cQ W U Q= π ρ      (8.71) 
where 





density ratio of natural gas vapor and air
r stoichiometric air/fuel mass ratio
inverse volumetric expansion ratio
Q heat of combustion













The following values of these parameters were used in estimating the dimensions of the 
flame. 









Q 500.2x10  J/kg







    (8.72)   
  
A numerical procedure was written in MatLab in order to compute the transient 
thermal flux.  This is based on the flame width as a function of time, flame height with 
time, view factor and received thermal flux equations.  The routine was used to estimate 
the thermal flux incident on receptors at specified distances from the fire.  A simple 
rectangular geometry was assumed for the flame from which the horizontal and vertical 
centerline view factors are determined using Equations 8.57 and 8.58. 
 
The results are shown in Figures 8.33 to 8.39.  These results can be used to 
estimate the effects and potential for fatality for passengers and persons that may be 
within the vicinity of a typical bus who may be impacted by a flash fire.  The effects will 






Figure 8.33 Heat Flux Intensity just after Ignition, t = 0 second. 
 




Figure 8.35 Heat Flux Intensity after, t = 0.2 second. 
 
 




Figure 8.37 Heat Flux Intensity after, t = 0.4 second. 
 
 




Figure 8.39 Variation of Heat Flux Intensity with Time. 
 
8.3.3.6 CFD Simulation of Thermal Radiation from Natural Gas Vapor Cloud Fire 
inside a Typical Bus 
Simulation of a fire inside of a bus was required in order to establish the thermal radiation 
that could be expected should a fireball engulf the bus or a flash fire is present inside the 
bus as opposed to outside as have been modeled in the previous exercises.  The Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) code developed by NIST was used for this simulation.  In 
addition to the large eddy simulation assumptions used in the code algorithm, some 
simplifying assumptions were made for the fire inside the bus.  These assumptions were 
included in the data file shown in Appendix 7 and include: 
 Fire and combustion products enter the bus through a single door or 
window at the back of the bus. 
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 Ventilation is provided by two open windows located close to the front of 
the bus. 
 Fire and combustion products are injected into the computational domain 
at a wind speed of 4 m/s. 
 The heat release rate per unit area of the fire is chosen to reflect the size of 
the fire that would be blazing inside the bus. 
 
 The radiative heat transfer is modeled by solving the radiation transport equation 
for a non-scattering gray gas [149].  This model adopts the idea of a set of discreet 
emitters to the large eddy simulation technique adopted for the FDS hydrodynamic 
model.  The assumption is that a prescribed fraction of the heat released from each 
thermal element used to describe the fire is radiated away.  This emitted flux is assumed 
to be the actual radiant energy emitted locally by the thermal element.  Typically this 
amounts to about thirty-five percent of the energy released in a combustion process [150].  
For the natural gas fire contemplated in this analysis, the radiant energy absorbed by 
smoke particulate matter can be neglected.  The actual radiant energy can therefore be 
estimated explicitly. 
 
 The radiative flux, qR at a given point on the surface of the target, sr can be 
expressed as [150]: 
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−λ = κ +∫    (8.74) 
 
Here n  is a unit normal vector to the surface at point sr , and Np is the total number of 
radiating elements at the instant in question.  The divergence of the radiant heat flux to 
some point of interest, r , from the same set of point emitters is given by: 
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π −
=
∇ ⋅ = −κ χ −λ∑    (8.75) 
 
Where, κ , the absorption coefficient is taken to be the Planck mean absorption 
coefficient for soot given by [151]: 
 






 11.86Y  / cmρρ
κ =
=
    (8.76) 
 
The soot volume fraction fv or mass fraction Ys is calculated by assuming that a 
fixed fraction of the fuel burned in each Lagrangian thermal element is converted to soot.  
For natural gas this is negligible, allowing the radiant heat transfer at each instant of time 
to be calculated with an exact solution found. 
In the simulation exercise, the sum in Equation 8.73 is calculated as a running average 
over several time steps.  At each time step, a random number of sample elements are 
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chosen and the sum is carried out and weighted to account for all of the emitted radiation.  
The mathematical model discussed, along with other solution improvement techniques, 
was implemented in the computational fluid dynamics simulation exercise.  This was 
used to compute the heat flux inside and surrounding the bus during a flash fire. 
 
 For the simulation a numerical grid consisting of 64 by 64 by 32 cells was used to 
span a domain of 12x3x4 m3. The cell sizes were chosen to achieve the greatest accuracy 
in the results.  The bus structure defined the computational domain was included as an 
obstruction.  Ambient atmospheric temperature was assumed to be uniformed at 25 C 
and the heat release rate of natural gas taken to be 1688 kW/m2.  The fraction of the 
chemical heat released rate converted to thermal radiation that is emitted from the 
thermal elements was assumed to be 35%. 
 
8.3.3.7 Results of CFD Simulation of the Unconfined Natural Gas Cloud Fire 
The snapshots of the Lagrangian elements that represent the fire plume at 
different time steps were animated and show the spread of the fire across the bus 
instances in time.  The results indicate that the temperature of the combustion products as 
well as the heat flux inside the bus is likely to result is fatality of all the occupants. 






8.3.3.8 Modeling of Natural Gas Vapor Cloud Explosion Outcome 
The procedure for modeling the effects of a vapor cloud explosion is shown in 
Figure 8.29.  Inputs required for calculating the intensity of the explosion include the 
mass of fuel released, dimensions of the flammable cloud and an estimate of the 
explosion yield.  The effects are measured in the damage level with distance and the peak 
overpressure estimated. 
 
Of the models available the TNT model with its simplicity will be applied.  This 
model is based on the assumption [152 – 155] that the explosion as a result of the natural 
gas cloud is equivalent to that of a TNT charge, factored by an explosion yield term.  
That relationship may be expressed as: 
 














m equivalent mass of TNT 
m mass of natural gas released
assumed or empirical explosion yield
h heat of combustion of natural gas











The maximum expected for explosion yield based on historical data [156] for a 
symmetrical cloud is 0.2.  The equivalent mass of TNT will be determined by substituting 















   (8.78) 
 
     TNTm 17.4 kg=     (8.79) 
 
This result will be used in calculating the effect of the vapor cloud exploding from 
documented TNT explosion monographs such as shown in Figure 8.40.  This chart was 
developed for a hemispherical TNT surface charge where explosive parameters are 
plotted as a function of the scaled range.  The estimated peak overpressure with distance 
is used in the consequence modeling of Section 8.5, to determine the possibility of 
fatalities.   
 
The fatality results derived are only approximations as the physical and chemical 
interactions in an unconfined vapor cloud deflagration are very different from that which 










8.3.4 Cylinder Physical Explosion Outcome 
 
The outcomes of a physical explosion from rupture of a CNG cylinder are the result of 
shock waves produced and energetic particles or missiles generated.  Since we are 
evaluating the risk with the bus in normal use, the effects of missiles will be considered 
to be integral with all other outcomes of an explosive event.    
 
Shock waves will be generated from sudden expansion of the gas in the 
pressurized cylinder.  Catastrophic rupture of a cylinder will occur with brittle type 
failure.  It is assumed that energy losses to generation of projectiles and heating the 
atmosphere are negligible and 100% of the available energy producing the shock wave.  
The procedure for calculating the outcome of a physical explosion is shown in Figure 
8.41.  This procedure estimates the equivalent energy in lbs of TNT that isothermal 
expansion of natural gas would produce in response to the decreasing of pressure to 
ambient conditions.  A shock wave correlation curve will be used to estimate the 
overpressure produced and potential for damage.  Ideal gas laws are assumed to apply. 
 
 The equivalent TNT energy for expanding natural gas from its initial and pressure 
to atmospheric conditions is given by Equation 8.80 [158]. 
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W energy in lb TNT
V volume of compressed gas, ft
p 3000 initial pressure of compressed natural gas, psia
p ambient pressure
p 14.7 psia, standard pressure








0 492 R, standard temperature 
R 1.987 Btu/lb mol- R
=
=    
 
Substituting into Equation 8.81, the equivalent energy is  
 
    TNTW 2.42 lb TNT=      (8.81) 
 
The blast pressure at the surface of the exploding CNG cylinder can be estimated from 
[159] 
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P pressure at surface of cylinder
P burst pressure of cylinder
ratio of specific heats
T absolute temperature, K































An iterative solution will be implemented to determine the blast pressure. In solving the 
expression the assumption is made that expansion will occur in air at standard 
atmospheric pressure and temperature of 25 C.  The other properties of the natural gas 
used are shown in Equation 8.83. 









    (8.83) 
 
The scaled distance based on the blast pressure at the surface could be determined from 
Figure 8.40 which is for pressure vessels at ground level.  The scaled distance is given by 
[160]:  










R radial distance from center of explosion, ft





Using the secant method of iteration for a routine implemented in MatLab, the blast 
pressure at the surface is calculated to be:  
     sP 169 psia=      (8.85) 
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The corrected center of explosion can be determined from Equations 8.84 and 8.85 and 
the scaled distance from Figure 8.40.  From Figure 8.40 for a blast pressure of 169 psia, 
the scaled distance is 







    
=
=
               (8.86) 
       
Substituting the equivalent mass of TNT the radial distance of the explosion surface from 
the center of explosion can be calculated.  This radial distance has to be corrected with 
the diameter of the cylinder.  This corrected radial distance, GR′  of the charge surface has 
to be added to any radial distance in evaluating the effects of a cylinder physical 
explosion. 
   GR 4.87 feet′ =       (8.87) 
 
 The equivalent mass of TNT as well as the distance at which certain pressure 
effects will be felt will be used in evaluating the pressure effects of an explosion of a 
typical CNG cylinder considered in this analysis. 
 
8.3.5 Outcome of Confined Vapor Explosion in the Bus of Building  
 The outcome of interest for a gas explosion in a confined space such as a bus of 
the depot is the shock wave produced by the overpressure.  Thermal effects are accounted 
for in the fire scenarios considered while fatalities due to projectiles generated are 
ignored.  A simplified approach will be used in estimating the outcome of overpressure 
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outcome.  In this approach we will assume that the bus and depot is occupied by a 
stoichiometric mixture of air and natural gas.  It is further assumed that all the 
combustion energy goes into producing a shock wave.   The energy produced by this 
combustion can be estimated from the mass of fuel available and the specific heat of 
combustion of methane.  The equivalent TNT energy is then calculated and the procedure 
for a physical explosion used to estimate the effects of a confined explosion. 
 
 The volume of air in a the typical bus is approximately [143] 
     3busV 3200 ft=     (8.88) 
The mass of fuel in this stoichiometric mixture of natural gas and air is  
     busfuelm 13.56 lb=     (8.89) 
The energy produced in this combustion process can be determined from the mass of fuel 
and the heat of combustion of natural gas which is assumed to be the same as methane. 
     combE 291600 Btu=     (8.90) 
Assuming that 1 lb TNT is equivalent to 2000 Btu then the energy released in equivalent 
weight of TNT is  
     busTNTW 145.8 lb TNT=    (8.91) 
 
The effect of a confined explosion inside of a bus or depot will be determined from the 
equivalent TNT, Figure 8.40 and Equation 8.86.  The potential for fatality is determined 
from the shock wave which is conservatively assumed to be created by 20% of the 
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combustion energy available.  Analysis for fatality is identical to the procedure for 
physical explosion once the equivalent TNT has been determined.      
 
8.4 Fire Scenarios Effects Analysis 
 The effects of the outcomes from the different fire scenarios are used to estimate 
the likely injury or damage to people, including fatality, from thermal radiation and 
explosions.  The potential for fatality will be determined from theoretical models based 
on the physiology of response of human skin to thermal radiation and the effect of direct 
and reflected blast overpressure.  It is assumed that the skin is bare for the duration of the 
exposure.  The effect of missiles created in explosions and human body translation is 
ignored even though both are very likely to cause fatalities. 
 
8.4.1 Thermal Radiation Effects Modeling 
Modeling of the effect of thermal radiation on human skin and underlying tissue 
is not possible due to the complexity of the thermal system with blood flow interacting 
with tissue.  Thermal radiation incident on human skin causes denaturation of skin 
proteins in the epidermis and destroys the cell structure and collagen protein in the dermis 
[161].  The severity of damage depends on the extent of destruction of the tissues.   
Empirical models are available for estimating burns and time for pain threshold.  
Determination of the thermal flux levels at which fatality will occur is subjective.  The 
most appropriate model for estimating the effect of thermal radiation is based on the 
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relation between thermal radiation intensity and burn injury for nuclear explosions at 
different yields [162].  This model is based on the probit method.  The probit estimated 
from Equation 8.92 can be used to estimate the percentage fatality expected from Table 
8.3.  The results are summarized in [163] and shown in Figure 8.42.   
 











The probit method has more application for toxic effects.  Its application for 
thermal injuries [164] has been shown to be relatively inaccurate.  Thermal radiation 





Figure 8.42 Fatality Levels for Thermal Radiation [163]  
 
In this analysis the effects of secondary fires which are started because of the presence of 
a large primary natural gas fire is not considered.  Taking into account the effect of 
secondary fires requires analysis of the radiation intensity and duration for excedence of 
threshold values for pyrolysis of bus structure and internal components.  Mitigating 
factors are conservatively assumed to significantly reduce the effects of secondary fires in 
the time required for them to develop.  No consideration is given to injuries that do not 
produce fatalities.  This is a very conservative approach as third degree burns frequently 





Using an average fixed thermal exposure criterion, resulting in a fixed number of 
fatalities, without accounting for duration of the exposure is a simplified approach.  The 
probit method however allows us to evaluate the consequence of each fire scenario, 
without reference to the changes in thermal flux over time.  This will give us the average 
consequence in terms of fire fatality for each scenario. 
 
8.4.2 Explosion Effects Modeling 
The effects of explosions are determined from the overpressure outcomes of the 
fire scenarios considered.  Explosion models reviewed predict the impact of this 
overpressure on humans in determining potential for fatalities.  Secondary effects due to 
projectiles formed when a structure explodes, are considered as well as fatalities due to 
whole body translation, which are expected to produce the most fatalities.  The total 
fatalities from all outcomes are determined from research on total fatality from a nuclear 
explosion without the effects of ionizing radiation [162].   
The best available model for quantitatively estimating fatalities due to explosions is the 
probit method by [162].  The primary inputs to this model are the equivalent TNT 
explosion yield and the yield that would cause 50% fatality for a certain blast pressure 
and shelter category.  These values are extracted from empirical curves considering all 
mechanisms of fatality for low yield explosions shown in Figure 8.43 and summarized in 
Equations 8.94 and 8.95.  The percentage of fatality expected within a certain distance 
from the blast center is given by 






b TNT TNT TNTp (inside) 16.151 0.897W 0.0245W 0.0002W= − + −   (8.94) 
50
2 3 4






Pr probability of fatality due to explosion
p blast pressure that would give 50% fatality






The explosion yield in lb TNT outcome computed in Section 8.3 is used to estimate the 
overpressure produced from Figure 8.43, based on the scaled distance from the corrected 
blast surface, and to estimate the blast pressure that would produce 50% fatality from 
Equations 8.94 to 8.95.  These estimates are used in computing the Probit of expected 
fatality from each explosion event whether inside the bus, inside the depot or outdoors.  
The percentage of fatality is determined from the probit of each event using Table 8.3 
 
Explosion effect modeling as described in Section 8.3 is based on TNT explosion 
modeling.  This requires qualification however as vapor cloud explosions are 
characterized as deflagrations and TNT explosions are detonations.  The effects are 
similar however provided the distance is sufficient to predict an overpressure of greater 




Figure 8.43 Mid-Lethal Free Field Overpressures for Various Shelter Categories [162] 
 
 




8.5 Fire Consequence Assessment 
The consequence of any fire scenario considered is determined by combining the 
outcome of each event, the effect of that outcome in terms of fatality, with the occupancy 
of the effect zone at the time of the incident.  Location of the bus is incorporated in the 
occupancy figures reported.  Determination of the occupancy will complete the variables 
required to estimate the consequence of the fire scenarios considered. 
 
8.5.1 Zone Occupancy Modeling 
Occupancy of the effect zones was detailed in [1] and is summarized in Table 8.4.  
The occupancy considered in this analysis only includes persons in direct contact with the 
fire incident and does not include persons in adjacent buildings who may be affected by 
secondary fires and explosion.  This is a very conservative assumption and would 
produce the lower bound of fatalities all other things being considered.  Persons in direct 
contact with the fire are summarized as follows: 
 The driver and an average passenger load in a single bus estimated to be 28 
persons total. 
 Persons in private vehicles on the roadway with average passenger load of 2 
persons, based on traffic density for that location, in a populous state where CNG 
vehicles would be expected to be used. 





The effect zone is measured in distance from the bus which is involved in the fire and is 
assumed to be static without consideration for peak and off peak traffic.  Tunnel traffic is 
assumed to be identical to urban traffic. 
 
Table 8.4 Occupation of Exposure Zones 
Location Zone Radius (m) 
 5 10 15 20 25 
Urban Roadway 36 39 43 49 53 
Sub-Urban Roadway 32 33 35 38 42 
Garage 5 6 8 11 15 
Station 7 8 10 13 17 
Tunnel 36 39 43 49 53 
 
 
8.5.2 Consequence Numerical Results for Fire Scenarios 
The consequence of each fire scenario is determined by combining the effect 
within a certain distance that would cause fatality with the occupancy of the zones with 
this effect.  The effect of each fire scenario outcome is dependent on the distance from 
the source as well.  In the case of thermal radiation, the thermal radiation incident on a 
receptor at a given distance from the source is noted.  The lethality of this flux in terms of 
the percentage fatality expected is noted.  This is multiplied by half of the expected 
occupancy of the zone of interest, to arrive at the fire fatality consequence due to thermal 
flux.  Half of the expected occupancy is used to be conservative in the fatality estimation.  
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A similar procedure is done for explosions and both combined to give the total fire 
fatality for each fire scenario.  The results are summarized in Table 8.5. 
 
 The consequence results along with the frequency of the initiating events 
identified in Part I are important new information developed through this research.  In 
performing a risk analysis, the likelihood of subsequent events is necessary in evaluating 
the pathways from a gaseous release to formation of a type of fire with its attendant 
consequences.  The likelihood of these subsequent events will now be evaluated along 
with development of a risk model to compute the fire fatality risk.  Part III completes this 




Table 8.5 Consequence of Fire Scenarios 
 
Location Fire Scenario 




  Thermal Explosion Thermal Explosion Thermal Explosion Explosion Explosion 
          
Passenger 28 0 28 0 28 0 28 6 Urban 
Roadway Non-Passenger 9 0 13 0 5 18 16 2 
Passenger 28 0 28 0 28 0 28 2 Sub-Urban 
Roadway Non-Passenger 5 0 6 0 1 7 6 2 
Passenger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Garage 
Non-Passenger 5 0 7 0 3 10 8 2 
Passenger 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 Station 
Non-Passenger 8 0 10 0 3 13 6 2 
Passenger 28 0 28 0 28 0 28 6 Tunnel 


















CHAPTER 9:  QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
The quantitative risk assessment develops fire scenarios and consequence 
resulting from the initial release of natural gas from one of the failure modes identified in 
Part 1, the subsequent scenarios and eventually leading to fatalities quantified in Part 2.  
Risk is then computed from the frequency of the initiating events, likelihood of the 
subsequence events leading to a fire and the consequence of each scenario.  The approach 
for risk modeling is summarized in Figure 9.1. 
 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH



















































9.1 Model Description 
The quantitative risk procedure determines the risk by combining the elements of the 
model as follows: 
 Frequency of release of natural gas from leakage or catastrophic rupture from 
a crack originating on the inside, outside or transition region surface.  The 
point estimate and the variance are shown in Tables 7.1 – 7.3. 
 Dispersion and mixing probabilities which would produce a flammable vapor 
cloud. 
 Likelihood of ignition of the flammable vapor cloud immediately with a 
catastrophic release or delayed after dispersion and mixing. 
  Probability of fire and explosion occurring together or separately after 
ignition of the vapor cloud. 
 Location of the bus when the incident is occurring. 
 Consequence of each scenario derived from the fire scenario and the 
expectation for fatalities, shown in Table 8.5. 
 
Each of the subsequent events will now be defined and the probability of occurrence 
investigated. 
 
9.2 Probability of Vapor Cloud Being Flammable 
Dispersion of a pressurized release of natural gas from a cylinder at 3000 psig has 
been found to occur as a dense cloud [142] in the vicinity of the release point.  In a jet 
discharge as from a crack in the cylinder wall, the edges of this cloud would have 
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undergone sufficient mixing to be flammable.  Similarly in a puff discharge from the 
catastrophic rupture of a cylinder the edge of the cloud was found to be flammable. 
Buoyant dispersion and further mixing will occur when the natural gas vapor is heated up 
by ambient air, rendering the entire discharge ignitable. Deterministic approaches were 
used in the fire modeling exercise of Chapter 8 assuming that ignition of a flammable 
cloud had occurred.  The probability of the vapor cloud achieving and remaining 
flammable will now be evaluated. 
 
Atmospheric boundary layer exhibits turbulent fluctuations.  The concentration of 
flammable natural gas vapor released into the atmospheric boundary layer will fluctuate 
around a time averaged mean concentration within the dispersed cloud.  At the edges this 
will fluctuate into and out of the flammable limits of natural gas or 5% at the lower limit 
(LFL) and 14% at the higher level (HFL).  A plot of the cumulative probability of a 
potentially flammable concentration occurring at a given point based on laboratory and 
field experiments by Birch [165] is shown in Figure 9.2.  This curve was plotted from the 
area of the probability density function (PDF) of the concentration variation between the 
static flammable limits, which was found to be directly related to the PDF of turbulent 







Figure 9.2 Probability of Formation of a Flammable Natural Gas Cloud [165] 
 
The curve in Figure 9.2 plots the cumulative probability of a potentially 
flammable concentration as a function of concentration ratio.  It can be seen that when 
the mean concentration equals the LFL, the probability of the cloud being flammable is 
50%.  The flammability probability increases with mean concentration and approaches a 
99% at a mean concentration of about twice the LFL or 10% by volume.  At lower 
concentrations the flammability potential decreases rapidly.  The initial dense cloud 
dispersion ensures that high vapor cloud concentrations are achieved prior to ignition.  
For this analysis a uniform distribution will be used for the probability that the vapor 
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cloud will be flammable, with upper and lower limits for the ratio of mean concentration 
to LFL being 0.4 and 1.6 respectively.  The density function and the cumulative function 
for the uniform distribution is given by 
 
     fl
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0         otherwise
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  (9.2)  
where 
  
x ratio of mean concentration and LFL
a 0.4,  lower limit of ratio






Equations 9.1 and 9.2 will be used to estimate the probability that a fully 
dispersed natural gas vapor cloud could be ignited in the presence of an ignition source. 
 
9.3 Probability of Ignition 
Ignition likelihood is an indicative assessment of the expected occurrence of 
ignition of the natural gas vapor.  The ignition likelihood estimate is cumulative for each 
fire scenario considered.  It is a function of time as well energy available for different 
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types of ignition.  Ignition of the flammable natural gas air mixture in the presence of an 
ignition source depends on the following: 
• Frequency of time the ignition source is present in the immediate area of 
the gas air flammable mixture, expressed in terms of a probability 
assuming a constant rate model, Pi. 
 • Probability that the source exceeds the ignition threshold, Pse. 
• Probability that the configuration between the source and the    mixture 
produces ignition, Pc. 
• Probability that the source is not extinguished by the turbulence created by 
the gas air mixture, Pne. 
 
Natural gas vapor clouds may be ignited by different sources that may be 
continuous or intermittent.  Such sources include engine temperature, traffic lights, a 
lighted cigarette, an activated lighter, electrical sparks or other vehicles.  The ignition 
sources relevant to a natural gas cloud will be analyzed using data from a study of over 
one hundred and fifty potential ignition sources for a natural gas vapor cloud in urban 
areas [167].  The probability of ignition by each source can be expressed as the product 
of the probabilities of the various events or conditions required for ignition identified 
above.  
 
Using rare event approximation and assuming independence of each event of 
condition, the likelihood of ignition by each source is given by 
     ig e se c neP P P P P= × × ×     (9.1) 
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A Fault Tree model shown in Figure 9.2 is used to compute the ignition potential of each 
source as well as the likelihood of ignition of a dispersed natural gas cloud.  Estimation 
of the Fault Tree probabilities will be done using data from [167] and estimates based on 
engineering judgments.   
 
9.3.1 Identification and Analysis of Relevant Ignition Sources 
Potential ignition sources for a gas release from the CNG tank of a typical bus are 
listed as follows: 
 Smoking which includes the lighted cigarette, car lighter and flame lighter. 
 Open fires from any source including other vehicle fire. 
 Electrical system arching  
 Other automobile systems producing high intensity spark. 
  Traffic lights in daytime operations. 
 
The probability in each category of importance for igniting a vapor cloud is shown in 
Table 9.1.  In the case of frequency of occurrence for each source, the probability of 
activation of this source during the dispersion and existence of a vapor cloud is used.  
This probability of activation is determined from the density of each ignition source in 
the specific area under consideration.  This density is very site specific but values for 
urban Boston area [167] is used in the computations.  Probability of activation is different 
for delayed and immediate ignition.  For immediate ignition, the sources have to be 
activated for a longer time and closer to the release point on the cylinder.  This reduces 
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the probability of being activated and the accessibility of the source to the dispersing 
vapor cloud.  The results are shown in Table 9.1   
 
 Ignition potential of each ignition source represents the likelihood of igniting a 
flammable vapor cloud when contact is made with the source.  Two types of ignition are 
possible with natural gas, namely piloted ignition and auto- ignition.  Piloted ignition for 
methane, the major constituent in natural gas, occurs from a source providing 300 Jµ  of 
energy [115].  Sparks produced by each of the sources is well in excess of this and 
therefore the potential for spark ignition in such cases approaches 100%.  Auto-ignition 
temperature of methane is 540 C  [115].  Heated surfaces over which the vapor cloud 
could pass cannot produce this heating effect so auto-ignition of the natural gas cloud is 
not expected to occur.  It should be noted that contaminants in the natural gas could lower 
the conditions for ignition from that of methane.  This effect is not investigated.  To 
compensate for this a low probability is assigned to the ignition potential for a lighted 
cigarette, even though experiments [167] have shown that it did not ignite a flammable 
methane-air vapor cloud of 7% by volume.   
 
An automobile contains other potential ignition sources apart from the electrical 
system [167].  These sources include: 
1. Flashback from the combustion chamber back into the carburetor. 
2. Exhaust of gases still burning as occurs with backfiring. 
3. Reaction inside a catalytic converter. 
4. Friction between the tires and the road and between metal parts.   
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No empirical data exist at present for these ignition sources.  Engineering judgment was 
used to assign a probability to the existence of such sources and the potential for igniting 
a flammable gas cloud.  Only the combination of these other potential ignition sources is 
considered in the analysis.  
 
Table 9.1 Probability Estimates for Applicable Ignition Sources 











 Del. Imm. Del. Imm. Del. Imm. Del. Imm. 
Traffic Light 1.0 0.5 0.24 0.24 0.8 0.05 1 1 
Smoking 0.29 0.29 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 
Lighter 0.14 0.14 1 1 0.5 0.01 1 1 
Vehicle Electrics 1.0 0.2 0.06 0.06 1.0 0.5 1 1.0 
Vehicle Other 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.5 
Open Fires 0.07 0.07 1.0 1.0 0.08 0.02 1.0 1.0 
 
9.3.2 Ignition Likelihood Results 
A Fault Tree model similar to what is typically used to compute the top event in a 
multi-component system is used to estimate the likelihood of delayed and immediate 
ignition.  The contribution of each source is represented by the probabilities computed 
from the events or category associated with each source from Table 9.1. occurring 
simultaneously.  The possibility of simultaneous occurrence of ignition sources is 
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represented by “and” gates on the tree.  The occurrence of any one of the source is 
sufficient to cause ignition of the vapor cloud.  This is represented by “or” gates.  The 
































































































































































































































































































































































9.4 Probability of Explosion of Natural Gas Vapor Cloud 
The probability of a vapor cloud exploding depends on the weight of flammable 
vapor in the cloud [154], [159] and the mass of flammable vapor at which the explosion 
probability is 50%.  In this analysis the latter is conservatively chosen to be 7.7 kg, even 
though bus natural gas explosions have been documented [1] with much less gas in the 
vapor cloud.  The probability relationship may be expressed as [159]: 
 
   
2 1/ 2W0.15 ln
7.7
EP 0.5 1 1 exp
  −     
      = − −        
            (9.2) 
where, 
  
EP Probability of vapor cloud explosion
W kg,  is the weight of flammable vapor in






Current research has not identified significant differences in probability of explosion for 
jet, plume and puff releases of natural gas [159].  Equation 9.2 will therefore be applied 
to jet and puff discharge originating from a crack in a cylinder wall and catastrophic 
rupture respectively.  The probability for each type of release will now be calculated. 
 
9.4.1 Jet Release Explosion Probability 
The volume of flammable vapor above the lower flammable limit in a jet, generated by 
release of natural gas near sonic velocity, from a crack in the wall of the cylinder is given 
by [167]: 
 
    
0.5
1.5 a
0.75 0.75 2 1.25
0
TW 0.178w
k T (LFM) M





w 0.019 kg/s, rate of vapor flow
T 25 C,  initial vapor temperature
T  24 C, ambient air temperature
k 1.307
LFL 5.3%,  lower flammable limit volume fraction







                 (9.4) 
   
Substituting from Equation 9.4 into 9.3 and into 9.2 we get  
     3 3W 1.856x10  m−=         (9.5) 
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JETE
P 0.06=             (9.6) 
 
9.4.2 Puff Release Explosion Probability 
The volume of flammable vapor at concentrations above the lower flammable limit in a 
puff of natural gas generated by the rupture of a CNG cylinder or release by the pressure 
relief device, is given by [168]: 
 








       (9.7)  
where, 
  v
W 7.7 kg,  the total initial mass of  fuel released
LFL 5.3%, lower flammable limit volume fraction
=
=
      (9.8)  
 
Substituting from Equation 9.8 into 9.7 and 9.2 we get 
  
     3W 6.75 m=            (9.9) 
 
     
PUFFE
P 0.42=        (9.10) 
  
9.5 Bus Location 
The number of fatalities from each fire scenario depends on where the bus is 
located.  Five locations are chosen for this analysis representing the full spectrum that a 
typical bus may be found in.  The five vehicle fire locations chosen represents normal 
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usage.  A probability factor, representing the expected length of time that a vehicle is 
expected to be in each location during normal use, is applied in order to normalize the use 
profile.  The probability factor is therefore the unconditional probability that the bus 
could be in that location when the fire scenario contemplated is occurring.  This allows 
determination of the expected fatality in each location.  The locations and probability 
factors are: 
   • Garage or storage facility (0.5). 
 • Fueling station (0.06). 
 • Urban roadway (0.25). 
 • Sub-Urban roadway (0.17). 
 • Tunnel or Bridges (0.02). 
 
9.6 Quantitative Risk Assessment Results 
The consequence the fire for each gas release scenario was multiplied by the 
frequency of occurrence of gas release, with the likelihood of other event leading up to 
that fire scenario, to get the estimated number of fatalities.  The total fire fatality risk is 
arrived at by summing the risk associated with each fire scenario.   
 
The risk results are calculated based on:  
combined gas release
consequence and fire event condequencesRisk  = Frequency Magnitude
unit time unit time combined gas release
 and fire event
  
       ×     
     
        
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The computation was done using event sequence diagrams, with each gas release 
scenario becoming an initiating event.  @ Risk and Precision Tree two codes in the 
Palisade suite of software [169] were used to perform the calculations.  The Event Trees 
are shown in Figure 9.5.  Table 9.2 summarizes the results.   
 
Table 9.2   Quantitative Risk Results 
 
RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Failure Scenario Leading to 














100 M Miles) 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
on inside surface of cylinder. 
5.61 × 10-4 3.34 × 10-4 8.95 × 10-4 8.95 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
on outside surface of cylinder. 
4.89 × 10-4 2.91 × 10-4 7.80 × 10-4 8.13 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
in transition region or ends 
surface of cylinder. 
3.47 × 10-4 2.06 × 10-4 5.53 × 10-4 5.76 
Total Mean Fire Fatality Risk 1.40 × 10-3 8.31 × 10-4 2.23 × 10-3 22.84 
 








9.7 Uncertainty Analysis 
The sources of uncertainty in the results of this study can be classified and characterized 
as follows:  
• Typical bus used to represent all bus configurations, cylinder type and use profile 
(model/completeness uncertainty). 
• Conservatism in the crack density in each cylinder manufactured. 
• Initial crack size distribution and distribution parameter (model/parameter 
uncertainty). 
• Model of crack propagation leading to failure (model uncertainty). 
• Major fire scenarios considered (model/completeness uncertainty). 
• Consequence modeling techniques used (model/ assumption uncertainty) 
• Bus location during the development of a fire scenario. 
• Integration of all scenarios to estimate total risk (model uncertainty) 
 
While model uncertainties are important, due to lack of a sound model uncertainty 
estimation methodology, at this point only the uncertainty in estimating model 
parameters.  Model uncertainties were accounted for by the conservatism used throughout 
the analysis in constructing the models.  
 
 Uncertainty in the frequency of occurrence of leakage and rupture of cylinders 
was evaluated by assuming a normal distribution of the frequency, with mean and 
standard deviations shown in Tables 7.1 – 7.3.   The uncertainty in the likelihood that a 
gas release will be flammable was represented by a uniform distribution, with the limits 
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representing the probability of a jet or puff release of natural gas becoming flammable, at 
the lower and upper flammable limits of methane, based on Figure 9.2.  The uncertainty 
that an explosion will accompany a fire when the gas is ignited was evaluated using a 
lognormal distribution based on the mass of fuel available and the mass of fuel, required 
for an explosion to occur.  This is detailed in Section 9.4.   
 
Uncertainty in the number of fatalities was represented by a lognormal 
distribution with a median value of half of the expected fatality calculated previously.  
An error factor of 6.3 was used representing the range of the worst case fatality scenario 
(0 - 40 fatalities in a secondary fireball scenario in urban areas), with a 90% confidence.  
Other methods such as for reducing the uncertainty in the initial crack distribution using 
Bayesian methods were discussed previously.  
  
Propagation and combination of the uncertainties in the risk analysis were 
performed using the @ Risk code [169].  The propagation of the uncertainties relied on a 
Monte Carlo simulation with Latin Hypercube sampling [170].  The results of the 
uncertainty analysis are summarized in Table 9.3.  Graphical representation of the risk for 








Table 9.3   Quantitative Risk Results 
 
RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Failure Scenario Leading to 









Risk 5%  
(Fatalities/ 
Bus/year) 
Risk 95%  
(Fatalities/ 
Bus/year) 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
on inside surface of cylinder. 
5.56 × 10-3 3.34 × 10-4 6.00 × 10-5 3.10 × 10-3 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
on outside surface of cylinder. 
4.84 × 10-3 2.98 × 10-4 6.00 × 10-5 2.73 × 10-3 
Jet or Puff Release from 
through wall crack and rupture 
due to micro-crack originating 
in transition region or ends 
surface of cylinder. 
3.42 × 10-3 2.21 × 10-4 6.00 × 10-5 3.00 × 10-3 
Total Mean Fire Fatality Risk  1.18 × 10-4 8.83 × 10-3 
 
* Assuming 9598 miles of travel per bus per year 
 
 
Figure 9.5  Risk Uncertainty Results for Initial  Crack on Inside Surface  
Uncertainty Distribution of Risk from Initial Crack  
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Figure 9.6  Risk Uncertainty Results for Initial  Crack on Outside Surface  
 
 
Figure 9.7  Risk Uncertainty Results for Initial  Crack on Transition Surface  
Uncertainty Distribution of Risk from Initial Crack on 
Outside Surface of Cylinder
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9.8     Discussions of Risk Results and Comparison with Diesel  
9.8.1 Overall Risk Results 
The projected mean fatalities from a typical bus due to cylinder failures from 
micro-cracks on the inside surface (the most likely scenario), resulting in an uncontained 
fire and explosion are 3.34×10-4/bus/year.  Considering school buses only, for the 1400 
CNG school buses [171 - 173] in operation in the U.S. in year 2004, this would lead to a 
mean total risk value of approximately 0.46 deaths/year or a mean time to occurrence of 
two years.  If all the existing buses were to be replaced with CNG buses, then the 
projected fatality would be 147 deaths/year. 
 
 The uncertainty in the risk results is dominated by the number of fatalities in each 
fire scenario.  This is expected as the number of persons in each scenario is subject to 
significant variation.  However using an error factor which would give between zero and 
forty fatalities in the worst case scenario for propagating the uncertainty in all fire events, 
the results are orders of magnitude close to the mean values estimated.  The results are 
therefore a credible representation of the fire fatality risk of CNG buses. 
 
It should be noted that some actual cases of CNG related explosions and fire from 
cylinder failures have been recorded.  One such incident was reported in Houston, Texas 
[174] in 1998.  In this case, gradual gas release and delayed ignition resulted in an 
explosion and a subsequent flash fire (no fatalities were reported).  A CNG cylinder 
rupture as a result of accidental impact caused a fireball in Nassau County, NY [175] in 
2001.  Seven individuals were killed in a CNG bus explosion/fire in Tajikistan and four 
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in another accident in San Salvador [176 - 177] in 2001. As such, the evidence of some of 
the scenarios considered in this study has already been observed. 
 
Comparing the historical data and the results of the analysis, the numbers of 
fatalities from CNG bus fires are low, or have not been reported to date in the U. S., this 
is only due to the small number of CNG buses in operation.  Increasing the number of 
such buses will increase the expected number of fatalities due to fires and explosions. 
 
9.8.2  Comparison with Diesel 
Of the 448,000 school buses in operation in year 2004, the large majority of them 
were diesel powered [178 - 179].  The school buses travel approximately 4.3 billion miles 
per year [179].  An average of one hundred and thirty deaths per year is recorded of 
which approximately 10 are school bus passengers and none are directly related to the 
catastrophic fires due to use of the diesel fuel itself.  This approximates to 3 fatalities (fire 
and non-fire causes) per 100-million miles for all, and 0.23 fatalities per 100-million 
miles for bus passengers.  There are about 12,000 injuries (all causes) in these bus 
incidents [179]. 
 
 At present, school buses consume all types of fuels, however, they are dominated 
by the diesel buses (over 95% were diesel in 2004) [173].  Accordingly, one can assume 
that the accident data discussed above can be viewed to a large extent as a representative 
of the diesel bus safety performance. Approximately 3 % of all fatalities are fire fatalities 
of which between 8% and 10%, are school bus passenger fatalities [179].  Accordingly, 
fire risk for diesel bus passengers is 0.0007 fatalities per 100-million miles of travel.  
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Also, considering all fire related fatalities (for bus passengers and others outside of the 
bus who are exposed to the fire), the fire risk for diesel buses would be 0.091 fatalities 
per 100-million miles.   
 
 Comparatively, based on the quantitative analysis done in this study, total mean 
fire risk for CNG buses is 23 per 100-million miles of operation.   This would suggest 
that CNG school buses are subject to fire fatality risk by a factor of 250 larger than that of 
diesel powered buses.  
 
According to this study 63 % of fire related fatalities in CNG buses are projected 
to be bus passengers.  Estimated CNG bus passenger mean risk is 14.4 fatalities per 100-
million miles vs. 23 per two-million miles for total estimated fatalities (bus passengers, 
other affected vehicle passengers, operators and pedestrians).    Therefore, CNG bus 
passengers are estimated to carry a higher risk of explosion and fire fatality.   Comparing 
the same experience for diesel bus passengers (i.e., 0.0007 fatalities per 100-million 
miles), CNG school bus passenger fire fatality risk is four orders of magnitude (20000) 
greater than that of diesel buses.  Explosions due to detonation or deflagration of 
flammable vapor cloud within a bus are a major contributor to this increased risk, which 
is not expected to occur with diesel.   With diesel buses fire is a secondary result of some 
accidents, and happens outside of the bus.   
    
 Corrosion-fatigue is a degradation process of the CNG cylinders.  The small 
number of incidents recorded for CNG buses can be due in part to the small number of 
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such buses in operations and the fact that the average age of buses are well below the 
anticipated 15 years useful life.  This is the reason that this study analytically developed 
the frequency of failure of CNG cylinders from the associated failure mechanisms, rather 
than relying on historical data.  Similarly modeling the consequence of fires was done 
using the most current models of methane fire propagation.  If all school buses are 
replaced by CNG buses, based on this research an increase in fire fatality is projected to 
occur. 
 
9.9     Conclusions  
  This research has contributed to the body of knowledge on CNG vehicles by the 
following: 
 Developing a probabilistic physics of failure model to compliment the existing 
deterministic model available [3 – 4].  This new model identifies important 
features of CNG cylinder crack propagation, where crack growth is dependent on 
cycling due to refilling.  Additionally crack growth will not occur below a stress 
intensity factor of 12 ksi-in2 and rate of crack growth will decrease above 14 – 15 
ksi-in2, due to crack tip blunting and the effect of plasticity at the crack tip. 
 
 A method was developed for estimating the flow rate of natural gas from a 
through wall crack, using crack tip opening displacement methods from fracture 
mechanics.  This enabled the calculation of release velocity and the propensity for 
sustaining a jet flame.  The results were consistent with experimental 
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determination of maximum release velocity from a circular orifice for sustaining a 
jet flame. 
 
 A tractable determination of the consequence of each fire scenario was 
accomplished but using analytical methods to estimate thermal and explosive 
outcomes from fire scenarios and their effects.  The most current models for 
evaluating fireballs and unconfined vapor cloud fires were used.   
 
 Fire fatality risk of CNG buses have been estimated for the first time, taking into 
account all the subsequent events required to develop a fire or explosion.  An 
approximation of the uncertainty in the risk results has also been completed.  
 
The results of this research have shown that CNG buses are more susceptible to 
major fires and explosions than diesel powered buses.  The estimated fire risks for all 
fatalities are two orders of magnitude greater.  Passengers risk is estimated to be higher 
than the overall estimated risk.  Previous study of CNG bus risk using generic models and 
failure data underestimated the risk especially for passengers.  This is mainly because of 
the approximate methods used to estimate the heat flux generated and the consequence of 
explosions ignored.  The results using the physics of failure modeling and analytic 
analysis of fire scenarios is expected to be more accurate.  Explosion effects are included 
in this detailed study which was not accounted for in the simplified approaches used 
previously to determine fire fatality risk.  The results in this detailed analysis supports the 
conclusions arrived at in the previous analysis, as they are within the margins of error for 
the overall risk.  
 
 346
CHAPTER 10:  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To compare the results of CNG risk with other technologies, the risk assessment 
should add risk of non-fatal injuries in addition to fatalities from all the major sources of 
risk unique to this technology.  For any policy decision making, the fire risk should be 
compensated for and properly characterized by integrating the safety risks of this study 
and the expected health and environmental benefits of using CNG powered school buses.  
The results from this analysis could be used in any such holistic risk assessment. 
 
This research estimated the fire fatality risk as a result of thermal radiation and 
explosion effects, by developing an analytical model of the predominant failure 
mechanism, in estimating the frequency of release of natural gas due to a cylinder failure.  
Modeling of the dispersion and dynamics of resulting fires was done using the most 
current research in modeling of methane or natural gas fires.  A number of simplifying 
assumptions were made in the computation procedures and various sources of uncertainty 
exist in the modeling exercise.  Future research has to be conducted in analyzing the 
uncertainties and the sensitivity of the results to some of the assumptions.  Specific 
recommendations to how the results may be improved are now itemized as follows: 
 
• The frequency of the initiating events was computed for steel cylinders only.  
Similar models of the degradation process of all the other types of cylinders 
should be developed and used to calculate the risk.  The overall risk would 
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then be estimated by weighting the proportion of cylinders of the different 
types that are found in the bus population. 
 
• A generic initial crack size distribution was developed and used in estimating 
the number of cycles to failure.  Data from the cylinder manufacturers should 
be used to estimate the initial crack depth distribution.  Additionally the 
distribution of crack shapes (crack aspect ratio) should be determined and a 
joint distribution of crack depth and aspect ration be used in the analysis 
instead of the marginal crack depth distribution. 
 
• The density of cracks in each section of the cylinder should be determined 
from actual data.  This density can then be used to compute the probability of 
existence of a crack on the inside, outside and ends of each cylinder. 
 
• Exponential and Poisson distributions were assumed for the crack size and 
occurrence in the cylinder, respectively.  The validity of these distributions 
should be determined from actual data.  The uncertainty in the risk results and 
sensitivity to using other distributions should be analyzed. 
 
• Each crack was assumed to grow independently through the wall of the 
cylinder without any interaction or cracks coalescing.   This is a conservative 
approach which should be relaxed and the likelihood cracks interacting and 




• A fixed number of iterations and crack growth increments were implemented 
in the algorithm developed for computing the number of cycles to failure.  
Analysis of the sensitivity of the results to the number of iterations, and crack 
growth increments is imperative.  A method of incorporating this uncertainty 
in the overall risk result has to be developed. 
 
• The number of cycles to leakage or rupture was predicated on the assumed 
number of cycles of 15,000 during normal usage in estimated during a lifetime 
of ten to fifteen years.  Uncertainty analysis should be performed on the risk 
result based on the use profile being different from the above assumption. 
 
• Uncertainty of fracture toughness of cylinder material can have the most 
impact on the cycles to catastrophic failure by brittle rupture.  The uncertainty 
in the fracture toughness is governed by the ductile to brittle transition 
temperature (DBTT) of the cylinder steels and the use profile of the buses.  
Sufficient data was not available to develop a distribution of the variation of 
KIC with temperature.  Additionally the temperature distribution of CNG buses 
has to be developed and the uncertainty of the frequency of rupture evaluated.  
This is an imperative as the buses may be operated in climates below DBTT.  
 
• Ignition likelihoods were estimated from data [167] available on Boston, 
Massachusetts and its environments for a typical urban and sub-urban area.  
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The uncertainty of the availability of such ignition sources and their ability to 
ignite a flammable vapor cloud should be investigated, for other areas of the 
US where large populations of CNG buses are located. 
 
• The number of fatality associated with each fire scenario was calculated based 
on the thermal radiation produced, explosive overpressure produced, 
explosion equivalent TNT mass and occupation of the exposure zones.  Some 
attempt was made to reducing this uncertainty and quantifying its effect on the 
overall results.  Further analysis is required for each individual scenario and 
its various outcomes.  This analysis should focus on using other population 
and vehicle demographics in deriving the occupation of the exposure zones. 
 
• The sensitivity of the overall result to each component in the risk model 
should be analyzed.  Based on the result of this analysis further uncertainty 
analysis should be performed on the most sensitive components.  In this way 
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